Judicial Evaluation

Canada's Supreme Court decides cases with far-reaching effects on Canadian politics and public policies. When the Supreme Court sets cases on its agenda, it exercises nearly unrestrained discretion and considerable public authority. But how does the Court choose these cases in the first place? From the several hundred requests for judicial review filed every year, how and why do the justices pick some cases but not others for review? Tournament of Appeals investigates the leave to appeal process in Canada and explores how and why certain cases "win" a place on the Court's agenda and others do not. Taking the approach that the process mimics a sports tournament, this study raises several vital questions. For example, is there an elite Supreme Court "bar" that routinely wins the tournament? Do the Court's rules affect the tournament's outcomes? Or does winning and losing reflect the resources of the parties? As players in this tournament, how do the judges play the game and how does it affect their votes to grant or deny judicial review? Drawing from systematically collected information on the process, applications, and lawyers that has never before been used in studies of Canada's Supreme Court, Roy B. Flemming offers both a qualitatively- and quantitatively-based explanation of how Canada's justices grant judicial review. The first of its kind, this innovative study will draw the attention of lawyers, academics, and students in Canada as well as in the Commonwealth, and European countries whose high courts share many features of the appeals process in Canada.

Any practitioner faced with the decision as to whether to appeal, or who has questions arising at each stage, will benefit enormously from a book that examines the law, principles, procedures, and processes involved. This leading work has been updated and restructured, to ensure it provides guidance on the complete and complex process of making a civil appeal. Clearly written and cross referenced, the books UK/European coverage of appeals includes: -- District Judges to Circuit Judges in the County Court -- Masters and District Judges to High Court Judges -- Court of Appeal -- House of Lords -- Privy Council -- The European Court -- The European Court of Human Rights -- Administrative Law and Elections

This publication is the latest in a series of steps to assist judges in carrying out their onerous responsibilities, and represents a concise yet comprehensive set of principles addressing the many difficult ethical issues that confront judges as they work and live in their communities. It also provides a sound basis to promote a more complete understanding of the role of the judge in society and of the ethical dilemmas they so often encounter. Sections of the publication cover the following: the purpose of the publication; judicial independence; integrity; diligence; equality; and impartiality, including judicial demeanour, civic and charitable activity, political activity, and conflicts of interest.

Unlike many other countries, the United States has few constitutional guarantees of social welfare rights such as income, housing, or healthcare. In part this is because many Americans believe that the courts cannot possibly enforce such guarantees. However, recent innovations in constitutional design in other countries suggest that such rights can be judicially enforced--not by increasing the power of the courts but by decreasing it. In Weak Courts, Strong Rights, Mark Tushnet uses a comparative legal perspective to show how creating weaker forms of judicial review may actually allow for stronger social welfare rights under American constitutional law. Under "strong-form" judicial review, as in the United States, judicial interpretations of the constitution are binding on other branches of government. In contrast, "weak-form" review allows the legislature and executive to reject constitutional rulings by the judiciary--as long as they do so publicly. Tushnet describes how weak-form review works in Great Britain and Canada and discusses the extent to which legislatures can be expected to enforce constitutional norms on their own. With that background, he turns to social welfare rights, explaining the connection between the "state action" or "horizontal effect" doctrine and the enforcement of social welfare rights. Tushnet then draws together the analysis of weak-form review and that of social welfare rights, explaining how weak-form review could be used to enforce those rights. He demonstrates that there is a clear judicial path--not an insurmountable judicial hurdle--to better enforcement of constitutional social welfare rights.

In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy.