Judicial Review And Contemporary Democratic Theory

For decades, the question of judicial review’s status in a democratic political system has been adjudicated through the framework of what Alexander Bickel labeled "the counter-majoritarian difficulty." That is, the idea that judicial review is particularly problematic for democracy because it opposes the will of the majority. Judicial Review and Contemporary Democratic Theory begins with an assessment of the empirical and theoretical flaws of this framework, and an account of the ways in which this framework has hindered meaningful investigation into judicial review’s value within a democratic political system. To replace the counter-majoritarian difficulty framework, Scott E. Lemieux and David J. Watkins draw on recent work in democratic theory emphasizing democracy’s opposition to domination and analyses of constitutional court cases in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere to examine judicial review in its institutional and political context. Developing democratic criteria for veto points in a democratic system and comparing them to each other against these criteria, Lemieux and Watkins yield fresh insights into judicial review’s democratic value. This book is essential reading for students of law and courts, judicial politics, legal theory and constitutional law.

Words That Bind presents a careful and nuanced treatment of constitutional interpretation and judicial review. By bringing constitutional theory and contemporary political philosophy to bear on each other, John Arthur illuminates these topics as no other recent author has.

This powerfully argued appraisal of judicial review may change the face of American law. Written for layman and scholar alike, the book addresses one of the most important issues facing Americans today: within what guidelines shall the Supreme Court apply the strictures of the Constitution to the complexities of modern life? Until now legal experts have proposed two basic approaches to the Constitution. The first, “interpretivism,” maintains that we should stick as closely as possible to what is explicit in the document itself. The second, predominant in recent academic theorizing, argues that the courts should be guided by what they see as the fundamental values of American society. John Hart Ely demonstrates that both of these approaches are inherently incomplete and inadequate. Democracy and Distrust sets forth a new and persuasive basis for determining the role of the Supreme Court today. Ely’s proposal is centered on the view that the Court should devote itself to assuring majority governance while protecting minority rights. “The Constitution,” he writes, “has proceeded from the sensible assumption that an effective majority will not unreasonably threaten its own rights, and has sought to assure that such a majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats itself. It has done so by structuring decision processes at all levels in an attempt to ensure, first, that everyone’s interests will be represented when decisions are made, and second, that the application of those decisions will not be manipulated so as to reintroduce in practice the sort of discrimination that is impermissible in theory.” Thus, Ely’s emphasis is on the procedural side of due process, on the preservation of governmental structure rather than on the recognition of elusive social values. At the same time, his approach is free of interpretivism’s rigidity because it is fully responsive to the changing wishes of a popular majority. Consequently, his book will have a profound impact on legal opinion at all levels—from experts in constitutional law, to lawyers with general practices, to concerned citizens watching the bewildering changes in American law.

In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision.

The role courts should play in American democracy has long been contested, fueling debates among citizens who take an active interest in politics. Alexander Bickel made a significant contribution to these debates with his seminal publication, The Least Dangerous Branch, which framed the problem of defending legitimate judicial authority. This book addresses whether or not the countermajoritarian difficulty outlined in Bickel's work continues to have significance for constitutional theory almost a half-century later. The contributors illustrate how the countermajoritarian difficulty and Bickel's response to it engage prominent theories: the proceduralisms of John Hart Ely and Jeremy Waldron; the republicanisms of Bruce Ackerman and Cass Sunstein; and the originalisms of Raoul Berger, Robert Bork, and Keith Whittington. In so doing, this book provides a useful introduction to recent debates in constitutional theory and also contributes to the broader discussion about the proper role of the courts.

Democratic dysfunction can arise in both 'at risk' and well-functioning constitutional systems. It can threaten a system's responsiveness to both minority rights claims and majoritarian constitutional understandings. Responsive Judicial Review aims to counter this dysfunction using examples from both the global north and global south, including leading constitutional courts in the US, UK, Canada, India, South Africa, and Colombia, as well as select aspects of the constitutional jurisprudence of courts in Australia, Fiji, Hong Kong, and Korea. In this book, Dixon argues that courts should adopt a sufficiently 'dialogic' approach to countering relevant democratic blockages and look for ways to increase the actual and perceived legitimacy of their decisions--through careful choices about their framing, and the timing and selection of cases. By orienting judicial choices about constitutional construction toward promoting democratic responsiveness, or toward countering forms of democratic monopoly, blind spots, and burdens of inertia, judicial review helps safeguard a constitutional system's responsiveness to democratic majority understandings. The idea of 'responsive' judicial review encourages courts to engage with their own distinct institutional position, and potential limits on their own capacity and legitimacy. Dixon further explores the ways that this translates into the embracing of a 'weakened' approach to judicial finality, compared to the traditional US-model of judicial supremacy, as well as a nuanced approach to the making of judicial implications, a 'calibrated' approach to judicial scrutiny or judgments about proportionality, and an embrace of 'weak DS strong' rather than wholly weak or strong judicial remedies. Not all courts will be equally well-placed to engage in review of this kind, or successful at doing so. For responsive judicial review to succeed, it must be sensitive to context-specific limitations of this kind. Nevertheless, the idea of responsive judicial review is explicitly normative and aspirational: it aims to provide a blueprint for how courts should think about the practice of judicial review as they strive to promote and protect democratic constitutional values.

Although the government of the United States is traditionally viewed as a democracy, there is considerable disagreement about what democracy means and implies. In a comprehensive study Professor Edelman examines the three democratic paradigms most prevalent in America today: natural rights, contract, and competition. Theories based on these paradigms lead to different ideas of democracy, each of which yields variant interpretations of the Constitution. This close relationship between democratic theories and constitutional interpretations is analyzed in an extensive historical introduction, which focuses on some of the major thinkers in American history. Edelman's discussion shows that neither the Constitution nor the development of American political thought can serve as an authoritative basis for any one theory of democracy. Instead of a particular theory, the historical constant was an appeal to reason inherent in our basic charter. In his methodological section, Edelman argues that we must use reason to clarify the latent values inherent in the differing concepts of democracy and the consequences that flow from them. He analyzes judicial ideas in the light of three concepts deemed central to any democratic theory—citizenship, political participation, and political freedom—and concludes with a balanced account of contemporary democratic theories, the constitutional theories related to them, and a critique of both.