Latin America S New Security Reality Irregular Asymmetric Conflict And Hugo Chavez

In 2005, Dr. Manwaring wrote a monograph entitled Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare. It came at a time when the United States and Venezuela were accelerating a verbal sparing match regarding which country was destabilizing Latin America more. President Chavez shows no sign of standing down; he slowly and deliberately centralizes his power in Venezuela, and carefully and adroitly articulates his Bolivarian dream (the idea of a Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S. economic and political imperialism). Yet, most North Americans dismiss Chavez as a "nut case," or--even if he is a threat to the security and stability of the Hemisphere--the possibilities of that threat coming to fruition are too far into the future to worry about. Dr. Manwaring's intent is to explain in greater depth what President Chavez is doing and how he is doing it. First, he explains that Hugo Chavez's threat is straightforward, and that it is being translated into a consistent, subtle, ambiguous, and ambitious struggle for power that is beginning to insinuate itself into political life in much of the Western Hemisphere. Second, he shows how President Chavez is encouraging his Venezuelan and other followers to pursue a confrontational, populist, and nationalistic agenda that will be achieved only by (1) radically changing the traditional politics of the Venezuelan state--and other Latin American states--to that of "direct" (totalitarian) democracy; (2) destroying North American hegemony throughout all of Latin America by conducting an irregular Fourth-Generation War "Super Insurgency"; and, (3) country-by-country, building a great new Bolivarian state out of a phased Program for the Liberation of Latin America.

Since his election as President of Venezuela in 1998, Hugo Chavez has encouraged and continues to encourage his Venezuelan and other Latin American followers to pursue a confrontational "defensive," populist, and nationalistic agenda that will supposedly liberate Latin America from the economic dependency and the political imperialism of the North American "Colossus" (the United States). Chavez argues that liberation, New Socialism, and Bolivarianismo (the dream of a Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S. hegemony) will only be achieved by (1) radically changing the traditional politics of the Venezuelan state to that of "direct" (totalitarian) democracy; (2) destroying North American hegemony thoughout all of Latin America by (3) conducting an irregular and asymmetric "Super Insurgency," or "Fourth Generation Warfare" to depose the illegitimate external enemy; and, 4) building a new Bolivarian state, beginning with Venezuela and extending to the whole of Latin America. This is not the rhetoric of a "nut case." It is, significantly, the rhetoric of an individual who is performing the traditional and universal Leninist- Maoist function of providing a strategic vision and the operational plan for gaining revolutionary power. In pursuit of this Bolivarian dream, Chavez has stirred the imaginations of many Latin Americans-especially the poor. Additionally, he has aroused the imaginations of many other interested observers around the world. And now, Hugo Chavez is providing political leaders-populists and neo-populists, new socialists, disillusioned revolutionaries, and oppositionists, and submerged nomenklaturas worldwide-with a relatively orthodox and sophisticated Marxist-Leninist-Maoist model for the conduct and implementation of an irregular "Super Insurgency." Interestingly, this kind of war is the only type of conflict the United States has ever lost. It is surprising and dismaying that the world's only superpower does not have a unified politicalmilitary strategy and a multidimensional interagency organizational structure to confront Chavez's challenge. It is time to make substantive changes to deal better with irregular contemporary conflict.

Since his election as President of Venezuela in 1998, Hugo Chavez has encouraged and continues to encourage his Venezuelan and other Latin American followers to pursue a confrontational "defensive," populist, and nationalistic agenda that will supposedly liberate Latin America from the economic dependency and the political imperialism of the North American "Colossus" (the United States). Chavez argues that liberation, New Socialism, and "Bolivarianismo" (the dream of a Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S. hegemony) will only be achieved by doing the following: (1) radically changing the traditional politics of the Venezuelan state to that of "direct" (totalitarian) democracy; (2) destroying North American hegemony throughout all of Latin America by (3) conducting an irregular and asymmetric "Super Insurgency" or "Fourth-Generation Warfare" to depose the illegitimate external enemy; and, 4) building a new Bolivarian state, beginning with Venezuela and extending to the whole of Latin America. This is not the rhetoric of a "nut case." It is, significantly, the rhetoric of an individual who is performing the traditional and universal Leninist-Maoist function of providing a strategic vision and the operational plan for gaining revolutionary power. In pursuit of this Bolivarian dream, Chavez has stirred the imaginations of many Latin Americans, especially the poor. Additionally, he has aroused the imaginations of many other interested observers around the world. And now, Hugo Chavez is providing political leaders with a relatively orthodox and sophisticated Marxist-Leninist-Maoist model for the conduct and implementation of an irregular "Super Insurgency." Interestingly, this kind of war is the only type of conflict the United States has ever lost. It is surprising and dismaying that the world's only superpower does not have a unified political-military strategy and a multidimensional interagency organizational structure to confront Chavez's challenge.

The author of this monograph answers questions regarding "Who is Hugo Chávez?" "What is the basis of Chávez's bolivarianismo?" "What is the context that defines Bolivarian threats?" "How does Chávez define contemporary asymmetric warfare, and what are the key components of success?" "How can the innumerable charges and countercharges between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments be interpreted?" And "What are the implications for democracy and stability in Latin America?" His conclusions are, first, that Hugo Chávez might be a military caudillo, but he is no "nut case." He is, in fact, what Ralph Peters calls a "wise competitor." Second, as such, he will not even attempt to defeat his enemies on their own terms. Rather, he will seek to shift the playing field away from conventional military confrontations and turn to nontraditional forms of assault on a nation's stability and integrity. Third, as a consequence, it is important to understand that Chávez understands that every player in the international community from small powers to the U.S. superpower must cope simultaneously with four levels of contemporary threat. Accordingly, all the types of threats in those four levels of conflict are seen as methods of choice-or areas for exploitation-for any commercial, ideological, or other movement that is dedicated to achieving control or radical change in a given nation-state. Fourth, Chávez understands that asymmetric warfare is the methodology of the weak against the strong. He understands that this type of conflict requires more than weaponry and technology. It requires lucid and incisive thinking, resourcefulness, determination, imagination, and a certain disregard for convention. Chávez considers three issues to be key to success (or failure) in contemporary asymmetric conflict. They are closely related to bolivarianismo's security scheme, social programs, and communications efforts. In these terms, he understands the sophistication and complexity of war as a whole. He also understands the value of facilitating the processes of state failure to achieve his objectives of establishing socialism for the 21st century, economic and political integration, and Latin American grandeza (greatness). And Chávez understands the centrality of relative moral legitimacy in conflict-and the critical importance of creating popular perceptions that his cause is morally correct, and will lead to a better life for all. Finally, taken all together, this is "war as a whole," or what Chávez calls "Guerra de todo el pueblo" (interchangeably: war of all the people, asymmetric, fourth-generation, or irregular war). At a minimum, Chávez and Venezuela are developing the conceptual and physical capability to challenge the status quo in Latin America, and to generate a "Super Insurgency" intended to bring about fundamental political and economic change in the region. Thus, as one sees Chávez's ideas developing and maturing, it is becoming more and more obvious that his bolivarianismo is resonating with large numbers of people in Venezuela and the rest of Latin America-and that he should not be taken lightly. This is the starting point from which to understand where Chávez may be going and how he expects to get there. And it is the starting point from which to understand the side effects that will shape the hemispheric security environment now and for the future. The consequences of failing to take this challenge seriously are clear. Unless thinking, actions, and organization are reoriented at the highest levels to deal with contemporary asymmetric realities, the problems of global, regional, and subregional democracy, stability, and security will resolve themselves-and not likely for the better.

The book examines the 'Pink Tide' of leftist governments in Latin America struggling against neoliberal hegemony from a critical International Political Economy perspective. Focusing particularly on Venezuela and Brazil, it evaluates the transformative and emancipatory potentials of their political projects domestically, regionally and globally.

Almost no one seems to understand the Marxist-Leninist foundations of Hugo Chavez's political thought. It becomes evident, however, in the general vision of his "Bolivarian Revolution." The abbreviated concept is to destroy the old foreign-dominated (U.S. dominated) political and economic systems in the Americas, to take power, and to create a socialist, nationalistic, and "popular" (direct) democracy in Venezuela that would sooner or later extend throughout the Western Hemisphere. Despite the fact that the notion of the use of force (compulsion) is never completely separated from the Leninist concept of destroying any bourgeois opposition, Chavez's revolutionary vision will not be achieved through a conventional military war of maneuver and attrition, or a traditional insurgency. According to Lenin and Chavez, a "new society" will only be created by a gradual, systematic, compulsory application of agitation and propaganda (i.e., agit-prop). That long-term effort is aimed at exporting instability and generating public opinion in favor of a "revolution" and against the bourgeois system. Thus, the contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the concept that the North American (U.S.) "Empire" and its bourgeois political friends in Latin America are not doing what is right for the people, and that the socialist Bolivarian philosophy and leadership will. This may not be a traditional national security problem for the United States and other targeted countries, and it may not be perceived to be as lethal as conventional conflict, but that does not diminish the cruel reality of compulsion.