Israel Vs Hamas

This book offers a comprehensive overview of the impact of ‘strategic culture’ on Israeli military operations against Hamas between 1987 and 2014. It has often been argued that Israeli policies and military operations against Hamas have proven tactically effective, but strategically disastrous, allowing the Islamic Resistance Movement to grow from a small spin-off of the Muslim Brotherhood into a powerful military and political actor in the Palestinian arena. This book argues, contrary to this opinion, that Israel was effective in its struggle against the Islamic Resistance Movement between 1987 and 2014, as the Jewish state ultimately managed to deny the majority of Hamas' strategic aims and to preserve a position of relative strength. By relying on a synthesis of primary sources, interviews, memoirs, scholarly and professional military studies and information gathered from the media, the study delivers a careful and comprehensive analysis of the conflict. It provides an historical outline of the development of the Israeli ‘strategic culture’ and analyzes its impact on the process of military adaptation during the First Intifada, the Oslo Peace Process, the al-Aqsa Intifada and the Gaza wars. Finally, the book illuminates how the Israeli strategic culture moulded a distinctive ‘way of war’ that, though marked by successes and failures, ultimately proved effective against Hamas. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, Middle Eastern politics, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and security studies in general.

Contents: (1) Gaza Conflict: Post-Conflict Developments; Origins; Did Israel Achieve Its Goals?; (2) Palestinian Rocket Attacks from Gaza: Threat Assessment and Israeli Responses; (3) Impact on Palestinian Civilians, and Israeli Civilians; (4) Addressing the Needs of the Gazan Population; Preventing Arms Smuggling into Gaza; Intra-Palestinian Politics ¿- Fatah (PA/PLO) and Hamas; Regional and International Implications; Impact on Israeli Elections; Effect on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process; (5) Defense Approp. for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Programs; Oversight of U.S. Arms Sales to Israel; U.S. Humanitarian Aid and Other Econ. Assistance to Palestinians; U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority; (6) Implications for U.S. Policy. Illus.

The May 2021 conflict between Israel and the terrorist group Hamas generated headlines around the world. However, much of the reporting ignored the history, funding, political dynamics, and other key components of the story. Hamas initiates conflict every few years. But the reporting rarely improves. Social media has only further clouded the picture. Hamas is rarely held responsible for its use of "human shields," blindly firing rockets at civilian areas in Israel, or diverting aid that should benefit the people of Gaza. The Islamic Republic of Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism, has been the primary patron of Hamas since the group's inception in the late 1980s. Hamas has received additional assistance over the years from Qatar, Turkey and Malaysia. These countries are fomenting conflict, while others, such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, have tried to minimize it. Gaza is therefore ground zero in a struggle for the future stability of the Middle East. The Biden administration has important choices to make. Its intent to re-enter the Iran nuclear deal could have significant consequences, given that sanctions relief to Iran will likely yield a financial boon for Hamas, along with other Iranian proxies. The Biden administration must also come to terms with "The Squad," a small but loud faction of the Democratic Party that seeks to undermine the US-Israel relationship.

The conflict between Palestinians and Israelis has heightened since 2001, even as any perceived threat to Israel from Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, or even Syria, has declined. Israel, according to Chaim Herzog, Israel's sixth President, had been "born in battle" and would be "obliged to live by the sword." Yet, the Israeli government's conquest and occupation of the West Bank and Gaza brought about a very difficult challenge, although resistance on a mass basis was only taken upyears later in the First Intifadha. Israel could not tolerate Palestinian Arabs' resistance of their authority on the legal basis of denial of self-determination,2 and eventually preferred to grant some measures of self-determination while continuing to consolidate control of the Occupied Territories, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza. However, a comprehensive peace, shimmering in the distance, has eluded all. Inter-Israeli and inter-Palestinian divisions deepenedas peace danced closer before retreating. Israel's stance towards the democratically elected Palestinian government headed by HAMAS in 2006, and towards Palestinian national coherence-legal, territorial, political, and economic-has been a major obstacle to substantive peacemaking. The reasons for recalcitrant Israeli and HAMAS stances illustrate both continuities and changes in the dynamics of conflict since the Oslo period (roughly 1994 to the al-Aqsa Intifadha of 2000). Now, more than ever, a long-term truce and negotiations are necessary. These could lead in stages to that mirage-like peace, and a new type of security regime. The rise in popularity and strength of the HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, or Movement of the Islamic Resistance) Organization and its interaction with Israel is important to an understanding of Israel's "Arab" policies and its approach to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The crisis brought about by the electoral success of HAMAS in 2006 also challenged Western powers' commitment to democratic change in the Middle East because Palestinians had supported the organization in the polls. Thus, the viability of a twostate solution rested on an Israeli acknowledgement of the Islamist movement, HAMAS, and on Fatah's ceding power to it. Shifts in Israel's stated national security objectives (and dissent over them) reveal HAMAS' placement at the nexus of Israel's domestic, Israeli-Palestinian, and regional objectives. Israel has treated certain enemies differently than others: Iran, Hizbullah, and Islamist Palestinians (whether HAMAS, supporters of Islamic Jihad, or the Islamic Movement inside Israel) all fall into a particular rubric in which Islamism-the most salient and enduring socio religious movement in the Middle East in the wake of Arab nationalism-is identified with terrorism and insurgency rather than with group politics and identity. The antipathy to religious fervor was somewhat ironic in light of Israel's own expanding "religious" (haredim) groups.

On December 27, 2008, Israel launched a major military campaign dubbed "Operation Cast Lead" against the Palestinian Islamist militant group Hamas in the Gaza Strip in order to counter Palestinian rocket fire and more broadly, to significantly weaken all aspects of Hamas rule in Gaza. On January 3, 2009, Israel began a ground offensive into Gaza intended to eliminate Hamas's willingness or capacity to launch rockets at Israeli towns and cities. As of January 14, Israeli bombings and ground forces had reportedly killed over 1,000 Palestinians, while 13 Israelis had been killed by Palestinian rockets. Some Israeli observers have suggested that neither toppling the Hamas regime nor permanently ending all rocket attacks is a realistic goal. Nevertheless, by temporarily disabling Hamas's military capacity and slowing its rearmament, Israel could ease the frequency and intensity of Hamas attacks in the months ahead as it prepares to deploy new, more sophisticated anti-rocket defence systems. Bringing an end to the conflict and constructing a sustainable order in its aftermath are major challenges with implications for the Gaza Strip's population and infrastructure, Israel's security, and the future Palestinian polity, including the role of Hamas. This book considers the changing fortunes of the Palestinian movement, HAMAS, and the recent outcomes of Israeli strategies aimed against this group. This book consists of public domain documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted, and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to provide easy access.

"The conflict between Palestine and Israel is one of the most highly publicized and bitter struggles of modern times, a dangerous tinderbox always poised to set the Middle East aflame, and to draw the United States into the fire. In this volume the author illuminates the history of the problem, reducing it to its very essence. He explores the Palestinian-Israeli dispute in twenty-year segments, to highlight the historical complexity of the conflict throughout successive decades. Each chapter starts with an examination of the relationships among people and events that marked particular years as historical stepping stones in the evolution of the conflict, including the 1897 Basel Congress, the 1917 Balfour Declaration and British occupation of Palestine, and the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan and the war for Palestine. Providing an exploration of the main issues, the author explores not only the historical basis of the conflict, but also looks at how and why partition has been so difficult and how efforts to restore peace continue today"--OCLC

Contents: (1) Overview; (2) Evaluating the Annapolis Process: Signs of Progress or of Setbacks?; Debate Over the Urgency of Reaching a 2-State Solution; Windows of Opportunity for Consensus on the Peace Process; Going Forward from Annapolis; (3) Changes Since Oslo: Middle East Geopolitics; Demographic Concerns -- Arabs to Outnumber Jews?; Violence and Palestinian Factionalism; Impediments to Palestinian Territorial Contiguity and Movement; (4) Alternatives to a 2-State Solution: ¿1-State Solution¿; Israeli Unilateralism; ¿Jordanian¿ or ¿Regional¿ Option; ¿Status Quo¿; (5) The U.S. Approach.; The Role of Hamas; Capacity-Building for Palestinian Moderates; Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Maps.

This report describes how the Israel Defense Force fought an adaptive hybrid adversary in a dense urban setting under intense public scrutiny during its wars in Gaza and draws lessons from the Israeli experience for the U.S. Army and the joint force.