Japan S Threat Perception During The Cold War

"Oren re-examines Japan's threat perception during the first two decades of the Cold war, using wide range of source materials, including many unavailable in English, or only recently declassified. There is a widely shared misconception that during the cold war the Japanese were largely shielded from threats due to the American military protection, the regional balance of power, Japan's geographical insularity and domestic aversion to militarism. Oren dispels this, showing how security threats pervaded Japanese strategic thinking in this period. By dispelling this misconception, Oren enables us to more accurately gauge the degree to which Japan's threat perception has evolved during and after the end of the cold war and to enhance our understanding of Tokyo's strategic calculus in the current situation of rivalry between China and the USA. This book will be of great value both to scholars of Japanese history and of contemporary international relations"--

Oren re-examines Japan’s threat perception during the first two decades of the Cold War, using a wide range of source materials, including many unavailable in English, or only recently declassified. There is a widely shared misconception that during the Cold War the Japanese were largely shielded from threats due to the American military protection, the regional balance of power, Japan’s geographical insularity, and domestic aversion to militarism. Oren dispels this, showing how security threats pervaded Japanese strategic thinking in this period. By dispelling this misconception, Oren enables us to more accurately gauge the degree to which Japan’s threat perception has evolved during and after the end of the Cold War and to enhance our understanding of Tokyo’s strategic calculus in the current situation of rivalry between China and the United States. This book will be of great value to both scholars of Japanese history and contemporary international relations.

This report examines Japanese views of the U.S.-Japan security relationship after the Cold War and considers implications of those views for the United States. Since the end of World War 11, the close U.S.- Japan security relationship has benefited both nations. The United States has been able to anchor its East Asian military presence in Japan, helping to contain communist influence and lending stability to the region. Japan has been able to concentrate on rebuilding its economy with relatively little concern (and cost) for its own defense. But both Tokyo and Washington have begun to reassess their security requirements in view of changing global threats and, in the United States case, in the face of perceptions of long-term economic decline. An important part of this reassessment involves an examination of the purpose and structure of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. In Japan, two events have prompted debate on the security relationship. The first is the apparent disappearance of a security threat from the former Soviet Union. The second is criticism-both domestic and foreign at Japan has received for its limited role in the Persian Gulf War.

The sudden end of the Cold War took the Japanese foreign policy community by surprise. The Yoshida Doctrine which served Japanese foreign policy so well during the Cold War is no longer a viable foreign policy option. This dissertation examines the restructuring of Japanese foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Through a series of 56 interviews with Japanese foregin policy elites, the changes in Japanese foreign policy are put into the context of the foreign policy literature.

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's security environment has changed significantly. While, on the global level, the United States is still Japan's most important security partner, the nature of the partnership has changed as a result of shifting demands from the United States, new international challenges such as the North Korean nuclear programme and the rapid rise of China. At the same time, Japan has been confronted with new, ‘non-traditional’ security threats such as international terrorism, the spread of infectious diseases, and global environmental problems. On the domestic level, demographic change, labour migration, economic decline, workplace insecurity, and a weakening impact of policy initiatives challenge the sustainability of the lifestyle of many Japanese and have led to a heightened sense of insecurity among the Japanese public. This book focuses on the domestic discourse on insecurity in Japan and goes beyond military security. The chapters cover issues such as Japan’s growing perception of regional and global insecurity; the changing role of military forces; the perceived risk of Chinese foreign investment; societal, cultural and labour insecurity and how it is affected by demographic changes and migration; as well as food insecurity and its challenges to health and public policy. Each chapter asks how the Japanese public perceives these insecurities; how these perceptions influence the public discourse, the main stakeholders of this discourse, and how this affects state-society relations and government policies. Governing Insecurity in Japan provides new insights into Japanese and international discourses on security and insecurity, and the ways in which security is conceptualized in Japan. As such, it will be of interest to students and scholars working on Japanese politics, security studies and international relations.

Since the end of the Cold War, one of the most significant debates in international relations has been the question of whether the rise of China as a major economic, political and military power will be a force for stability or instability in the international system and the East Asian region. Forceful arguments have been put forward on both sides. This book examines perceptions of the 'China Threat', and governments' policies in response to the perceived threat in a wide range of countries, including the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, South Asia, South-East Asia and the Middle East, as well as the perceptions of the Chinese themselves. For each country current security concerns and policies, especially the policy of engagement, are examined in detail, and future prospects for relations with China are assessed. As the Bush administration in Washington increasingly focuses on China as a 'strategic competitor' and Sino-US relations becomes increasingly tense, the 'China Threat' issue has come to dominate the security agenda in the Asia-Pacific region, and now poses the biggest foreign policy challenge of the 21st century.

The indistinct status of the Zainichi has meant that, since the late 1940s, two ethnic Korean associations, the Chongryun (pro-North) and the Mindan (pro-South) have been vying for political loyalty from the Zainichi, with both groups initially opposing their assimilation in Japan. Unlike the Korean diasporas living in Russia, China or the US, the Zainichi have become sharply divided along political lines as a result. Myung Ja Kim examines Japan's changing national policies towards the Zainichi in order to understand why this group has not been fully integrated into Japan. Through the prism of this ethnically Korean community, the book reveals the dynamics of alliances and alignments in East Asia, including the rise of China as an economic superpower, the security threat posed by North Korea and the diminishing alliance between Japan and the US. Taking a post-war historical perspective, the research reveals why the Zainichi are vital to Japan's state policy revisionist aims to increase its power internationally and how they were used to increase the country's geopolitical leverage.With a focus on International Relations, this book provides an important analysis of the mechanisms that lie behind nation-building policy, showing the conditions controlling a host state's treatment of diasporic groups.

Governments increasingly offer or demand apologies for past human rights abuses, and it is widely believed that such expressions of contrition are necessary to promote reconciliation between former adversaries. The post-World War II experiences of Japan and Germany suggest that international apologies have powerful healing effects when they are offered, and poisonous effects when withheld. West Germany made extensive efforts to atone for wartime crimes-formal apologies, monuments to victims of the Nazis, and candid history textbooks; Bonn successfully reconciled with its wartime enemies. By contrast, Tokyo has made few and unsatisfying apologies and approves school textbooks that whitewash wartime atrocities. Japanese leaders worship at the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors war criminals among Japan's war dead. Relations between Japan and its neighbors remain tense. Examining the cases of South Korean relations with Japan and of French relations with Germany, Jennifer Lind demonstrates that denials of past atrocities fuel distrust and inhibit international reconciliation. In Sorry States, she argues that a country's acknowledgment of past misdeeds is essential for promoting trust and reconciliation after war. However, Lind challenges the conventional wisdom by showing that many countries have been able to reconcile without much in the way of apologies or reparations. Contrition can be highly controversial and is likely to cause a domestic backlash that alarms—rather than assuages—outside observers. Apologies and other such polarizing gestures are thus unlikely to soothe relations after conflict, Lind finds, and remembrance that is less accusatory-conducted bilaterally or in multilateral settings-holds the most promise for international reconciliation.