Israel S Reprisal Policy 1953 1956

Following Israel's War of Independence in 1948 and 1949, the anticipated peace did not materialize and the new nation soon found itself embroiled in protracted military conflict with neighbouring Arab states. Demobilization of its armed forces led to the formation of special elite unit under the command of Ariel Sharon to cope with cross-border infiltration, pillage and murder. A policy of deterrence was governed by the tactic of retaliation, which contained the seeds of escalation. At the same time, a military dynamic unfolded in which the logic of field unit response dictated both military and political policy and caught the imagination of a demoralized and war-weary Israeli society. The myth of the Israeli paratroopers at the beginning of the 1950s, and their heroic deeds in the reprisal raids, embodied the new Zionist ethos for which the current Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, claims much of the credit. The book thus provides historical insight into some of the most intractable developments of the current Arab-Israeli conflict.

"This book methodically examines the train of retaliatory actions conducted by the Israel Defence Force, the clashing orientations among Israeli political leadership towards the deteriorating military situation, the impact of massive immigration upon the social military fabric, and the restructuring of the Israeli army within the conceptual confines of field unit reprisal actions. A connected narrative of these actions provides case study illumination of the theoretical premises of study, namely the determination of security policy from below and the interaction between agency and structure in a military setting."--BOOK JACKET.

This book shows the "deception by omission" used at the United Nations to gain backing for Jewish statehood in Palestine.

This book is devoted to Israel's asymmetric wars, those conducted against irregular armed groups that have attacked it. It seeks to understand the Israeli strategy in the fight against terrorists acting under the guise of civilians or using the population as human shields. The army has implemented a loosely devised, if not simplistic, doctrine of "disproportionate response" since Israel's founding. The results have been mediocre, nearly always leading to the death of innocent Arab civilians and exacerbating anti-Israeli sentiment. Each time it has led to an escalation that is difficult to control and thrown the entire country into an increasingly inextricable situation. Practically every time it has made Israel, the aggressed party, look like the aggressor. What explains such perseverance? This research is based on vast documentation collected in Israel as well as on more than 60 in-depth interviews with officers and simple soldiers, senior counterterrorism officials, politicians, journalists and NGOs.

This book offers an analysis of key individuals who have contributed to both the theory and the practice of counterinsurgency (COIN). Insurgencies have become the dominant form of armed conflict around the world today. The perceptible degeneration of the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan into insurgent quagmires has sparked a renewal of academic and military interest in the theory and practice of counterinsurgency. In light of this, this book provides a rigorous analysis of those individuals who have contributed to both the theory and practice of counterinsurgency: ‘warrior-scholars’. These are soldiers who have bridged the academic-military divide by influencing doctrinal and intellectual debates about irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is notoriously difficult for the military, and scholarly understanding about this type of warfare is also problematic; especially given the residual anti-intellectualism within Western militaries. Thus, The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare is dedicated to analysing the best perceivable bridge between these two worlds. The authors explore the theoretical and practical contributions made by a selection of warrior-scholars of different nationalities, from periods ranging from the French colonial wars of the mid-twentieth century to the Israeli experiences in the Middle East; from contributions to American counter-insurgency made during the Iraq War, to the thinkers who shaped the US war in Vietnam. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, strategic studies, defence studies, war studies and security studies in general.

Making Endless War is built on the premise that any attempt to understand how the content and function of the laws of war changed in the second half of the twentieth century should consider two major armed conflicts, fought on opposite edges of Asia, and the legal pathways that link them together across time and space. The Vietnam and Arab-Israeli conflicts have been particularly significant in the shaping and attempted remaking of international law from 1945 right through to the present day. This carefully curated collection of essays by lawyers, historians, philosophers, sociologists, and political geographers of war explores the significance of these two conflicts, including their impact on the politics and culture of the world’s most powerful nation, the United States of America. The volume foregrounds attempts to develop legal rationales for the continued waging of war after 1945 by moving beyond explaining the end of war as a legal institution, and toward understanding the attempted institutionalization of endless war.

This study examines the attitudes and policies on all sides of the majority/minority divide in Israel during the state’s formative decade, and how the social, political, and strategic decisions made vis-à-vis the non-Jewish populations then continue to impact this unique Middle Eastern state today. While land, labor, and settlement policies, or the educational, legal, or political systems, could have been used to explore majority-minority relations in Israel between 1948-1958, this study does so through the prism of the army – in theory, the state’s most unifying social institution. The central questions investigated in this study are; how did the leadership of the Jewish majority balance its declared commitment to the state’s democratic ideals and the principle of equality on the one hand, and its commitment to creating a Jewish state and ensuring its security on the other? Was the army – charged with instilling Zionist patriotism in Jewish youth – prepared to absorb and integrate Arabs, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the non-Jewish minorities? Would the state’s minority groups be viewed as trustworthy and loyal enough to serve in the army? Furthermore, how would (potential) Arab military service impact the educational mission, and particularly the simultaneously transformative and integrative effort the army was charged with carrying out among Jews? While a specialized work in the fields of Israel and Middle Eastern Studies, this book should appeal to all students interested in majority/minority relations and the state-building process in newly-emerging democratic societies.

Others cover the French, US and Prussian (later German) navies, which move from relative weakness towards a position from which they challenged Britain's supremacy."