John Foster Dulles And The Diplomacy Of The Cold War

As Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles came to personify the shortcomings of American foreign policy. This collection of essays, representing the first archivally based reassessment of Dulles's diplomacy, examines his role during one of the most critical periods of modern history. Rejecting familiar Cold War stereotypes, this volume reveals the hidden complexities in Dulles's conduct of foreign policy and in his own personality.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, deployed a tactic Chris Tudda calls “rhetorical diplomacy”— sounding a belligerent note of anti-Communism in speeches, addresses, press conferences, and private meetings with allies and with Moscow. Yet all the while, Tudda discloses, the two were confidentially committed to a contradictory course—the establishment of a strong system of collective security in Western Europe, peaceful accommodation of the Soviet Union, and the maintenance of a new, albeit divided Germany. Tudda explores the Eisenhower administration’s pursuit of these two mutually exclusive diplomatic strategies and reveals how failure to reconcile them endangered the fragile peace of the 1950s. He builds his argument through three case studies: of the administration’s badgering the French and their allies to ratify the European Defense Community, of its threat to liberate Eastern Europe from Moscow’s rule, and of its forcing the issue of German reunification. By emphasizing the threat from the Soviet Union, Eisenhower and Dulles were trying to promote an activist rather than an isolationist foreign policy. But their rhetorical diplomacy intensified Cold War tensions with European allies as well as with Moscow and effectively overwhelmed the administration’s true diplomatic aims. Based on American, British, Eastern European, and Soviet primary sources—many only recently unearthed—The Truth Is Our Weapon is a major contribution to the historiography of Eisenhower’s diplomacy and an important statement about the implications of public and private policy making.

Power and Peace offers the first analysis of in Dulles' operational plan across the board. It is also unique for the type of linkage that is uncovered between different issues in different parts of the world. Beyond this, on the basis of research notable for breadth as well as depth in key areas, it differentiates Dulles from Eisenhower, showing that, contrary to conventional wisdom, it was the former who generally took the lead on policy matters. It indicates that Dulles was capable of weighing in heavily on the side of non-intervention and hence was no more of a "hawk" than Ike. It also unveils important differences of opinion separating the secretary from his boss. Professor Marks presents some of the most crucial episodes in an entirely new light - for instance the Dien Bien Phu crisis, Western European union, intervention in Guatemala, and Dulles' indispensable work on behalf of Austrian freedom, work that has yet to receive even minimal recognition.

John Foster Dulles was one of the most influential and controversial figures in the history of twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations. Active in the field for decades, Dulles reflected and was a reflection of the tension that pervaded U.S. international conduct from its evolution as a global power in the early twentieth century through its emergence as the 'leader of the Free World' during the Cold War. His life and career embody the best and most troubling aspects of American foreign policy as it progressed toward international supremacy while swaying between altruism and self-interest. In this biography, Richard Immerman traces Dulles's path from his early days growing up in the parsonage of the First Presbyterian Church of Watertown, N.Y., through his years of amassing influence and power as an international business lawyer and adviser, to his service as President Eisenhower's secretary of state. This volume illuminates not only the history of modern U.S. foreign policy, but its search for a twentieth-century identity. Sophisticated yet accessible, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy is an important resource for graduate and undergraduate courses in U.S. history and U.S. foreign relations.

During his long, distinguished career, Chester L. Cooper has served in the White House, State Department, and CIA, often as a deputy to such high-profile statesman as John Foster Dulles and Averell Harriman. He has been near the center of power during many of the crises of our nation's recent history. In this engrossing memoir, he offers an insider's glimpse into the memorable events and important decisions in which he personally participated -- from the conflict over the Suez Canal in 1956 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 to the difficult peace negotiations of the Viet Nam War, dealing with Soviet officials during the Reagan years, and today addressing the problems of global climate change. Cooper notes that policy-making "does not emerge, like Venus, wholly formed from a half shell. Rather, it is fashioned, or cobbled up, from day to day, month to month out of vexations, arguments, failures, and triumphs of hard-pressed, over-stressed officials and civil servants." As one of those over-stressed civil servants, Cooper has unique, behind-the-scenes insights into the personalities of many now historic individuals, including Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Allen Dulles, John Foster Dulles, Averell Harriman, Anthony Eden, Harold Wilson, Nikita Khrushchev, and Ho Chi Minh. Cooper's reflections on the friendships, animosities, and enduring relationships within the network of government insiders reveal the human side of policy-making and offer important lessons for the future course of international relations.

The Cold War ended with an exhilarating wave of events: the toppling of the Berlin Wall, the rise of the dissident poet Vaclav Havel, the revolution in Romania. Americans rejoiced at the dramatic conclusion of the long struggle. "But victories in wars--hot or cold--tend to unfocus the mind," writes John Gaddis. "It can be a dangerous thing to have achieved one's objectives, because one then has to decide what to do next." In The United States and the End of the Cold War, Gaddis provides a sharp focus on the long history of the Cold War, shedding new light on its sudden ending, as well as on what might come next. In this provocative, insightful book, Gaddis offers a number of thoughtful essays on the history of international relations during the last half century. His reassessments of important figures and themes from the Cold War are sometimes surprising. For example, he portrays John Foster Dulles and Ronald Reagan as far more flexible and perceptive statesmen than the missile-toting caricatures depicted in editorial cartoons. And he takes a second look at the importance of espionage and intelligence in Cold War history, a field often left to buffs and spy novelists. Most important, he focuses on the central elements in superpower relations. In an eloquent account of the American style of foreign policy in the twentieth century, for instance, he explores how Americans (having learned the lesson of Adolf Hitler) consistently equated the forms of foreign governments with their external behavior, assuming that authoritarian states would be aggressive states. He also analyzes the "tectonics" of Cold War history, demonstrating how long term changes in international affairs and Soviet bloc countries built up pressures that led to the sudden earthquakes of 1989. And along the way, Gaddis illuminates such topics as the role of morality in American foreign policy, the relevance of nuclear weapons to the balance of power, and the objectives of containment. He even includes (and criticizes) an essay entitled, "How the Cold War Might End," written before the dramatic events of recent years, to demonstrate how quickly the tide of history can overwhelm contemporary analysis. Gaddis concludes with a thoughtful consideration of the problems and forces at work in the post-Cold War world. Author of such works as The Long Peace and Strategies of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis is one of the leading authorities on postwar American foreign policy. In these perceptive, highly readable essays, he provides a fresh assessment of the evolution of the Cold War, and insight into the shape of things to come.

When Strategies of Containment was first published, the Soviet Union was still a superpower, Ronald Reagan was president of the United States, and the Berlin Wall was still standing. This updated edition of Gaddis' classic carries the history of containment through the end of the Cold War. Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's postwar plans, Gaddis provides a thorough critical analysis of George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of detente, and now a comprehensive assessment of how Reagan - and Gorbechev - completed the process of containment, thereby bringing the Cold War to an end. He concludes, provocatively, that Reagan more effectively than any other Cold War president drew upon the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. A must-read for anyone interested in Cold War history, grand strategy, and the origins of the post-Cold War world.