Japan S Nuclear Future

Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Background; (3) An Evolving Security Environment in Asia; (4) Japan¿s Nuclear Capacity: Japan¿s Nuclear Energy Program; Technological Potential; (5) Japanese Legal and Political Restraints: (a) Domestic Factors: Public Opinion; Elite Opinions; Constitutional Restraints; 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law; Three Non-Nuclear Principles; (b) External Factors: International Law; Consequences for Civilian Nuclear Program; International Diplomatic Consequences; (6) Issues for U.S. Policy; U.S. Security Commitment; Potential for Asian Arms Race; U.S.-China Relations; Future of the Korean Peninsula; Japan¿s International Reputation; Damage to Global Non-Proliferation Regime.

SCOTT (Copy 1): From the John Holmes Library Collection

"Naoto Kan, who was prime minister of Japan when the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster began, has become a ubiquitous and compelling voice for the global antinuclear movement. Kan compared the potential worst-case devastation that could be caused by a nuclear power plant meltdown as tantamount only to 'a great world war. Nothing else has the same impact.' Japan escaped such a dire fate during the Fukushima disaster, said Kan, only ‘due to luck.’ Even so, Kan had to make some steely-nerved decisions that necessitated putting all emotion aside. In a now famous phone call from Tepco, when the company asked to pull all their personnel from the out-of-control Fukushima site for their own safety, Kan told them no. The workforce must stay. The few would need to make the sacrifice to save the many. Kan knew that abandoning the Fukushima Daiichi site would cause radiation levels in the surrounding environment to soar. His insistence that the Tepco workforce remain at Fukushima was perhaps one of the most unsung moments of heroism in the whole sorry saga."—The Ecologist On March 11, 2011, a massive undersea earthquake off Japan’s coast triggered devastating tsunami waves that in turn caused meltdowns at three reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Ranked with Chernobyl as the worst nuclear disaster in history, Fukushima will have lasting consequences for generations. Until 3.11, Japan’s Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, had supported the use of nuclear power. His position would undergo a radical change, however, as Kan watched the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima No. 1 Power Plant unfold and came to understand the potential for the physical, economic, and political destruction of Japan.In My Nuclear Nightmare, Kan offers a fascinating day-by-day account of his actions in the harrowing week after the earthquake struck. He records the anguished decisions he had to make as the scale of destruction became clear and the threat of nuclear catastrophe loomed ever larger—decisions made on the basis of information that was often unreliable. For example, frustrated by the lack of clarity from the executives at Tepco, the company that owned the power plant, Kan decided to visit Fukushima himself, despite the risks, so he could talk to the plant’s manager and find out what was really happening on the ground. As he details, a combination of extremely good fortune and hard work just barely prevented a total meltdown of all of Fukushima’s reactor units, which would have necessitated the evacuation of the thirty million residents of the greater Tokyo metropolitan area.In the book, first published in Japan in 2012, Kan also explains his opposition to nuclear power: "I came to understand that a nuclear accident carried with it a risk so large that it could lead to the collapse of a country." When Kan was pressured by the opposition to step down as prime minister in August 2011, he agreed to do so only after legislation had been passed to encourage investments in alternative energy. As both a document of crisis management during an almost unimaginable disaster and a cogent argument about the dangers of nuclear power, My Nuclear Nightmare is essential reading.

In a speech delivered in Japanese at Cornell University, Naoto Kan describes the harrowing days after a cataclysmic earthquake and tsunami led to the meltdown of three reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. In vivid language, he tells how he struggled with the possibility that tens of millions of people would need to be evacuated. Cornell Global Perspectives is an imprint of Cornell University’s Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies. The works examine critical global challenges, often from an interdisciplinary perspective, and are intended for a non-specialist audience. The Distinguished Speaker series presents edited transcripts of talks delivered at Cornell, both in the original language and in translation.

Japan, traditionally one of the most prominent advocates of the international non-proliferation regime, has consistently pledged to forswear nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, evolving circumstances in Northeast Asia, particularly North Korea's nuclear test in October 2006 and China's ongoing military modernization drive, have raised new questions about Japan's vulnerability to potential adversaries and, therefore, the appeal of developing an independent nuclear deterrent. The previous taboo within the Japanese political community of discussing a nuclear weapons capability appears to have been broken, as several officials and opinion leaders have urged an open debate on the topic. Despite these factors, a strong consensus -- both in Japan and among Japan watchers -- remains that Japan will not pursue the nuclear option in the short-to-medium term. This paper examines the prospects for Japan pursuing a nuclear weapons capability by assessing the existing technical infrastructure of its extensive civilian nuclear energy program. It explores the range of challenges that Japan would have to overcome to transform its current program into a military program. Presently, Japan appears to lack several of the prerequisites for a full-scale nuclear weapons deterrent: expertise on bomb design, reliable delivery vehicles, an intelligence program to protect and conceal assets, and sites for nuclear testing. In addition, a range of legal and political restraints on Japan's development of nuclear weapons. Any reconsideration and/or shift of Japan's policy of nuclear abstention would have significant implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. In this report, an examination of the factors driving Japan's decision-making -- most prominently, the strength of the U.S. security guarantee -- analyzes how the nuclear debate in Japan affects U.S. security interests in the region.

This book explores how Japanese views of nuclear power were influenced not only by Hiroshima and Nagasaki but by government, business and media efforts to actively promote how it was a safe and integral part of Japan’s future. The idea of “atoms for peace” and the importance of US-Japan relations were emphasized in exhibitions and in films. Despite the emergence of an anti-nuclear movement, the dream of civilian nuclear power and the “good atom” nevertheless prevailed and became more accepted. By the late 1950s, a school trip to see a reactor was becoming a reality for young Japanese, and major events such as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and 1970 Osaka Expo seemed to reinforce the narrative that the Japanese people were destined for a future led by science and technology that was powered by the atom, a dream that was left in disarray after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011.

This book begins with the analysis of America’s post-war intelligence operations, propaganda campaigns, and strategic psychological warfare in Japan. Banking on nuclear safety myths, Japan promoted an aggressive policy of locating and building nuclear power plants in depopulated areas suffering from a significant decline of local industries and economies. The Fukushima nuclear disaster substantiated that U.S. propaganda programs left a long lasting legacy in Japan and beyond and created the futile ground for the future nuclear disaster. The book reveals Japan's tripartite organization of the dominating state, media-monopoly, and nuclear-plant oligarchy advancing nuclear proliferation. It details America’s unprecedented pro-nuclear propaganda campaigns; Japan’s secret ambitions to develop its own nuclear bombs; U.S. dumping of reprocessed plutonium on Japan; and the joint U.S.-Nippon propaganda campaigns for "safe" nuclear-power and the current “safe-nuclear particles” myths. The study shows how the bankruptcy of the central state has led to increased burdens on the population in post-nuclear tsunami era, and the ensuing dangerous ionization of the population now reaching into the future.

Though the Carter administration came to office committed both to good U.S.-Japanese relations and to a more stringent nuclear nonproliferation policy, it soon became clear that these objectives were at cross-purposes, and that the dispute over nuclear nonproliferation policy threatened to shake the alliance between the two countries. Professors Im