Law Narrative And Reality

This book is at odds with the presuppositions behind a received view on law as a systematic solution to social problems in the name of justice. It argues that neither do facts in law represent social reality, nor do norms represent a moral ideal. Representationalism as such, in its various legal guises, is put to the test of what is called here `the interception hypothesis'. Although it is derived from the theory of literature (the theory of narrative) and corroborated by several close reading analyses of legal texts (both decisions and statutory rules), this hypothesis aims, in the first part, at providing an alternative model for the structure and the value of legal knowledge. The second part shows how this knowledge is operative in fundamental concepts like democracy, punishment and (contractual) obligation.

The law is full of stories, ranging from the competing narratives presented at trials to the Olympian historical narratives set forth in Supreme Court opinions. How those stories are told and listened to makes a crucial difference to those whose lives are reworked in legal storytelling. The public at large has increasingly been drawn to law as an area where vivid human stories are played out with distinctively high stakes. And scholars in several fields have recently come to recognize that law's stories need to be studied critically.This notable volume-inspired by a symposium held at Yale Law School-brings together an exceptional group of well-known figures in law and literary studies to take a probing look at how and why stories are told in the law and how they are constructed and made effective. Why is it that some stories-confessions, victim impact statements-can be excluded from decisionmakers' hearing? How do judges claim the authority by which they impose certain stories on reality?Law's Stories opens new perspectives on the law, as narrative exchange, performance, explanation. It provides a compelling encounter of law and literature, seen as two wary but necessary interlocutors.ContributorsJ. M. BalkinPeter BrooksHarlon L. DaltonAlan M. DershowitzDaniel A. FarberRobert A. FergusonPaul GewirtzJohn HollanderAnthony KronmanPierre N. LevalSanford LevinsonCatharine MacKinnonJanet MalcolmMartha MinowDavid N. RosenElaine ScarryLouis Michael SeidmanSuzanna SherryReva B. SiegelRobert Weisberg.

Using extensive and novel new research, this book explores one of the long-standing challenges in legal education - the prospects for bringing legal theory into the training of future lawyers.

This book is at odds with the presuppositions behind a received view on law as a systematic solution to social problems in the name of justice. It argues that neither do facts in law represent social reality, nor do norms represent a moral ideal. Representationalism as such, in its various legal guises, is put to the test of what is called here `the interception hypothesis'. Although it is derived from the theory of literature (the theory of narrative) and corroborated by several close reading analyses of legal texts (both decisions and statutory rules), this hypothesis aims, in the first part, at providing an alternative model for the structure and the value of legal knowledge. The second part shows how this knowledge is operative in fundamental concepts like democracy, punishment and (contractual) obligation.

PATRICKNERHOT Since the two operations overlap each other so much, speaking about fact and interpretation in legal science separately would undoubtedly be highly artificial. To speak about fact in law already brings in the operation we call interpretation. EquaHy, to speak about interpretation is to deal with the method of identifying reality and therefore, in large part, to enter the area of the question of fact. By way of example, Bemard Jackson's text, which we have placed in section 11 of the first part of this volume, could no doubt just as weH have found a horne in section I. This work is aimed at analyzing this interpretation of the operation of identifying fact on the one hand and identifying the meaning of a text on the other. All philosophies of law recognize themselves in the analysis they propose for this interpretation, and we too shall seek in this volume to fumish a few elements of use for this analysis. We wish however to make it clear that our endeavour is addressed not only to legal philosophers: the nature of the interpretive act in legal science is a matter of interest to the legal practitioner too. He will find in these pages, we believe, elements that will serve hirn in rcflcction on his daily work.

Considers both the texts and everyday contexts of the storytelling process with accompanying guidelines for analysis and illustrations from empirical material.

Scholars from many disciplines discuss the crucial roles played by narrative and metaphor in the theory and practice of law.