Kissinger And The Invasion Of Cyprus

Can Henry Kissinger be described as a serious statesman who altered the course of relations between states? Or was he a shallow impersonator of those whom he admired, and a geopolitical engineer who treated people as collateral fodder, reducing morality to the status of a strategic and tactical tool? Using the story of Kissinger’s behaviour over Cyprus, backed up by recently revealed government documents, many critical, William Mallinson, former diplomat and leading authority on Cyprus’ history, provides an incisive analysis and evaluation of Kissinger’s approach, revealing a man who appears to have considered political strategy more important than law and ethics.

In 1974 the Greek colonels ousted the Greek-Cypriot leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and Turkey retaliated by invading and seizing a third of the island. Cyprus remains split in two, like Berlin before the wall came down, bristling with troops and spying bases, and permanently policed by the United Nations. Henry Kissinger claimed he could do nothing to stop the coup because of the Watergate crisis, but this book presents evidence to support the view that it was no failure of American foreign policy, but the realization of a long-term plot. The authors describe the strategic reasons for Washington's need to divide the island. Their account encompasses an international cast of characters that includes Eden, Eisenhower, Nixon, Kissinger, Wilson, Callaghan, Grivas, and the leaders of the two halves of the divided island, Clerides and Denktas.

In the troubled island of Cyprus, the national interests and rivalries of Greece and Turkey still collide, the population remains divided between the Greek and Turkish communities and the country is still a cat's paw of outside powers - especially the USA and the now resurgent Russia - as it has been since the acquisition of the island by Britain in 1878. Global rivalry between the great powers and Cyprus's vitally strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean - a 'listening post' in the Cold War and even today - has meant that the populations have never been free to shape their own destinies which have been constantly influenced by great power interests. These are problems that have been brought into sharp focus by Cyprus's entry into the European Union. William Mallinson's book is a fast-moving and incisive narrative history which portrays Cyprus as a continuing source of international tension in the Mediterranean and beyond. It features the latest source material from the recently released National Archive, vivid interviews with key players, even reports which raise awkward and embarrassing questions. His critical eye uncovers the underlying story of American and British involvement in the island's affairs, first as a key territory in Cold War politics with its close proximity to the Middle East and Asia and now as a key asset in the 'war on terror'. Mallinson's new insights and revelations on the period leading up to and following the Turkish invasion in 1974, when Greece and Turkey - both NATO members - were on the brink of war are fascinating and make essential reading. Henry Kissinger is seen to be even more the master puppeteer, pressuring Britain not to give up her bases. Mallinson examines how after the Turkish invasion Kissinger planned the abortive Annan Plan to divide the island and how he regarded the retention of Cyprus as vital for a future solution of the Arab-Israeli problem. For Kissinger Cyprus was the important square on the 'world chequer-board' while British influence continued to decline and her independence in foreign policy was virtually non-existent. Mallinson also explores how Turkey's drive to join the EU will affect not only stability in Cyprus but also the whole region, as Russia's influence in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean expands. So, in William Mallinson's words, 'Cyprus lies [still] at the epicentre of this whole geopolitical merry-go-round'.

In this incendiary book, Hitchens takes the floor as prosecuting counsel and mounts a devastating indictment of Henry Kissinger, whose ambitions and ruthlessness have directly resulted in both individual murders and widespread, indiscriminate slaughter.

Journalist Christopher Hitchens examines events leading up to the partition of Cyprus and its legacy. He argues that the intervention of four major foreign powers Turkey, Greece, Britain, and the United States turned a local dispute into a major disaster. In a new Afterword, Hitchens reviews the implications of Cyprus's applications for European Union membership and more.

After the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus of 20 July 1974 that changed completely the balance of power in Cyprus in favour of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots the deposed and self-exiled President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios III met three times with the head of the American diplomacy, Dr Henry Kissinger. Makarios was obviously in a very weak political position and tried without any visible success to influence the position of the USA with regard to the terrible situation in Cyprus. A very interesting account of how the balance of power can change dramatically after a military defeat on the ground.

In-depth study of the events leading up to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974.

This volume approaches foreign interventions in Cyprus from two different angles: a vertical angle, which corresponds to a case-by-case historical analysis of foreign interventions which have taken place throughout the modern history of Cyprus, and a horizontal angle, which corresponds to the implementation of systemic models of analysis in approaching foreign interventions in Cyprus. Furthermore, the volume deals with domestic perceptions formed as a result of foreign interventions in Cyprus, focusing particularly on their impact on the politics and public rhetoric of the Cyprus problem, especially as regards the Greek Cypriot community.