Knowledge Morals And Practice In Kant S Anthropology

This volume sheds new light on Immanuel Kant’s conception of anthropology. Neither a careful and widespread search of the sources nor a merely theoretical speculation about Kant’s critical path can fully reveal the necessarily wider horizon of his anthropology. This only comes to light by overcoming all traditional schemes within Kantian studies, and consequently reconsidering the traditional divisions within Kant’s thought. The goal of this book is to highlight an alternative, yet complementary path followed by Kantian anthropology with regard to transcendental philosophy. The present volume intends to develop this path in order to demonstrate how irreducible it is in what concerns some crucial claims of Kant’s philosophy, such as the critical defense of the unity of reason, the search for a new method in metaphysics and the moral outcome of Kant’s thought.

Table of contents

Kant's lectures on anthropology capture him at the height of his intellectual power. They are immensely important for advancing our understanding of Kant's conception of anthropology, its development, and the notoriously difficult relationship between it and the critical philosophy. This 2003 collection of essays by some of the leading commentators on Kant offers a systematic account of the philosophical importance of this material that should nevertheless prove of interest to historians of ideas and political theorists. There are two broad approaches adopted: a number of the essays consider the systematic relations of the anthropology to critical philosophy, especially speculative knowledge and ethics. Other essays focus on the anthropology as a major source for the clarification of both the content and development of Kant's work. The volume also serves as an interpretative complement to the translation of the lectures in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.

This work is the product of several years of intense study of the various aspects of Kant's work, and the attempt to provide insights for students both with respect to the details of the Kantian system, and into the development and implications of the system as a whole. During that time many individuals have contributed to its ultimate formulation, and I would like to express my appreciation at least to the more generous contributors. For a careful reading of the manuscript in its earlier forms, and suggestions which helped in many ways to improve the work and to crystalize its thesis, I would like to thank Professors Wilbur Long, A. C. Ewing, and Richard Bosley. For their interest and encouragement in the later stages of the project, I must thank Professor Lewis White Beck, and the many students who have taken my Kant seminar at the University of Alberta, especially Mr. Dieter Hartmetz. And finally, 1 acknowledge with pleasure my longstanding debt to Professor William H. Werkmeister for his years of critical advice and encouragement. Perhaps only Kant and my wife have contributed more to my philosophic development. Acknowledgment must also be made of the permission kindly granted by various publishers for the use of material from the following works under their copyright. Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Lewis White Beck (copyright 1956, by The Liberal Arts Press, Inc.

The second part of Kant's ethics was described by Kant as applied moral philosophy or ethics applied to the human being. Kant's Impure Ethics critically examines this second part and assesses its value and nature in great detail.

The only English translation of recently edited transcriptions of Kant's lectures on anthropology, given between 1772 and 1789.

Currently fashionable among critics of enlightenment thought is the charge that Kant's ethics fails to provide an adequate account of character and its formation in moral and political life. G. Felicitas Munzel challenges this reading of Kant's thought, claiming not only that Kant has a very rich notion of moral character, but also that it is a conception of systematic importance for his thought, linking the formal moral with the critical, aesthetic, anthropological, and biological aspects of his philosophy. The first book to focus on character formation in Kant's moral philosophy, it builds on important recent work on Kant's aesthetics and anthropology, and brings these to bear on moral issues. Munzel traces Kant's multifaceted definition of character through the broad range of his writings, and then explores the structure of character, its actual exercise in the world, and its cultivation. An outstanding work of original textual analysis and interpretation, Kant's Conception of Moral Character is a major contribution to Kant studies and moral philosophy in general.

In a footnote to the Preface of his A nthropology Kant gives, if not altogether accurately, the historical background for the publication of this work. The A nthropology is, in effect, his manual for a course of lectures which he gave "for some thirty years," in the winter semesters at the University of Konigsberg. In 1797, when old age forced him to discontinue the course and he felt that his manual would not compete with the lectures themselves, he decided to let the work be published (Ak. VII, 354, 356). The reader will readily see why these lectures were, as Kant says, popular ones, attended by people from other walks of life. In both content and style the Anthropology is far removed from the rigors of the Critiques. Yet the Anthropology presents its own special problems. The student of Kant who struggles through the Critique of Pure Reason is undoubtedly left in some perplexity regarding specific points in it, but he is quite clear as to what Kant is attempting to do in the work. On finishing the Anthropology he may well find himself in just the opposite situation. While its discussions of the functioning of man's various powers are, on the whole, quite lucid and even entertaining, the purpose of the work remains somewhat vague. The questions: what is pragmatic anthropology? what is its relation to Kant's more strictly philosophical works? have not been answered satisfactorily.