Japan Under The Dpj

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in 2009 with a commanding majority, ending fifty years of almost uninterrupted Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rule. What explains the DPJ's rapid rise to power? Why has policy change under the DPJ been limited, despite high expectations and promises of bold reform? Why has the party been paralyzed by internecine conflict? This volume examines the DPJ's ascendance and its policies once in power. Chapters in the volume cover: DPJ candidate recruitment, the influence of media coverage, nationalization of elections, electoral system constraints on policy change, the role of third parties, municipal mergers, the role of women, transportation policy, fiscal decentralization, information technology, response to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, security strategy, and foreign policy. Japan under the DPJ makes important contributions to the study of Japanese politics, while drawing upon and advancing scholarship on a wider range of issues of interest to political scientists. Contributors include Kenneth McElwain (University of Michigan), Ethan Scheiner (University of California-Davis), Steven Reed (Chuo University, Japan ), Kay Shimizu (Columbia University), Daniel Smith (Stanford University), Robert Pekkanen (University of Washington), Ellis Krauss (University of California-San Diego), Yukio Maeda (University of Tokyo), Linda Hasunuma (Franklin and Marshall College), Alisa Gaunder (Southwestern University), Christopher Hughes (University of Warwick, UK), and Daniel Sneider (Stanford University).

When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in September 2009, Japanese citizens expected the imminent arrival of a new political era, characterized by a two-party system. However, in addition to the triple disasters of March 2011, the DPJ faced numerous difficulties arising from its controversial policies and massive party defections following the government’s consumption tax hike legislation. The DPJ fell from power following a crushing defeat in the 2012 Lower House election, in which its seat total was drastically reduced. This book examines the September 2009-December 2012 administration of the DPJ from various perspectives, including policies, party governance, management, and legacy. It identifies the significance of the DPJ to Japan’s party politics, explains the reasons for its downfall, and derives crucial lessons for the future of party democracy in Japan. The contributors, a team of professional academics and a lawyer, analyse the policies and events of the DPJ administration based on their interviews with key DPJ politicians and related persons at or close to the centre of the administration. Together they elicit insights from the experiences of the DPJ government to inform the expectations of Japan’s party democracy. Explaining how the failure of the DPJ government has long-term importance for understanding Japanese politics, this book will be invaluable for students and scholars of the field.

Democratic leaders around the world are finding it increasingly difficult to exercise strong leadership and maintain public support. However, there is nowhere that this has proven to be as challenging of a task as Japan, which has seen its top leaders change more often over the past 25 years than any other major country in the world. The current prime minister has strived to put an end to this pattern, but can he buck this historical trend? More fundamentally, why do Japan's prime ministers find it so difficult to project strong leadership, or even stay in office? And what are the ramifications for Japan's partners and for the world? This volume, authored by contributors who straddle the scholarly and policymaking worlds in Japan, explores the obstacles facing Japan as it looks for greater leadership and explains why this matters for the rest of the world.

In the election to the House of Representatives in 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) almost tripled the number of its lower house members by winning 308 seats. It subsequently formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party and the People’s New Party. The new ruling party promised to completely overhaul policymaking mechanisms that had been shaped over the past decades. Yet, the Japanese people quickly felt disappointed with the DPJ’s ‘policymaking engineering’. Examining the evolution of the decision-making process in Japan under the DPJ administration between the years 2009-2012, this book offers a multidimensional explanation for the reasons for the DPJ’s failure in producing effective policymaking mechanisms. Implementing conceptual tools borrowed from historical institutionalism, the author explains why the Democrats displayed inflexibility in introducing selected elements of the Westminster system, incoherence in regard to many aspects of the decision-making reform, and unwillingness to take advantage of all of the institutional resources at their disposal. The book argues that the examination of the DPJ’s origins and interactions with other parties is crucial in understanding its misconceptions regarding the institutional model, policy vision, and institutional tools required for a durable change in policymaking patterns. Illustrating its argument with a range of case studies, this book explains why, ultimately, the DPJ’s concept of a politician-led government resulted in failure. It will also be helpful in understanding the prerequisites for the success of institutional reforms in general. As such it will be of interest to students and scholars of Japanese studies, Political science, Asian studies.

When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power in September 2009, Japanese citizens expected the imminent arrival of a new political era, characterized by a two-party system. However, in addition to the triple disasters of March 2011, the DPJ faced numerous difficulties arising from its controversial policies and massive party defections following the government’s consumption tax hike legislation. The DPJ fell from power following a crushing defeat in the 2012 Lower House election, in which its seat total was drastically reduced. This book examines the September 2009-December 2012 administration of the DPJ from various perspectives, including policies, party governance, management, and legacy. It identifies the significance of the DPJ to Japan’s party politics, explains the reasons for its downfall, and derives crucial lessons for the future of party democracy in Japan. The contributors, a team of professional academics and a lawyer, analyse the policies and events of the DPJ administration based on their interviews with key DPJ politicians and related persons at or close to the centre of the administration. Together they elicit insights from the experiences of the DPJ government to inform the expectations of Japan’s party democracy. Explaining how the failure of the DPJ government has long-term importance for understanding Japanese politics, this book will be invaluable for students and scholars of the field.

Tomohito Shinoda tracks slow yet steady changes in the operation of and tensions between Japan's political parties and the public's behavior in Japanese elections, as well as in the government's ability to coordinate diverse policy preferences and respond to political crises.

After holding power continuously from its inception in 1955 (with the exception of a ten-month hiatus in 1993–1994), Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost control of the national government decisively in September 2009. Despite its defeat, the LDP remains the most successful political party in a democracy in the post–World War II period. In The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP, Ellis S. Krauss and Robert J. Pekkanen shed light on the puzzle of the LDP's long dominance and abrupt defeat. Several questions about institutional change in party politics are at the core of their investigation: What incentives do different electoral systems provide? How do politicians adapt to new incentives? How much does structure determine behavior, and how much opportunity does structure give politicians to influence outcomes? How adaptable are established political organizations? The electoral system Japan established in 1955 resulted in a half-century of "one-party democracy." But as Krauss and Pekkanen detail, sweeping political reforms in 1994 changed voting rules and other key elements of the electoral system. Both the LDP and its adversaries had to adapt to a new system that gave citizens two votes: one for a party and one for a candidate. Under the leadership of the charismatic Koizumi Junichiro, the LDP managed to maintain its majority in the Japanese Diet, but his successors lost popular support as opposing parties learned how to operate in the new electoral environment. Drawing on the insights of historical institutionalism, Krauss and Pekkanen explain how Japanese politics functioned before and after the 1994 reform and why the persistence of party institutions (factions, PARC, koenkai) and the transformed role of party leadership contributed both to the LDP's success at remaining in power for fifteen years after the reforms and to its eventual downfall. In an epilogue, the authors assess the LDP's prospects in the near and medium term.

In the election to the House of Representatives in 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) almost tripled the number of its lower house members by winning 308 seats. It subsequently formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party and the People�s New Party. The new ruling party promised to completely overhaul policymaking mechanisms that had been shaped over the past decades. Yet, the Japanese people quickly felt disappointed with the DPJ�s �policymaking engineering�. Examining the evolution of the decision-making process in Japan under the DPJ administration between the years 2009-2012, this book offers a multidimensional explanation for the reasons for the DPJ�s failure in producing effective policymaking mechanisms. Implementing conceptual tools borrowed from historical institutionalism, the author explains why the Democrats displayed inflexibility in introducing selected elements of the Westminster system, incoherence in regard to many aspects of the decision-making reform, and unwillingness to take advantage of all of the institutional resources at their disposal. The book argues that the examination of the DPJ�s origins and interactions with other parties is crucial in understanding its misconceptions regarding the institutional model, policy vision, and institutional tools required for a durable change in policymaking patterns. Illustrating its argument with a range of case studies, this book explains why, ultimately, the DPJ�s concept of a politician-led government resulted in failure. It will also be helpful in understanding the prerequisites for the success of institutional reforms in general. As such it will be of interest to students and scholars of Japanese studies, Political science, Asian studies.