Israel And The Western Powers 1952 1960

In this study, Zach Levey provides a comprehensive analysis of the development of Israel's foreign policy during the critical years of the 1950s, focusing particularly on relations between the Jewish state and the three Western powers involved in the Middle East arms race--the United States, Great Britain, and France. Drawing extensively on recently declassified archival materials, Levey challenges traditional accounts of the nature and success of Israel's policy goals. By 1950 Israel's primary foreign policy objective was the creation of a bilateral strategic relationship with the United States. The country's leaders failed to achieve that goal, though, even after the Suez-Sinai campaigns of 1956. According to Levey, it was this failure that motivated Israel to cultivate ties with the West's other leading powers, France and Britain. But cooperation with these countries was not the outgrowth of a gradually developing strategic understanding with either one, he argues. Instead, Israel viewed its French and British connections only as temporary substitutes for the desired eventual arrangement with the United States. Originally published in 1997. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

This book focuses on the bilateral and multilateral relations between Britain, the 'former proprietor' and Israel, the 'successor state', during the period following their armed clash in January 1949, to Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza and the Sinai in March 1957. It highlights the formulation of foreign policy decisions in Britain and Israel; Britain's special responsibility and influence, which affected Israel's relations with neighbouring Arab states; Israel's complex policy towards Britain; Anglo-Jewry's attitude towards Israel and the distinctive relationship between Israel's embassy in London and the Jewish community.

This volume seeks to reconstruct the process by which the Kennedy administration decided to sell to Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles. It argues that both domestic considerations and political calculations were part of a highly complex decision made by members of Washington's high policy elite.

Uri Bialer lays a foundation for understanding the principal aspects of Israeli foreign policy from the early days of the state's existence to the Oslo Accords. He presents a synthetic reading of sources, many of which are recently declassified official documents, to cover Israeli foreign policy over a broad chronological expanse. Bialer focuses on the objectives of Israel's foreign policy and its actualization, especially as it concerned immigration policy, oil resources, and the procurement of armaments. In addition to identifying important state actors, Bialer highlights the many figures who had no defined diplomatic roles but were influential in establishing foreign policy goals. He shows how foreign policy was essential to the political, economic, and social well-being of the state and how it helped to deal with Israel's most intractable problem, the resolution of the conflict with Arab states and the Palestinians.

This book presents a synthesis of strategic planning and diplomacy in the Middle East during a critical period The book explains the pivotal role that the young State of Israel played in Middle East politics Will appeal to students of strategy, middle eastern politics and military history.

For over 60 years, Israel’s foreign policy establishment has looked at its regional policy through the lens of a geopolitical concept named "the periphery doctrine." The idea posited that due to the fundamental hostility of neighboring Arab countries, Israel ought to counterbalance this threat by engaging with the "periphery" of the Arab world through clandestine diplomacy. Based on original research in the Israeli diplomatic archives and interviews with key past and present decision-makers, this book shows that this concept of a periphery was, and remains, a core driver of Israel’s foreign policy. The periphery was borne out of the debates among Zionist circles concerning the geopolitics of the nascent Israeli State. The evidence from Israel’s contemporary policies shows that these principles survived the historical relationships with some countries (Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia) and were emulated in other cases: Azerbaijan, Greece, South Sudan, and even to a certain extent in the attempted exchanges by Israel with Gulf Arab kingdoms. The book enables readers to understand Israel’s pessimistic – or realist, in the traditional sense – philosophy when it comes to the conduct of foreign policy. The history of the periphery doctrine sheds light on fundamental issues, such as Israel’s role in the regional security system, its overreliance on military and intelligence cooperation as tools of diplomacy, and finally its enduring perception of inextricable isolation. Through a detailed appraisal of Israel’s periphery doctrine from its birth in the fifties until its contemporary renaissance, this book offers a new perspective on Israel’s foreign policy, and will appeal to students and scholars of Middle East Politics and History, and International Relations.

Since the Sinai campaign, France had been Israel's ally, providing advanced weapons and granting political support and economic aid. When Charles de Gaulle returned to lead France in 1958 during the Algerian War, Israeli leadership faced a challenge to maintain the friendship in light of the President's insistence on re-establishing French influence in the Arab world. This book discusses their efforts and examines de Gaulle's uncompromising pursuit of French grandeur and the ramifications of this for the State of Israel.

Relations between the new state of Israel and the European Union in the first twenty years of the Community’s existence were a major policy issue given the background of the Holocaust and the way the new nation was established. This book focuses on Israel-European Community relations from 1957 to 1975 - from the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957), which officially established the Common Market, to the conclusion of Israel’s Free Trade Agreement with the Community. It reveals a new and key facet of Israeli diplomacy during the country's infancy, joining the many studies concerning Israel's relations with the United States, France, Germany and Britain.