Israel S Lebanon War

From Simon & Schuster, Israel's Lebanon War is the first and only complete inside account of a disastrous military adventure and its ongoing consequences. A detailed narrative by two Israeli journalists on the origins, conduct, and political repercussions of the Lebanon war, based on previously unreleased documents and interviews with high officials.

This is the first comprehensive account of the progression of the Second Lebanese War, from the border abduction of an Israeli soldier on the morning of July 12, 2006, through the hasty decision for an aggressive response; the fateful discussions in the Cabinet and the senior Israeli command; to the heavy fighting in south Lebanon and the raging diplomatic battles in Paris, Washington and New York. The book answers the following questions: has Israel learned the right lessons from this failed military confrontation? What can Western countries learn from the IDF's failure against a fundamentalist Islamic terror organization? And what role did Iran and Syria play in this affair? 34 Days delivers the first blow-by-blow account of the Lebanon war and new insights for the future of the region and its effects on the West.

Cathy Sultan combines vital history and vivid personal interviews to relate the lives of the oft-ignored civilians of southern Lebanon and northern Israel during the July war of 2006 and its aftermath. She documents how thousands of area residents have been victimized by the hawkish, shortsighted policy decisions of Israel, Lebanon and the United States. Throughout the book, these narratives of mothers, soldiers, activists and ambulance drivers on both sides are memorable for their detail, honesty and the deep sense of tragedy they relate.Tragedy in South Lebanon also addresses the media treatment of the war, systematically dispelling common myths about the region perpetuated by government and main-stream sources. Sultan discusses how divisive factions within the current Lebanese government leave the country teetering on the brink of yet more violence, imploring government officials on all sides to act with foresight, compassion and responsibility. Features include a chronology of Lebanese history, maps depicting wartime activity and a glossary of Middle Eastern terms.

Despite the bitter conflict that divided Jerusalem and Damascus, a fascinating process of indirect – through the United States – and tacit understandings emerged with regard to Lebanon in the 1970s. This derived largely from the Israeli deterrence posture which held in check Syrian military involvement in Lebanon. This book, first published in 1987, traces the development of the Israeli and Syrian involvement in Lebanon between 1975 and 1985, and of the deterrence dialogue which evolved between them. It also places this dialogue within the larger context of the overall Israeli-Syrian deterrence equation. War and Intervention in Lebanon is a fascinating and relevant work, of great value to those with an interest in International Relations and Middle Eastern history, politics and diplomacy.

Contents: Introduction; Chapter 1. Hard Lessons Learned: ¿Training, Training and Training as Well as Innovative Thinking¿: The IDF Response to the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War; Hezbollah; The Gaza Conflict; Conclusion; Chapter 2. Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics: Introduction; Application of the PMESII+PT Variables; Hamas and Hezbollah; Political; Military; Economic; Social; Infrastructure; Information; Physical Environment; Time; The 2006 Second Lebanon War; Hezbollah TTPs; 2008-2009 Hamas/Israeli Conflict; Hamas TTPs; Conclusion. Charts and tables.

In response to a surprise incursion by Hezbollah combatants into northern Israel and their abduction of two Israeli soldiers, Israel launched a campaign that included the most complex air offensive to have taken place in the history of the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Many believe that the inconclusive results of this war represent a "failure of air power." The author demonstrates that this conclusion is an oversimplification of a more complex reality. He assesses the main details associated with the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF's) campaign against Hezbollah to correct the record regarding what Israeli air power did and did not accomplish (and promise to accomplish) in the course of contributing to that campaign. He considers IAF operations in the larger context of the numerous premises, constraints, and ultimate errors in both military and civilian leadership strategy choice that drove the Israeli government's decisionmaking throughout the counteroffensive. He also examines the IDF's more successful operation against the terrorist organization Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009, to provide points of comparison and contrast in the IDF's conduct of the latter campaign based on lessons learned and assimilated from its earlier combat experience in Lebanon.--Publisher description.