Issues In The Coordination Of Monetary And Fiscal Policy

This paper examines issues in the current debate over coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. Section I1 uses the traditional targets-instruments approach to assess the potential gains from greater coordination. Since greater coordination is often equated with looser money and tighter fiscal policy, two econometric models of the economy are used to estimate the quantitative importance of the policy mix. Expectational effects that arise from the government budget constraint are also analyzed. Section III shows that our attitudes toward the non- coordination problem may be quite different depending on why policies were not coordinated to begin with, and argues that there are plausible circumstances under which it may be better to have uncoordinated policies. Section IV turns to the design of a coordination system. The game-theoretic aspects of having two independent authorities are stressed, and I offer a general reason to expect that uncoordinated behavior will result in tight money and loose fiscal policy even when both parties would prefer easy money and tight fiscal policy. Finally, Section, considers the old "rules versus discretion" debate from the particular perspective of this paper

Recently, monetary authorities have increasingly focused on implementing policies to ensure price stability and strengthen central bank independence. Simultaneously, in the fiscal area, market development has allowed public debt managers to focus more on cost minimization. This “divorce” of monetary and debt management functions in no way lessens the need for effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policy if overall economic performance is to be optimized and maintained in the long term. This paper analyzes these issues based on a review of the relevant literature and of country experiences from an institutional and operational perspective.

International coordination of macroeconomic policies has attracted much attention in recent years. The main issue has been whether economic performance can be improved by coordination Although it is still a controversial issue many economists have argued that coordination would make a positive contribution to economic performance. This paper deals with the requirements for successful fiscal coordination. It concludes that those requirements are such that the best fiscal policies that countries can pursue are those aimed at putting their houses in order.

Research Paper from the year 2010 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: A, The ESC Rennes School of Business (-), course: MSc, language: English, abstract: This paper attempts to study the importance of both Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy in the international context. And also to understand the chemistry between Monetary and Fiscal policy and extent to which the coordination can be achieved. In any open economy, Monetary policy is designed, formulated and being conducted by the central Bank, wherein the National Planning or Ministry of Finance of the respective country is responsible for designing, formulating and conducting the Fiscal policy for the nation. This research paper finds that there is a close linkage between Monetary and Fiscal policy and hence the proper coordination leads to addressing today's biggest talk of nation‟s deficit. Currently there is an abundance of literature available on both Monetary and Fiscal policy. There is also good number of books available containing plethora of information on the subject. This research paper addresses the importance, impact, and issues of Monetary and Fiscal policy in open economy.

A comprehensive study of the international coordination of economic policy in a monetary union. It carefully discusses the process of policy competition and the structure of policy cooperation. As to policy competition, the focus is on competition between the union central bank, the German government, and the French government. Similarly, as to policy cooperation, the focus is on cooperation between the union central bank, the German government, and the French government. The key questions are: Does the process of policy competition lead to full employment and price stability? Can these targets be achieved through policy cooperation? And is policy cooperation superior to policy competition? Another important issue is monetary competition / monetary cooperation between Europe and America.

The unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) pursued by the advanced economies (AEs) have posed macroeconomic challenges for the emerging market economies (EMEs) through volatile capital flows and exchange rates. AE central banks need to acknowledge and appreciate the spillovers resulting from such UMPs. Central banks of the AEs, who have set up standing mutual swap facilities, should explore similar arrangements with other significant EMEs with appropriate risk mitigation measures. These initiatives could do much to actually curb volatility in global financial markets and hence in capital flows to EMEs, thus obviating the need for defensive policy actions on the part of EMEs.

This volume provides an integrated compilation of selected major articles published by the author in several fields of international finance. These include contributions to the understanding of currency crises and financial contagion, the evolution of exchange rate regimes, the interaction between national fiscal policies and regional monetary unions, and the effect of uncertainty on the gains from international economic policy coordination. The author spent most of his career doing research at established institutions (the Bank of Canada, OECD, and IMF), and these articles emerged from the need to understand the major economic policy issues of the day. In the book's introduction, the author discusses the motivation for these contributions and the unifying themes that emerged, while a concluding chapter provides his personal reflections and suggestions about promising avenues for further research.

Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations analyzes coordination of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies between countries and currency areas using a dynamic game approach. The first four chapters introduce the reader to the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy cooperation. Issues covered include: fiscal coordination, fiscal stringency requirements, structural and bargaining power asymmetries and the design of monetary and fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. In the four last chapters multiple-player settings with aspects of fiscal and/or monetary coordination are analyzed using the endogenous coalition formation approach. The analysis is focused on shock and model asymmetries and issues of multi-country coordination in the presence of (possibly many) monetary unions.