Intuition Theory And Anti Theory In Ethics

What form, or forms, might ethical knowledge take? In particular, can ethical knowledge take the form either of moral theory, or of moral intuition? If it can, should it? A team of experts explore these central questions for ethics, and present a diverse range of perspectives on the discussion.

This volume documents a movement from theory and rules in ethics to an account of morality based on local practice and perception of the particular case. The Introduction lays the foundation for this position, then the authors draw from the analytic tradition as they forcefully argue against theory derived from different philosophical ancestors. In the second half they examine moral conservatism, exhibiting how placing moral practice as primary does not restrict one to any form of political conservatism.

Many well known philosophers defend the role of theory in ethics. They suppose that it is impossible to justify the moral rules and principles we live by without a theory being in place. They also argue that theorizing is needed in order to rationally generate new or modify old rules and principles. Anti-theorists argue that theories in ethics oversimplify matters and only give the appearance of being useful. The debate between the two sides seems not to be resolvable.

What form, or forms, might ethical knowledge take? In particular, can ethical knowledge take the form either of moral theory, or of moral intuition? If it can, should it? These are central questions for ethics today, and they are the central questions for the philosophical essays collected in this volume. Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory in Ethics draws together new work by leading experts in the field, in order to represent as many different perspectives on the discussion as possible. The volume is not built upon any kind of tidy consensus about what 'knowledge', 'theory', and 'intuition' mean. Rather, the idea is to explore as many as possible of the different things that knowledge, theory, and intuition could be in ethics.

This book represents the most comprehensive account to date of an important but widely contested approach to ethics--intuitionism, the view that there is a plurality of moral principles, each of which we can know directly. Robert Audi casts intuitionism in a form that provides a major alternative to the more familiar ethical perspectives (utilitarian, Kantian, and Aristotelian). He introduces intuitionism in its historical context and clarifies--and improves and defends--W. D. Ross's influential formulation. Bringing Ross out from under the shadow of G. E. Moore, he puts a reconstructed version of Rossian intuitionism on the map as a full-scale, plausible contemporary theory. A major contribution of the book is its integration of Rossian intuitionism with Kantian ethics; this yields a view with advantages over other intuitionist theories (including Ross's) and over Kantian ethics taken alone. Audi proceeds to anchor Kantian intuitionism in a pluralistic theory of value, leading to an account of the perennially debated relation between the right and the good. Finally, he sets out the standards of conduct the theory affirms and shows how the theory can help guide concrete moral judgment. The Good in the Right is a self-contained original contribution, but readers interested in ethics or its history will find numerous connections with classical and contemporary literature. Written with clarity and concreteness, and with examples for every major point, it provides an ethical theory that is both intellectually cogent and plausible in application to moral problems.

A defence of ethical intuitionism where (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know these through an immediate, intellectual awareness, or 'intuition'; and (iii) knowing them gives us reasons to act independent of our desires. The author rebuts the major objections to this theory and shows the difficulties in alternative theories of ethics.

"This is a timely collection of important papers. It gives focus to a new development in moral philosophy, by defining the problems it addresses, by identifying the similarities and differences among various representatives, and by articulating the common themes which run through the works of these people." -- John Kekes "The book reveals an underlying unity to what might at first appear to be a diverse body of literature. The first section on "Anti-theory in Ethics" collects all of the most important contributions to the growing skepticism about moral theory as it is currently practiced. In itself it would make an interesting and useful collection. By combining it with the second section on moral conservatism, the editors reveal that the implications of the anti-theorists' arguments are not merely negative, and extend beyond the confines of methodological disputes in academic philosophy. The essays in part two both discuss moral conservatism and exemplify it; in so doing they reveal that attempting to build comprehensive theories is not the only way in which moral philosophy can be both rigorous and critical." -- Arthur Ripstein This volume documents a movement from theory and rules in ethics to an account of morality based on local practice and perception of the particular case. The Introduction lays the foundation for this position, then the authors draw from the analytic tradition as they forcefully argue against theory derived from different philosophical ancestors. In the second half they examine moral conservatism, exhibiting how placing moral practice as primary does not restrict one to any form of political conservatism.