Judging Statutes

In an ideal world, the laws of Congress--known as federal statutes--would always be clearly worded and easily understood by the judges tasked with interpreting them. But many laws feature ambiguous or even contradictory wording. How, then, should judges divine their meaning? Should they stick only to the text? To what degree, if any, should they consult aids beyond the statutes themselves? Are the purposes of lawmakers in writing law relevant? Some judges, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, believe courts should look to the language of the statute and virtually nothing else. Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectfully disagrees. In Judging Statutes, Katzmann, who is a trained political scientist as well as a judge, argues that our constitutional system charges Congress with enacting laws; therefore, how Congress makes its purposes known through both the laws themselves and reliable accompanying materials should be respected. He looks at how the American government works, including how laws come to be and how various agencies construe legislation. He then explains the judicial process of interpreting and applying these laws through the demonstration of two interpretative approaches, purposivism (focusing on the purpose of a law) and textualism (focusing solely on the text of the written law). Katzmann draws from his experience to show how this process plays out in the real world, and concludes with some suggestions to promote understanding between the courts and Congress. When courts interpret the laws of Congress, they should be mindful of how Congress actually functions, how lawmakers signal the meaning of statutes, and what those legislators expect of courts construing their laws. The legislative record behind a law is in truth part of its foundation, and therefore merits consideration.

In the last twenty-five years, there has been a raging debate over how judges should interpret the laws of Congress - called federal statutes. In an ideal world, federal statutes would always be clearly worded and easily-understood by the judges tasked with interpreting them, But many laws are worded ambiguously or even contradictorily, requiring the judge to divine their meaning. Should, for example, the judge understand "convicted in any court" to include any court in the world, or simply any court in the United States? How is the judge to determine the answer? Should she stick only to the text? To what degree, if any, should the judge consult aids beyond the statutes themselves, including legislative materials, when interpreting laws? Are the purposes of lawmakers in writing law relevant? Some judges, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, believe courts should look to the language of the statute and virtually nothing else. Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectfully disagrees. In Judging Statutes, Judge Katzmann, both a trained political scientist and a judge, argues that our constitutional system charges Congress with enacting laws; so, how Congress makes its purposes known through both the laws themselves and reliable accompanying materials should be respected. He contends that when courts interpret the laws of Congress, they should pay greater attention to how Congress actually functions, how lawmakers signal their meaning in statutes, and what they expect from those interpreting its laws. The legislative record behind a law is in truth part of its foundation, and therefore merits consideration Judge Katzmann begins his argument with a look at how the American government works, including how laws come to be and how various agencies construe legislation. He then explains the judicial process of interpreting and applying these laws through the demonstration of two interpretative approaches, purposivism-that is, focusing on the purpose of a law-and textualism-that is, focusing on the text of the written law itself. Judge Katzmann draws from his personal experience on the U.S. Court of Appeals in showing how this process plays out in the real world, and concludes with some suggestions to promote understanding between the courts and Congress.

A history of the discretion accorded U.S. judges in interpreting legislation (from the Revolution to the present), culminating in the author's own theory of the proper scope of judicial discretion.

In this book, Adrian Vermeule shows that any approach to legal interpretation rests on institutional and empirical premises about the capacities of judges and the systemic effects of their rulings. He argues that legal interpretation is above all an exercise in decisionmaking under severe empirical uncertainty.

What role should the Senate play in the selection and confirmation of judges? What criteria are appropriate in evaluating nominees? What kinds of questions and answers are appropriate in confirmation hearings? How do judges interpret laws enacted by Congress, and what problems do they face? And what kinds of communications are proper between judges and legislators? These questions go to the heart of the relationship between the federal judiciary and Congress—a relationship that critically shapes the administration of justice. The judiciary needs an environment respectful of its mission; and the legislative branch seeks a judicial system that faithfully construes its laws and efficiently discharges justice. But the judicial-congressional relationship is hindered by an array of issues, including an ever-rising judicial caseload, federalization of the law, resource constraints, concerns about the confirmation process, increasing legislative scrutiny of judicial decisionmaking and the administration of justice, and debates about how the courts should interpret legislation. Drawing on the world of scholarship and from personal experience, Robert A. Katzmann examines governance in judicial-congressional relations. After identifying problems, he offers ways to improve understanding between the two branches. Copublished with the Governance Institute

This publication is the latest in a series of steps to assist judges in carrying out their onerous responsibilities, and represents a concise yet comprehensive set of principles addressing the many difficult ethical issues that confront judges as they work and live in their communities. It also provides a sound basis to promote a more complete understanding of the role of the judge in society and of the ethical dilemmas they so often encounter. Sections of the publication cover the following: the purpose of the publication; judicial independence; integrity; diligence; equality; and impartiality, including judicial demeanour, civic and charitable activity, political activity, and conflicts of interest.

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.

In this groundbreaking book, Scalia and Garner systematically explain all the most important principles of constitutional, statutory, and contractual interpretation in an engaging and informative style with hundreds of illustrations from actual cases. Is a burrito a sandwich? Is a corporation entitled to personal privacy? If you trade a gun for drugs, are you using a gun in a drug transaction? The authors grapple with these and dozens of equally curious questions while explaining the most principled, lucid, and reliable techniques for deriving meaning from authoritative texts. Meanwhile, the book takes up some of the most controversial issues in modern jurisprudence. What, exactly, is textualism? Why is strict construction a bad thing? What is the true doctrine of originalism? And which is more important: the spirit of the law, or the letter? The authors write with a well-argued point of view that is definitive yet nuanced, straightforward yet sophisticated.