Law As Punishment Law As Regulation

Law depends on various modes of classification. How an act or a person is classified may be crucial in determining the rights obtained, the procedures employed, and what understandings get attached to the act or person. Critiques of law often reveal how arbitrary its classificatory acts are, but no one doubts their power and consequence. This crucial new book considers the problem of law's physical control of persons and the ways in which this control illuminates competing visions of the law: as both a tool of regulation and an instrument of coercion or punishment. It examines various instances of punishment and regulation to illustrate points of overlap and difference between them, and captures the lived experience of the state's enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules. Ultimately, the essays call into question the adequacy of a view of punishment and/or regulation that neglects the perspectives of those who are at the receiving end of these exercises of state power.

This classic collection of essays, first published in 1968, has had an enduring impact on academic and public debates about criminal responsibility and criminal punishment. Forty years on, its arguments are as powerful as ever. H.L.A. Hart offers an alternative to retributive thinking about criminal punishment that nevertheless preserves the central distinction between guilt and innocence. He also provides an account of criminal responsibility that links the distinction between guilt and innocence closely to the ideal of the rule of law, and thereby attempts to by-pass unnerving debates about free will and determinism. Always engaged with live issues of law and public policy, Hart makes difficult philosophical puzzles accessible and immediate to a wide range of readers. For this new edition, otherwise a reproduction of the original, John Gardner adds an introduction engaging critically with Hart's arguments, and explaining the continuing importance of Hart's ideas in spite of the intervening revival of retributive thinking in both academic and policy circles. Unavailable for ten years, the new edition of Punishment and Responsibility makes available again the central text in the field for a new generation of academics, students and professionals engaged in criminal justice and penal policy.

Nicola Lacey presents a new approach to the question of the moral justification of punishment by the State. She focuses on the theory of punishments in context of other political questions, such as the nature of political obligation and the function and scope of criminal law. Arguing that no convincing set of justifying reasons has so far been produced, she puts forward a theory of punishments which places the values of the community at its centre.

In Philip K. Dick’s short story Minority Report, the institution of Precrime punishes people with imprisonment for crimes they would have committed had they not been prevented. With Dick’s allegorical inspiration, the authors of Criminal Law and Precrime: Legal Studies in Canadian Punishment and Surveillance in Anticipation of Criminal Guilt posit that recent developments in Canadian law indicate a trend toward imposing punitive measures at increasingly earlier stages of the prosecutorial process. The result is a potentially new field of criminal management that could be characterized as "precrime"—particularly the use of the law as a technology of surveillance and prevention since "terror" became a justification for intervention. The authors note that as risk management logics (based in actuarial sciences) have shifted to precautionary ones (based in administrative sciences), the law has responded by developing techniques in the arena of criminal regulation in light of the "war on terror": the need to ensure security, the proliferation of digital data, and the development of drones, social networking, and cloud storage to gather personal data. The authors view shifts in criminal investigation; the substantive criminal law of sexual expression, conduct, and work; and civil forfeiture as emblematic of precrime populism. The unifying theme of these techniques is that they occur prior to state-identified crime, arise out of a precautionary philosophy, and seek to presume (or circumvent) criminality. The book is a provocative read for scholars and students in criminal law, policing, and surveillance, as well as for those interested in how areas of law, such as immigration, health, and anti-terrorism, are mobilizing the logics of risk and surveillance in new ways that emphasize precaution. The authors invite legal scholars to place the analytical lens of precrime on criminal and regulatory practices in Canada as well as other Western nations across the globe.

Critics take the unclear status of restorative justice practices, along with their vagueness in meaning and purpose, as a clear invitation to a fundamental questioning of the legitimacy of these practices. Their supporters consider the experiment of restorative justice as a platform for reforming penal institutions and for rethinking the legitimacy of orthodox legal reasoning. Within the framework of a rechtsstaat, a democratic state governed by fundamental rights and by the rule of law, both issues of legitimacy lead not only to reflection on concepts such as restoration, punishment, or on such notions as harm and wrong. Questioning the legitimacy both of restorative justice practices and of the prevailing penal system also inevitably involves some reflection on, and articulation of, the underlying values and normative aspirations of such a democratic constitutional state. What are these values and how can they be given appropriate expression in the leading concepts and principles of the criminal law? To what extent are fundamental rights and principles of the rule of law sufficiently reflected in the practices of restorative justice? How are these practices to be related to the criminal justice system according to the normative aspirations of a democratic constitutional state? To what degree can current penal practices be made continuous with these aspirations? These fundamental questions formed the intellectual framework for the 10th Aquinas Conference on Restorative Justice, Punishment and the Morality of Law, at which conference the larger part of the papers published in this volume were presented. Consistent with the structure of the conference, this collection of essays is organised into three parts, each focussing on one central topic and containing a lead essay and corresponding replies. The first part offers critical scrutiny of one of the cornerstones of a criminal justice system governed by the rule of law, namely the principle of legality. Efforts are made to empower this principle through reflection on its underlying values and aspirations, and this in order to meet some of the legitimate ideals and concerns of restorative justice. These efforts are subsequently assessed from both sociological and philosophical perspectives. In the second part, attention is drawn to the legitimacy of restorative justice practices. Here, the normative intuitions of a democratic constitutional state serve either as a critical framework to assess these practices, or, more optimistically, as ideals to whose realisation restorative justice is supposed to make a valuable contribution. And, finally, in the third part, reflection on the value of restorative justice brings us to a fundamental questioning of the legitimacy of punishment and penal practices. Central to the discussion is whether it is possible to interpret and normatively reconstruct the idea and practice of punishment so as to make them compatible with, and even continuous with, the underlying values of a democratic constitutional state.

Indonesia’s criminal law system faces major challenges. Despite the country’s transition to democracy, both the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code are badly out of date, the former only superficially changed since colonial times and the latter remaining as it was under Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order regime. Law enforcement officers and judges are widely seen as corrupt or incompetent, and new laws, including new Islamic laws passed at the regional level, often contradict the Criminal Code and national statutes, including human rights laws. This book, based on extensive original research by leading scholars in the field, provides an overall assessment of the state of criminal law, law enforcement and penal policy in Indonesia, considers in depth a wide range of specific areas of criminal law, and discusses recent efforts at reform and their prospects for success.

Money is the most frequently means used in the legal system to punish and regulate. Monetary penalties outnumber all other sanctions delivered by criminal justice in many jurisdictions, imprisonment included. More people pay fines than go to prison and in some jurisdictions many of those in prison are there because of failure to pay their fines. Therefore, it is surprising how little has been written in the Anglophone academic world about the nature of money sanctions and their specific characteristics as legal sanctions. In many ways, legal innovations related to money sanctions have been poorly understood. This book argues that they are a direct consequence of the changing meaning of money. Considering the ‘meaninglessness’ of modern money, the book aims to examine the history of changing conceptions in how fines have been conceived and used. Using a set of interpretative techniques sensitive to how money and freedom are perceived, the genealogy of the penal fine is presented as a story of constant reformulation in response to shifting political pressures and changes in intellectual developments that influenced ideological commitments of legislators and practitioners. This book is multi-disciplinary and will appeal to those engaged with criminology, sociology and philosophy of punishment, socio-legal studies, and criminal law.