Law Truth And Reason

This book is an innovative contribution to analytical jurisprudence. It is mainly based on the distinct premises of linguistic philosophy and Carnapian semantics, but also addresses the issues of institutional philosophy, social pragmatism, and legal principles as envisioned by Dworkin, among others. Wróblewski ́s three ideologies (bound/free/legal and rational) and Makkonen ́s three situations (isomorphic/semantically vague/normative gap) of judicial decision-making are further developed by means of 10 frames of legal analysis as discerned by the author. With the philosophical theories of truth serving as a reference, the frames of legal analysis include the isomorphic theory of law (Wittgenstein, Makkonen), the coherence theory of law (Alexy, Peczenik, Dworkin), the new rhetoric and legal argumentation theory (Perelman, Aarnio), social consequentialism (Posner), natural law theory (Fuller, Finnis), and the sequential model of legal reasoning by Neil MacCormick and the Bielefelder Kreis. At the end, some key issues of legal metaphysics are addressed, like the notion of legal systematics and the future potential of the analytical approach in jurisprudence.

Taking up a single question--"What does it mean to say a proposition of law is true?"--this book advances a major new account of truth in law. Drawing upon the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, as well as more recent postmodern theory of the relationship between language, meaning, and the world, Patterson examines leading contemporary jurisprudential approaches to this question and finds them flawed in similar and previously unnoticed ways. He offers a powerful alternative account of legal justification, one in which linguistic practice--the use of forms of legal argument--holds the key to legal meaning.

Reason, Democracy, Society deals with basic points of legal theory and philosophy of law. The main contention of the book relates to the insufficiencies of the legal positivistic approach. Some of its claims are that we must sharply separate what the law is from, what the law ought to be, and that we can know what the law is without appealing to meta-legal considerations. These and other claims are criticized. The author shows that with the legal positivistic approach we cannot know, in all cases, what the law is, if that is equated to the rules posited by the legislator. He also challenges H.L.A. Hart's and MacCormick's points of view, amongst others, about the characteristic corner stones of legal positivism. Some other issues relate to human rights, legal rationality and efficiency and ethics. This book will be of interest to philosophers concerned with law or ethics, those concerned with justice in modern society and to jurists and law students.

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This Major Reference series brings together a wide range of key international articles in law and legal theory. Many of these essays are not readily accessible, and their presentation in these volumes will provide a vital new resource for both research and teaching. Each volume is edited by leading international authorities who explain the significance and context of articles in an informative and complete introduction.

In the wake of Brexit and Trump, the debate surrounding post-truth fills the newspapers and is at the center of the public debate. Democratic institutions and the rule of law have always been constructed and legitimized by discourses of truth. And so the issue of "post-truth" or "fake truth" can be regarded as a contemporary degeneration of that legitimacy. But what, precisely, is post-truth from a theoretical point of view? Can it actually change perceptions of law, of institutions and political power? And can it affect our understanding of society and social relations? What are its ideological premises? What are the technical conditions that foster it? And most importantly, does it have anything to teach lovers of the truth? Pursuing an interdisciplinary perspective, this book gathers both well-known and newer scholars from a range of subject areas, to engage in a philosophical interrogation of the relationship between truth and law.

This book differs from a standard jurisprudence text in that it examines law as a truth claim. Its major question is whether there are any eternal truths about the law, and, if so, whether they are knowable. Examples of questions discussed are: What is the correct foundation of law? Is it knowable? What is its source? What is the role of reason? Does reason exist apart from the "sources" of law, in the Cartesian tradition separating mind and body (res cogitans and res extensa)? What is the nature of the obligation to obey the law and how does it arise? What is the nature of the connection between law and morality? The first Western philosopher who explicitly asserted that law is a truth claim was Socrates. It is not surprising that other Western philosophers followed this path. This book traces the origins of this claim to some 500 years before Socrates walked the streets of Athens and then provides a compete historical profile over eight overlapping historical/philosophical periods: The pre-philosophical period, the presocratic period, the post-socratic period, the Roman period, the medieval/Christian period, the enlightenment period, the modern period and the postmodern period. These periods are intended to serve as analytical categories on which the organizational framework of the book rests. They also serve as evolutionary guideposts in an intellectual voyage, so that the reader gets an integrated picture of law not just as a social phenomenon but also as a truth claim, which, like all truth claims, can be critically evaluated. "This book is a brilliantly conceived and executed exploration of the extent to which law is rooted in "truth": rational truth, perceptive truth, and moral truth. This question is obviously foundational to law, whether law is viewed practically or theoretically. Through keen selection of materials and sharp commentary, Professor Dore presents - in one volume - the best current treatment of these issues from a broad historical perspective. It is an engaging and critical achievement, important reading for anyone interested in law as a human institution." -- Laura S. Underkuffler, J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School