Investigating Corruption In The Afghan Police Force

Based on unprecedented empirical research, this book assesses how institutional legacy and external intervention have shaped the structural conditions of corruption in the Afghan police force and state. Filling a major gap in the literature, this is an invaluable contribution to the literature and to anti-corruption policy in developing states.

Introduction -- The Afghan National Police -- Key reasons for ANP shortcomings -- Conclusions and recommendations.

Based on unprecedented empirical research conducted with lower levels of the Afghan police, this unique study assesses how institutional legacy and external intervention, from countries including the UK and the US, have shaped the structural conditions of corruption in the police force and the state. Taking a social constructivist approach, the book combines an in-depth analysis of internal political, cultural and economic drivers with references to several regime changes affecting policing and security, from the Soviet occupation and Mujahidin militias to Taliban religious police. Crossing disciplinary boundaries, Singh offers an invaluable contribution to the literature and to anti-corruption policy in developing and conflict-affected societies.

A Washington Post Best Book of 2021 ​The #1 New York Times bestselling investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about America’s longest war, foreshadowing the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, by Washington Post reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist Craig Whitlock. Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support. At first, the goals were straightforward and clear: defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11. Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power, the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives. Distracted by the war in Iraq, the US military become mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand. But no president wanted to admit failure, especially in a war that began as a just cause. Instead, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress, even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory. Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam, The Afghanistan Papers contains “fast-paced and vivid” (The New York Times Book Review) revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines. In unvarnished language, they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess, that the nation-building project was a colossal failure, and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government. All told, the account is based on interviews with more than 1,000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted, and sometimes entirely fabricated, version of the facts on the ground. Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to meet with him. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are.” His successor, Robert Gates, said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda.” The Afghanistan Papers is a “searing indictment of the deceit, blunders, and hubris of senior military and civilian officials” (Tom Bowman, NRP Pentagon Correspondent) that will supercharge a long-overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered.

We will call to order the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for a hearing on Afghan National Security Forces, specifically looking at Afghan corruption and the development of an effective fighting force. This afternoon we have before us a panel of experts to provide testimony about how corruption in Afghanistan might impede the development of that nation's security forces. Corruption could prevent army and police units from successfully assuming the responsibility for securing Afghanistan from internal and external threats after 2014. Corruption also potentially reduces the operational effectiveness of security forces and jeopardizes their legitimacy with their population. In order for the United States to achieve its strategic goal of denying terrorists safe haven in Afghanistan, it is essential that Afghan forces be capable of maintaining security and stability after transition is complete in 2014.

Mr. WITTMAN. Ladies and gentleman, thank you all so much. We will call to order the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for a hearing on Afghan National Security Forces, specifically looking at Afghan corruption and the development of an effective fighting force. I want to welcome folks today as our subcommittee convenes the fifth and final hearing in our series related to the Afghan National Security Forces. This afternoon we have before us a panel of experts to provide testimony about how corruption in Afghanistan might impede the development of that nation's security forces. Corruption could prevent army and police units from successfully assuming the responsibility for securing Afghanistan from internal and external threats after 2014. Corruption also potentially reduces the operational effectiveness of security forces and jeopardizes their legitimacy with their population. In order for the United States to achieve its strategic goal of denying terrorists safe haven in Afghanistan, it is essential that Afghan forces be capable of maintaining security and stability after transition is complete in 2014. Our purpose today is not to undertake a comprehensive assessment of corruption in the region, but instead to narrowly focus on how corruption affects the development of an effective Afghan army and police. Our panel today includes retired Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War; Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Foreign Policy Study Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Dr. Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. Thank you for your participation today. We appreciate you taking your time and we look forward to your testimony.

Afghan National Security Forces : Afghan corruption and the development of an effective fighting force : hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, second session, hearing held August 2, 2012.