International Intervention And The Use Of Force Military And Police Roles

Intervening states apply different approaches to the use force in war-torn countries. Calibrating the use of force according to the situation on the ground requires a convergence of military and police roles: soldiers have to be able to scale down, and police officers to scale up their use of force. In practice, intervening states display widely differing abilities to demonstrate such versatility. This paper argues that these differences are shaped by how the domestic institutions of sending states mediate between demands for versatile force and their own intervention practices. It considers the use of force by Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States in three contexts of international intervention: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The paper highlights quite different responses to security problems as varied as insurgency, terrorism, organised crime and riots. This analysis offers important lessons. Those planning and implementing international interventions should take into account differences in the use of force. At the same time, moving towards versatile force profoundly changes the characteristics of security forces and may increase their short-term risks. This difficulty points to a key message emerging from this paper: effective, sustainable support to states emerging from conflict will only be feasible if intervening states reform their own security policies and practices.

This book explores the large and controversial subject of the use of force in international law. It examines not only the use of force by states but also the role of the UN in peacekeeping and enforcement action, and the increasing role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN Charter framework is under challenge. Russia's invasion of Georgia and intervention in Ukraine, the USA's military operations in Syria, and Saudi Arabia's campaign to restore the government of Yemen by force all raise questions about the law on intervention. The 'war on terror' that began after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA has not been won. It has spread far beyond Afghanistan: it has led to targeted killings in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, and to intervention against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Is there an expanding right of self-defence against non-state actors? Is the use of force effective? The development of nuclear weapons by North Korea has reignited discussion about the legality of pre-emptive self-defence. The NATO-led operation in Libya increased hopes for the implementation of 'responsibility to protect', but it also provoked criticism for exceeding the Security Council's authorization of force because its outcome was regime change. UN peacekeeping faces new challenges, especially with regard to the protection of civilians, and UN forces have been given revolutionary mandates in several African states. But the 2015 report Uniting Our Strengths reaffirmed that UN peacekeeping is not suited to counter-terrorism or enforcement operations; the UN should turn to regional organizations such as the African Union as first responders in situations of ongoing armed conflict.

After war, police forces are often unable or unwilling to put pressure on suspected war criminals, organized crime groups, and other spoilers of sustainable peace. This book sheds light on the role of international military forces in post-conflict law enforcement. Drawing on numerous interviews, it shows that EU and NATO military forces have not systematically fought serious crime in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. International actors need to better balance their own interests as well as the requirement to separate military and police functions with the urgent need to protect individuals in war-torn countries. The policy recommendations in the book are aimed at contributing to more effective, efficient, and legitimate peace operations in the Balkans and beyond.

Responsibility to Protect: Research, bibliography, background. Supplementary volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

Richard Haass traces the evolution of thinking about force from medieval times to our own, taking into account new technologies, new states, new weapons, and new ideas about sovereignty and intervention. Using twelve case studies drawn from recent experiences - including Bosnia, Somalia, Panama, Grenada, Haiti and the Gulf War - he sets forth realistic political and military guidelines for U.S. military interventions ranging from peacekeeping and humanitarian operations to preventive strikes and all-out warfare. Haass then discusses how past interventions could have turned out if these guidelines had been observed. Last, he assesses where and how the United States should be prepared to use force in the future - in the Persian Gulf, the Korean Peninsula, Eastern Europe and in other situations around the world where strategic or humanitarian interests warrant.

When can a state give political support to a military intervention in another state? The Government of the Netherlands commissioned an Expert Group to examine this complex, topical and time-sensitive question and to consider whether it should press for international acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a new legal basis for the use of force between states in exceptional circumstances. This volume is the result of those efforts. The Expert Group was led by Professor Cyrille Fijjnaut and consisted of Mr. Kristian Fischer, Professor Terry Gill, Professor Larissa van den Herik, Professor Martti Koskenniemi, Professor Claus Kreß, Mr. Robert Serry, Ms. Monika Sie Dhian Ho, Ms. Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Professor Rob de Wijk. Their thorough analysis and recommendations offer important insights that can aid governments in formulating a position on political support for the use of force between states and humanitarian intervention. The volume also constitutes a useful tool for scholars and practitioners in considering these difficult and important issues.