Issuance Of Central Bank Securities

The paper discusses the reasons for central bank (CB) issuance of securities, and reasons for choosing different approaches e.g. in maturities and target market. It provides evidence on the range of different approaches taken by those CBs which do issue, as well as suggesting reasons why some CBs do not; and provides operational guidelines on the major building blocks of the issuance of CB securities.

The limited supply of government securities in some industrial countries has important ramifications for the operating techniques used by central banks to implement monetary policy, provide credit to the financial sector, and also for the assets they hold on their balance sheets. The paper reviews the salient facts regarding industrial central bank balance sheets and operating techniques, and outlines different options for dealing with a limited supply of government securities. The main conclusion is that central banks may wish to consider extending credit using a broad range of assets as collateral, and engage in outright transactions of securities guaranteed by financial institutions.

Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.

This paper discusses the challenging question of whether central banks should use treasury bills or central bank bills for draining excess liquidity in the banking system. While recognizing that there are practical reasons for using central bank bills, the paper argues that treasury bills are the first best option especially because positive externalities for the financial sector and the rest of the economy. However, the main considerations in the choice should be: (i) operational independence for the central bank; (ii) market development; and (iii) the strengthening of the transmission of monetary policy impulses.

Central banks may operate perfectly well without capital as conventionally defined. A large negative net worth, however, is likely to compromise central bank independence and interfere with its ability to attain policy objectives. If society values an independent central bank capable of effectively implementing monetary policy, recapitalization may become essential. Proper accounting practice in determining central bank profit or loss and rules governing the transfer of the central bank’s operating result to the treasury are also important. A variety of country-specific central bank practices are reviewed to support the argument.

This paper considers the central bank mandate with respect to financial stability and identifies the links to the functioning of securities markets. It argues that while emergency support to securities markets is an important part of the crisis management response, a high bar should be set for its use. Importantly, it should be used only as part of a comprehensive policy package. The paper considers what types of securities markets may be important for financial stability, what market conditions could trigger emergency support measures, and how programs can be designed to restore market functioning while minimizing moral hazard.

Between 1980 and before the recent crisis, the ratio of financial market debt to liquid assets rose exponentially in the U.S. (and in other financial markets), reflecting in part the greater use of securitized assets to collateralize borrowing. The subsequent crisis has reduced the pool of assets considered acceptable as collateral, resulting in a liquidity shortage. When trying to address this, policy makers will need to consider concepts of liquidity besides the traditional metric of excess bank reserves and do more than merely substitute central bank money for collateral that currently remains highly liquid.

The first of its kind, this book is entirely dedicated to the implementation of monetary policy. Monetary policy implementation has gone through tremendous changes over the last twenty years, which have witnessed the quiet end of 'reserve position doctrine' and the return of an explicit focus on short-term interest rates. Enthusiastically supported by Keynes and later by the monetarist school, reserve position doctrine was developed mainly by US central bankers and academics during the early 1920s, and at least in the US became the unchallenged dogma of monetary policy implementation for sixty years. The return of interest rate targeting also corresponds largely to the restoration of central banking principles established in the late 19th century. Providing a simple theory of monetary policy implementation, Bindseil goes on to explain the role of the three main instruments (open market operations, standing facilities, and reserve requirements) and reviews their use in the twentieth century. In closing, he summarizes current views on efficient monetary policy implementation.