Interpretation And Social Knowledge

For the past fifty years anxiety over naturalism has driven debates in social theory. One side sees social science as another kind of natural science, while the other rejects the possibility of objective and explanatory knowledge. Interpretation and Social Knowledge suggests a different route, offering a way forward for an antinaturalist sociology that overcomes the opposition between interpretation and explanation and uses theory to build concrete, historically specific causal explanations of social phenomena.

For the past fifty years anxiety over naturalism has driven debates in social theory. One side sees social science as another kind of natural science, while the other rejects the possibility of objective and explanatory knowledge. Interpretation and Social Knowledge suggests a different route, offering a way forward for an antinaturalist sociology that overcomes the opposition between interpretation and explanation and uses theory to build concrete, historically specific causal explanations of social phenomena.

This book discusses the question of whether legal interpretation is a scientific activity. The law’s dependency on language, at least for the usual communication purposes, not only makes legal interpretation the main task performed by those whose work involves the law, but also an unavoidable step in the process of resolving a legal case. This task of decoding the words and sentences used by normative authorities while enacting norms, carried out in compliance with the principles and rules of the natural language adopted, is prone to all of the difficulties stemming from the uncertainty intrinsic to all linguistic conventions. In this context, seeking to determine whether legal interpretation can be scientific or, in other words, can comply with the requirements for scientific knowledge, becomes a central question. In fact, the coherent application of the law depends on a knowledge regarding the meaning of normative sentences that can be classified (at least) as being structured, systematically organized and tendentially objective. Accordingly, this book focuses on analyzing precisely these problems; its respective contributions offer a range of revealing perspectives on both the problems and their ramifications.

In succinct and engaging fashion Michael Walzer demystifies the activity of the social critic, providing a philosophical framework for understanding social criticism as social practice.

Conventional wisdom has it that the sciences, properly pursued, constitute a pure, value-free method of obtaining knowledge about the natural world. In light of the social and normative dimensions of many scientific debates, Helen Longino finds that general accounts of scientific methodology cannot support this common belief. Focusing on the notion of evidence, the author argues that a methodology powerful enough to account for theories of any scope and depth is incapable of ruling out the influence of social and cultural values in the very structuring of knowledge. The objectivity of scientific inquiry can nevertheless be maintained, she proposes, by understanding scientific inquiry as a social rather than an individual process. Seeking to open a dialogue between methodologists and social critics of the sciences, Longino develops this concept of "contextual empiricism" in an analysis of research programs that have drawn criticism from feminists. Examining theories of human evolution and of prenatal hormonal determination of "gender-role" behavior, of sex differences in cognition, and of sexual orientation, the author shows how assumptions laden with social values affect the description, presentation, and interpretation of data. In particular, Longino argues that research on the hormonal basis of "sex-differentiated behavior" involves assumptions not only about gender relations but also about human action and agency. She concludes with a discussion of the relation between science, values, and ideology, based on the work of Habermas, Foucault, Keller, and Haraway.

Humans have an extraordinary capability to combine different types of information in a single meaningful interpretation. The quickness with which interpretation processes evolve suggests the existence of a uniform procedure for all domains. In this book the authors suggest that such a procedure can be found. They concentrate on the introduction of a theory of interpretation, and they define a model that enables a meaningful representation of knowledge, based on a dynamic view of information and a cognitive model of human information processing. The book consists of three parts. The first part focuses on the properties of signs and sign interpretation; in the second part the authors introduce a model that complies with the conditions for sign processing set by the first part; and in the third part they examine applications of their model in the domain of logic, natural language, reasoning and mathematics. Finally they show how these domains pop up as perspectives in an overall model of knowledge representation. The reader is assumed to have some interest in human information processing and knowledge modeling. Natural language is considered in the obvious sense, familiarity with linguistic theories is not required. Sign theoretical concepts are restricted to a manageable subset, which is introduced gently. Finally, some familiarity with basic concepts of propositional and syllogistic logic may be useful.

'Interpretation' is used as an umbrella for bringing together a wide range of concepts and developments in the philosophy of social science that provide the foundation for clear thinking about social phenomena. In his new book, John O’Shaughnessy familiarises the reader with the nature of interpretation and its importance in social life, decision making in social science enquiries and consumer marketing, thus offering a multidisciplinary approach to problems of bias and uncertainty. Thus, this book is novel in its outlook and comprehensive in its approach. Whereas past studies in interpretation have focused on hermeneutical methods, O’Shaughnessy goes further considering the role of interpretation in social interactions, in undertaking scientific work, in the use of statistics, in causal analysis, in consumer evaluations of products and artifacts and in interpreting problematic situations together with the corresponding biases arising from emotional happiness and the concepts employed.

Henderson examines the foundations of an analytic social science approach to develop a well-integrated account of the human sciences, focusing on the pivotal notions of interpretation and explanation. The author acknowledges the importance of interpretive understanding in the human sciences, and proposes a methodology that reflects both interpretive practice as well as scientific methodology. He refutes the methodological separatists who hold that the logic of explanation and testing in the human sciences is fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences, and examines in detail the constraints on interpretation. In providing an integrated treatment of these two central issues in social science, Henderson offers a thorough analysis of the adequacy of interpretation and the nature of explanation in the human sciences.