John F Kennedy And The Politics Of Arms Sales To Israel

This volume seeks to reconstruct the process by which the Kennedy administration decided to sell to Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles. It argues that both domestic considerations and political calculations were part of a highly complex decision made by members of Washington's high policy elite.

Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel seeks to reconstruct and elucidate the processes behind the decisions made by the Johnson Administration during the years 1965-68 to sell Israel M-48 tanks, A-4 Skyhawk planes and F-4 Phantom planes. This examination is based on a distinction between three factions which competed for influence within Washington's high-policy elite: the traditionalists (whose major representative was Secretary of State Dean Rusk); the pragmatists (whose most outspoken representative was Robert Komer of the National Security Council); and the domestically oriented policymakers (the central decision-maker who quintessentially exemplifies this category being President Johnson). This book is a sequel to: John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel, which examined the first arms deal between the US and Israel.

John F. Kennedy entered the White House hoping to make America and the world a better and safer place in which to live. Through diplomacy, he wanted to achieve a settlement of the East-West tensions and to bring about a peaceful resolution to such issues as the Israeli-Arab conflict. Although his provision of defensive HAWK anti-aircraft missiles, in response to Russian, French, and British arms sales to the Arabs, made him the first President to supply arms to Israel, Kennedy feared both exacerbation of the arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While he remained an honest and loyal friend to Israel, he also attempted to further America's relationship with the Arab states and to encourage a settlement of the Arab refugee issue. Kennedy was an independent thinker who learned how to rely upon his own best judgment and intelligence rather than upon his father or officials like Dean Rusk or Allen Dulles. Kennedy ultimately agreed to regular consultations between Israeli and American military personnel, but he would not agree to a dual alliance nor would he allow America to become Israel's main source of military equipment. The author contends that it was this precarious and uncertain diplomatic and military situation that encouraged Israel to develop its own defense industries and to investigate the possibilities of producing its own nuclear weapons systems.

After more than seventy years, the Palestinian refugee problem remains unsolved. But if a deal could have been reached involving the repatriation of Palestinian refugees, it was in the early years of the Arab-Israeli conflict. So why didn't this happen? This book is the first comprehensive study of the international community's earliest efforts to solve the Palestinian refugee problem. Based on a wide range of international primary sources from Israeli, US, UK and UN archives, the book investigates the major proposals between 1948 and 1968 and explains why these failed. It shows that the main actors involved – the Arab states, Israel, the US and the UN – agreed on very little when it came to the Palestinian refugees and therefore never got seriously engaged in finding a solution. This new analysis highlights how the international community gradually moved from viewing the Palestinian refugee problem as a political issue to looking at it as a humanitarian one. It examines the impact of this development and the changes that took place in this formative period of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the limited influence US policy makers had over Israel.

This book demonstrates that the origins of the US-Israeli alliance lay in the former's concern over Egyptian influence in Jordan, contrasting with the widely-held view of the significance of the Six Day War. The American-Israeli Alliance will be of great interest to students of Middle East studies, history, and politics.

At the Cold War's height, John F. Kennedy set precedents that continue to shape America's encounter with the Middle East. Kennedy was the first president to make a major arms sale to Israel, the only president to push hard to deny Israel the atomic bomb, and the last president to reach out to the greatest champion of Arab nationalism, Egyptian President Jamal Abdul Nasser. Now Warren Bass takes readers inside the corridors of power to show how Kennedy's New Frontiersmen grappled with the Middle East. He explains why the fiery Nasser spurned Washington's overtures and stumbled into a Middle Eastern Vietnam. He shows how Israel persuaded the Kennedy administration to start arming the Jewish state. And he grippingly describes JFK's showdown with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion over Israel's secret nuclear reactor. From the Oval Office to secret diplomatic missions to Cairo and Tel Aviv, Bass offers stunning new insights into the pivotal presidency that helped create the U.S.-Israel alliance and the modern Middle East.

Based on research from an array of American, Arab, British, French, German, and Israeli sources, this book provides a nuclear history of the world's most explosive region. Most significantly, it gives an exposition of Israel's acquisition and political use, or nonuse, of nuclear weapons as a central factor of its foreign policy in the 1960-1991 period. In stressing the factor of nuclear weapons, the author highlights an often-neglected aspect of Israeli security policy. This is the first interpretation of the historical development of nuclear doctrine in the Middle East that assesses the strategic implications of opacity—Israel's use of suggestion, rather than open acknowledgment, that it possesses nuclear weapons. Aronson discusses the strategic thinking of Israel, the Arab countries, the U.S., the former Soviet Union, and other countries and connects Israeli strategies for war, peace, territories, and the political economy with the use of nuclear deterrence. The author approaches the development of Israeli doctrines on nuclear weapons and defense in general within a large matrix that includes the United States; Israeli perceptions of Arab history, culture, and psychology; and Israeli perceptions of Israel's own history, culture, and psychology. He also deals with Arab perceptions of Israel's nuclear program and with Arab and Iranian incentives to go nuclear. In addition, he discusses at length the importance of nuclear factors in the conduct of the Persian Gulf War and examines the implications of the decline of the former Soviet Union for arms control and peace in the Middle East.