International Coordination Of National Stabilization Policies

As cross-border transactions and economic integration among nations have increased, formerly neglected differences among the domestic economic policies of nations have become progressively exposed to international scrutiny. National governments trying to pursue autonomous polices have found their decisions more difficult and the consequences of their decisions more uncertain. These trends have in turn provoked debate about whether governments should cooperate more fully when making their policy decisions. In this book, part of the Integrating National Economies series, Ralph A. Bryant considers how much national governments might benefit from coordination of their macroeconomic stabilization polices, the circumstances in which they might cooperation; and how ambitious that cooperation should be. Bryant argues that the potential benefits of attempted coordination are often greater than the potential risks. When national decisionmakers take into account the cross-border spillovers of their actions, and especially if the are prepared to consider mutually beneficial adjustments of their policy instruments, each cooperating nation may be able to attain higher levels of welfare. Bryant discusses circumstances in which efforts to coordinate could prove counterproductive. On the whole, however, he contends that efforts to coordinate policies internationally typically deserve examination and, frequently, can be expected to advance the common interests of nations' citizens. Bryant identifies and analyzes different forms of intergovernmental cooperation for monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies. One of the contributors of the book compares and evaluates three different analytical perspectives: the traditional policy-optimization approach favored by economists, the rule analysis of international regime environments, and the institutional analysis developed by scholars of international relations and political science. The book concludes with an o

As cross-border transactions and economic integration among nations have increased, formerly neglected differences among the domestic economic policies of nations have become progressively exposed to international scrutiny. National governments trying to pursue autonomous polices have found their decisions more difficult and the consequences of their decisions more uncertain. These trends have in turn provoked debate about whether governments should cooperate more fully when making their policy decisions. In this book, part of the Integrating National Economies series, Ralph A. Bryant considers how much national governments might benefit from coordination of their macroeconomic stabilization polices, the circumstances in which they might cooperation; and how ambitious that cooperation should be. Bryant argues that the potential benefits of attempted coordination are often greater than the potential risks. When national decisionmakers take into account the cross-border spillovers of their actions, and especially if the are prepared to consider mutually beneficial adjustments of their policy instruments, each cooperating nation may be able to attain higher levels of welfare. Bryant discusses circumstances in which efforts to coordinate could prove counterproductive. On the whole, however, he contends that efforts to coordinate policies internationally typically deserve examination and, frequently, can be expected to advance the common interests of nations' citizens. Bryant identifies and analyzes different forms of intergovernmental cooperation for monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies. One of the contributors of the book compares and evaluates three different analytical perspectives: the traditional policy-optimization approach favored by economists, the rule analysis of international regime environments, and the institutional analysis developed by scholars of international relations and political science. The book concludes with an o

"The conference was organized by the three editors of this book and took place on August 15-16, 2012 in Seattle."--Preface.

Recently, monetary authorities have increasingly focused on implementing policies to ensure price stability and strengthen central bank independence. Simultaneously, in the fiscal area, market development has allowed public debt managers to focus more on cost minimization. This “divorce” of monetary and debt management functions in no way lessens the need for effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policy if overall economic performance is to be optimized and maintained in the long term. This paper analyzes these issues based on a review of the relevant literature and of country experiences from an institutional and operational perspective.

Since the end of the Great Recession in 2009 the central banks of the advanced countries have taken unprecedented actions to reflate and stimulate their economies. There have been significant differences in the timing and pace of these actions. These independent monetary policy actions have had significant spillover effects on the economies and monetary policy strategies of other advanced countries. In addition the monetary policy actions and interventions of the advanced countries have had a significant impact on the emerging market economies leading to the charge of 'currency wars.' The perceived negative consequences of spillovers from the actions of national central banks has led to calls for international monetary policy coordination. The arguments for coordination based on game theory are the same today as back in the 1980s, which led to accords which required that participant countries follow policies to improve global welfare at the expense of domestic fundamentals. This led to disastrous consequences. An alternative approach to the international spillovers of national monetary policy actions is to view them as deviations from rules based monetary policy.

The launch of European Monetary Union (EMU) marked the beginning of a new era, and its establishment has proved an impressive success at the technical, legal, and procedural level. After all, EMU has accelerated economic and political integration in the European Union and tied the economies of the Member States closer together. However, the performance of the euro, high unemployment rates, uneven output and investment growth, and the issue of structural reforms that have yet to be tackled have raised questions about the performance of EMU in practice. There is a general consensus on the justification for economic policy coordination. The existing literature on economic policy coordination, however, seems far from able to provide robust conclusions about how to organize the necessary interaction of institutions and policies. Therefore, there seems to be a case for re-examining the subject under the new framework set by EMU. The objective of such a reassessment is to enhance the understanding of what type of coordination and what institutional setting for policy coordination can be expected to be most favorable. Challenges for Economic Policy Coordination within European Monetary Union provides an intellectually stimulating contribution to the ongoing debate.

This book studies the international coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in the world economy. It carefully discusses the process of policy competition and the structure of policy cooperation. As to policy competition, the focus is on monetary and fiscal competition between Europe and America. Similarly, as to policy cooperation, the focus is on monetary and fiscal cooperation between Europe and America. The spillover effects of monetary policy are negative while the spillover effects of fiscal policy are positive. The policy targets are price stability and full employment. The policy makers follow either cold-turkey or gradualist strategies. Policy expectations are adaptive or rational. The world economy consists of two, three or more regions. The present book is part of a larger research project on European Monetary Union, see the references at the back of the book. Some parts of this project were presented at the World Congress of the International Economic Association in Lisbon. Other parts were presented at the International Institute of Public Finance, at the Macro Study Group of the German Economic Association, at the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association, at the Gottingen Workshop on International Economics, at the Halle Workshop on Monetary Economics, at the Research Seminar on Macroeconomics in Freiburg, and at the Passau Workshop on International Economics.

"A readable, balanced, and provocative view of the prospects for fruitful international economic cooperation. The papers are realistic: each discusses the difficulties involved in reaching cooperative solutions or procedures as well as the benefits of doing so. The discussion among the conference participants is lively, interesting, and insightful."--William H. Branson, Princeton University