Kant S Deduction From Apperception

In focusing on the systematic deduction of the categories from a principle, Schulting takes up anew the controversial project of the eminent German Kant scholar Klaus Reich, whose monograph “The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments” made the case that the logical functions of judgement can all be derived from the objective unity of apperception and can be shown to link up with one another systematically. Common opinion among Kantians today has it that Kant did not mean to derive the functions of judgement, and accordingly the categories, from the principle of apperception. Schulting challenges this standard view and aims to resuscitate the main motivation behind Reich’s project. He argues, in agreement with Reich’s main thesis about the derivability of the functions of judgement, that Kant indeed does mean to derive, in full a priori fashion, the categories from the principle of apperception. Schulting also shows that, given the general assumptions of the Critical philosophy, Kant's derivation is successful and that absent an account of the derivation of the categories from apperception, the B-Deduction cannot really be understood. New edition. First published 2012 as „Kant’s Deduction and Apperception. Explaining the Categories" (Palgrave Macmillan)

The book offers a thoroughgoing, analytic account of the Deduction of the Categories in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason that is different from existing interpretations in at least one important aspect: its central claim is that the categories are derivable from the principle of apperception.

This book is organized as a commentary following the text of the B-Transcendental Deduction line by line. In so doing, it becomes evident that each step of the Deduction necessarily follows from the preceding step and is grounded in it, although not in the way the steps of a formal-logic deduction are. The primary hypothesis of this book is that the succession of steps is but the unfolding of the Principle of Apperception. The commentary assumes that the entire argument of the B-Deduction consists in a progressive enlargement and enrichment of the Principle of Apperception. The book draws its unity from this assumption, as well as from the strong concatenation of the successive steps. Focusing the monograph on the very narrow problem of the B-Deduction’s argumentative structure enables the author to settle several controversial questions, such as, for instance, those originating in the division of the B-Deduction in two steps, and that of the function of the doctrine of the transcendental subject expounded in paragraphs 24 and 25. Its comprehensive explanation of the Transcendental Deduction ensures that the book will be helpful to students of Kantian Philosophy, while its focus on a single problem will make it useful to specialists. Kant’s B Deduction is part of the Kantian Questions series.

Der Band enthält zweiundzwanzig Texte von anerkannten Experten der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, die sich mit der Theorie der Apperzeption, mit der transzendentalen Deduktion der Kategorien und mit den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft aus sehr unterschiedlichen Perspektiven auseinandersetzen. Untersucht werden vor allem (1) die philosophischen Quellen der Kantischen Begriffe „Apperzeption" und „Selbstbewusstsein", (2) die historische Entwicklung der Lehre der Apperzeption und der Deduktion der Kategorien in der sogenannten vor-kritischen Phase, (3) Struktur und Inhalte sowohl der A- als auch der B-Deduktion der Kategorien, und schließlich (4) den (Kantischen, aber auch nicht Kantischen) Sinn der Begriffe der „Apperzeption" und des „Selbstbewusstseins".

The central novel claim of the book is that in the B-Deduction Kant provides a proof of the derivability of each of the twelve categories from the principle of apperception. This goes against the current view that the Transcendental Deduction is not

Immanuel Kant’s ‘Transcendental Deduction of the Categories’ addresses issues centrally debated today in philosophy and in cognitive sciences, especially in epistemology, and in theory of perception. Kant’s insights into these issues are clouded by pervasive misunderstandings of Kant’s ‘Deduction’ and its actual aims, scope, and argument. The present edition with its fresh and accurate translation and concise commentary aims to serve these contemporary debates as well as continuing intensive and extensive scholarship on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Two surprising results are that ‘Transcendental Deduction’ is valid and sound, and it holds independently of Kant’s transcendental idealism. This lucid volume is interesting and useful to students, yet sufficiently detailed to be informative to specialists.

In this book, Dennis Schulting presents a staunch defence of Kant’s radical subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge. This defence is mounted by means of a comprehensive analysis of what is arguably the centrepiece of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, namely, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Radical subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge is to be understood as the thesis that the possibility of knowledge of objects essentially and wholly depends on subjective functions of thought, or the capacity to judge by virtue of transcendental apperception, given sensory input. Subjectivism thus defined is not about merely the necessary conditions of knowledge, but nor is it claimed that it grounds the very existence of things. Novel interpretations are provided of such central themes as the objective unity of apperception, the threefold synthesis, judgement, truth and objective validity, spontaneity in judgement, figurative synthesis and spatial unity, nonconceptual content, idealism and the thing in itself, and material synthesis. One chapter is dedicated to the interpretation of the Deduction by Kant’s most prominent successor, G.W.F. Hegel, and throughout Schulting critically engages with the work of contemporary readers of Kant such as Lucy Allais, Robert Hanna, John McDowell, Robert Pippin, and James Van Cleve.

The argument of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the Critique of Pure Reason is the deepest and most far-reaching in philosophy. In his new book, Robert Howell interprets main themes of the Deduction using ideas from contemporary philosophy and intensional logic, thereby providing a keener grasp of Kant's many subtleties than has hitherto been available. No other work pursues Kant's argument through every twist and turn with the careful, logically detailed attention maintained here. Surprising new accounts of apperception, the concept of an object, the logical functions of thought, the role of the Metaphysical Deduction, and Kant's relations to his Aristotelian-Cartesian background are developed. Howell makes a precise contribution to the discussion of most of the disputed issues in the history of Deduction interpretation. Controversial in its conclusions, this book demands the attention of all who take seriously the task of understanding Kant's work and evaluating it dispassionately.