Judicializing The Administrative State

A basic feature of the modern US administrative state taken for granted by legal scholars but neglected by political scientists and historians is its strong judiciality. Formal, or court-like, adjudication was the primary method of first-order agency policy making during the first half of the twentieth century. Even today, most US administrative agencies hire administrative law judges and other adjudicators conducting hearings using formal procedures autonomously from the agency head. No other industrialized democracy has even come close to experiencing the systematic state judicialization that took place in the United States. Why did the American administrative state become highly judicialized, rather than developing a more efficiency-oriented Weberian bureaucracy? Legal scholars argue that lawyers as a profession imposed the judicial procedures they were the most familiar with on agencies. But this explanation fails to show why the judicialization took place only in the United States at the time it did. Okayama demonstrates that the American institutional combination of common law and the presidential system favored policy implementation through formal procedures by autonomous agencies and that it induced the creation and development of independent regulatory commissions explicitly modeled after courts from the late nineteenth century. These commissions judicialized the state not only through their proliferation but also through the diffusion of their formal procedures to executive agencies over the next half century, which led to a highly fairness-oriented administrative state.

From two legal luminaries, a highly original framework for restoring confidence in a government bureaucracy increasingly derided as “the deep state.” Is the modern administrative state illegitimate? Unconstitutional? Unaccountable? Dangerous? Intolerable? American public law has long been riven by a persistent, serious conflict, a kind of low-grade cold war, over these questions. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the administrative state can be redeemed, as long as public officials are constrained by what they call the morality of administrative law. Law and Leviathan elaborates a number of principles that underlie this moral regime. Officials who respect that morality never fail to make rules in the first place. They ensure transparency, so that people are made aware of the rules with which they must comply. They never abuse retroactivity, so that people can rely on current rules, which are not under constant threat of change. They make rules that are understandable and avoid issuing rules that contradict each other. These principles may seem simple, but they have a great deal of power. Already, without explicit enunciation, they limit the activities of administrative agencies every day. But we can aspire for better. In more robust form, these principles could address many of the concerns that have critics of the administrative state mourning what they see as the demise of the rule of law. The bureaucratic Leviathan may be an inescapable reality of complex modern democracies, but Sunstein and Vermeule show how we can at last make peace between those who accept its necessity and those who yearn for its downfall.

De Tocqueville once wrote that 'insufferable despotism' would prevail if America ever acquired a national administrative state. Between 1900 and 1940, radicals created vast bureaucracies that continue to trample on individual freedom. Ernst shows, to the contrary, that the nation's best corporate lawyers were among the creators of 'commission government'; that supporters were more interested in purging government of corruption than creating a socialist utopia; and that the principles of individual rights, limited government, and due process were designed into the administrative state.

This book examines administrative law throughout Asia, exploring the profound changes in many legal regimes that have occurred. It shows how many states have shifted towards a more market-oriented regulatory state model, involving a greater role for judges and law-like processes, and explores the profound implications of this for policy-making.

In this Handbook, distinguished experts in the field of administrative law discuss a wide range of issues from a comparative perspective. The book covers the historical beginnings of comparative administrative law scholarship, and discusses important methodological issues and basic concepts such as administrative power and accountability.

The Max Planck Handbooks in European Public Law series describes and analyses the public law of the European legal space, an area that encompasses not only the law of the European Union but also the European Convention on Human Rights and, importantly, the domestic public laws of European states. Recognizing that the ongoing vertical and horizontal processes of European integration make legal comparison the task of our time for both scholars and practitioners, it aims to foster the development of a specifically European legal pluralism and to contribute to the legitimacy and efficiency of European public law. The first volume of the series begins this enterprise with an appraisal of the evolution of the state and its administration, with cross-cutting contributions and also specific country reports. While the former include, among others, treatises on historical antecedents of the concept of European public law, the development of the administrative state as such, the relationship between constitutional and administrative law, and legal conceptions of statehood, the latter focus on states and legal orders as diverse as, e.g., Spain and Hungary or Great Britain and Greece. With this, the book provides access to the systematic foundations, pivotal historic moments, and legal thought of states bound together not only by a common history but also by deep and entrenched normative ties; for the quality of the ius publicum europaeum can be no better than the common understanding European scholars and practitioners have of the law of other states. An understanding thus improved will enable them to operate with the shared skills, knowledge, and values that can bring to fruition the different processes of European integration.

This open access book addresses several questions regarding the implementation of human and organisational factors (HOF) so that recent improvements in industrial safety can be built upon. It addresses sources of frustration in senior management with high expectations of operational recommendations and disquiet on the part of HOF specialists struggling to have an impact on high-level decision making. The brief explores these issues with an emphasis on examples and lessons learned based on the experience of its authors, who come from different academic disciplines and various industrial sectors such as oil and gas, energy and transportation. It then offers some ways forward for a better consideration of HOF in hazardous companies with a view of promoting safety and facing challenges in a rapidly changing world.

During the last two decades the judiciary has come to play an increasingly important political role in Latin America. Constitutional courts and supreme courts are more active in counterbalancing executive and legislative power than ever before. At the same time, the lack of effective citizenship rights has prompted ordinary people to press their claims and secure their rights through the courts. This collection of essays analyzes the diverse manifestations of the judicialization of politics in contemporary Latin America, assessing their positive and negative consequences for state-society relations, the rule of law, and democratic governance in the region. With individual chapters exploring Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, it advances a comparative framework for thinking about the nature of the judicialization of politics within contemporary Latin American democracies.