Judicial Review In New Democracies

New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop in the early stages of democratic liberalization, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in Asia: Taiwan, Korea, and Mongolia. In a region that has traditionally viewed law as a tool of authoritarian rulers, constitutional courts in these three societies are becoming a real constraint on government. In contrast with conventional culturalist accounts, this book argues that the design and functioning of constitutional review are largely a function of politics and interests. Judicial review - the power of judges to rule an act of a legislature or national leader unconstitutional - is a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing insurance to prospective electoral losers, judicial review can facilitate democracy.

Introduction : the accountability function of courts in new democracies / Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella, and Elin Skaar Judicial review in developed democracies / Martin Shapiro How some reflections on the United States' experience may inform African efforts to build court systems and the rule of law / Jennifer Widner The constitutional court and control of presidential extraordinary powers in Colombia / Rodrigo Uprimny The politics of judicial review in Chile in the era of domestic transition, 1990-2002 / Javier A. Couso Legitimating transformation : political resource allocation in the South African constitutional court / Theunis Roux The accountability function of courts in Tanzania and Zambia / Siri Gloppen Renegotiating "law and order" : judicial reform and citizen responses in post-war Guatemala / Rachel Sieder Economic reform and judicial governance in Brazil : balancing independence with accountability / Carlos Santiso In search of a democratic justice what courts should not do : Argentina, 1983-2002 / Roberto Gargarella Lessons learned and the way forward / Irwin P. Stotzky.

For decades, the question of judicial review’s status in a democratic political system has been adjudicated through the framework of what Alexander Bickel labeled "the counter-majoritarian difficulty." That is, the idea that judicial review is particularly problematic for democracy because it opposes the will of the majority. Judicial Review and Contemporary Democratic Theory begins with an assessment of the empirical and theoretical flaws of this framework, and an account of the ways in which this framework has hindered meaningful investigation into judicial review’s value within a democratic political system. To replace the counter-majoritarian difficulty framework, Scott E. Lemieux and David J. Watkins draw on recent work in democratic theory emphasizing democracy’s opposition to domination and analyses of constitutional court cases in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere to examine judicial review in its institutional and political context. Developing democratic criteria for veto points in a democratic system and comparing them to each other against these criteria, Lemieux and Watkins yield fresh insights into judicial review’s democratic value. This book is essential reading for students of law and courts, judicial politics, legal theory and constitutional law.

Explores the relationship between the legitimacy, the efficacy, and the decision-making of national and transnational constitutional courts.

Describes the decisions of the most innovative of the new constitutional courts in post Soviet Central Europe

This book examines how constitutional courts can support weak democratic states in the wake of societal division and authoritarian regimes.

In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision.

This is the first focused study on the relationship between the use of national courts to pursue retrospective justice and the construction of viable democracies. Included in this interdisciplinary volume are fascinating, detailed essays on the experiences of eight countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and South Africa. According to the contributors, the most important lesson for leaders of new democracies, who are wrestling with the human rights abuses of past dictatorships, is that they have many options. Democratizing regimes are well-advised to be attentive to the significant political, ethical, and legal constraints that may limit their ability to achieve retribution for past wrongs. On prudential ground alone, some fledgling regimes will have no choice but to restrain their desire for punishment in the interest of political survival. However, it would be incorrect to think that all new democracies are therefore bereft of the political and legal resources needed to bring the perpetrators of egregious human rights violations to justice. In many instances, governments have overcome the obstacles before them and, by appealing to both national and international legal standards, have brought their former dictators to trial. When these judicial proceedings have been properly conducted and insulated from partisan political pressures, they have provided tangible evidence of the guiding principles-equality, fairness, and the rule of law-that are essential to the post-authoritarian order. This collection shows that the quest for transitional justice has amounted to something more than merely a break with the past--it constitutes a formative act which directly affects the quality and credibility of democratic institutions.