Laypeople In Law

This book contributes to a better understanding of the role laypeople hold in the social functioning of law. It adopts the scholarly insight that the law is unthinkable without an everyday legal understanding of the law pursued by laypeople. It engages with the assumption that not only the law’s existence but also its development is shaped by the layperson’s affirmations, oppositions, ignorance, or negations of the law. This volume thus aims to fill a void in socio-legal studies. Whereas many sociolegal theories tend to conceptualize the law through legal experts’ actions, institutions, procedures, and codifications, it argues that such a viewpoint underestimates the role of laypeople in the law’s processing and advocates for a strengthened conceptual place in socio-legal theory. This book will appeal to socio-legal scholars and sociologists (of law), as well as to legal practitioners and laypersons themselves.

Offers a comprehensive and comparative picture of how countries around the globe use ordinary citizens to decide criminal cases.

In common law jurisdictions, litigants are free to choose whether to procure legal representation or litigate in person. There is no formal requirement that civil litigants obtain legal representation, and the court has no power to impose it on them, regardless of whether the litigant has the financial means to hire a lawyer or is capable of conducting litigation effectively. Self-representation is considered indispensable even in circumstances of extreme abuse of process, such as in 'vexatious litigation'. Intriguingly, although self-representation is regarded as sacrosanct in common law jurisdictions, most civil law systems take a diametrically opposite view and impose obligations of legal representation as a condition for conducting civil litigation, except in low-value claims courts or specific tribunals. This disparity presents a conundrum in comparative law: an unfettered freedom to proceed in person is afforded in those legal systems that are more reliant on the litigants' professional skills and whose rules of procedure and evidence are more formal, complex, and adversarial, whereas legal representation tends to be made obligatory in systems that are judge-based and offer more flexible and informal procedures, which would seem, intuitively, to be more conducive to self-representation. In Injustice in Person: The Right to Self Representation, Rabeea Assy assesses the theoretical value of self-representation, and challenges the conventional wisdom that this should be a fundamental right. With a fresh perspective, Assy develops a novel justification for mandatory legal representation, exploring a number of issues such as the requirements placed by the liberal commitment to personal autonomy on the civil justice system; the utility of plain English projects and the extent to which they render the law accessible to lay people; and the idea that a high degree of litigant control over the proceedings enhances litigants' subjective perceptions of procedural fairness. On a practical level, the book discusses the question of mandatory representation against the case law of English and American courts and also that of the European Court of Human Rights, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the Human Rights Committee.

Erlend D. MacGillivray’s Epictetus and Laypeople: A Stoic Stance toward the Rest of Humanity explores the understanding that ancient philosophers had towards the vast majority of people at the time, those who had no philosophical knowledge or adherence—laypeople. After exploring how philosophical identity was established in antiquity, this book examines the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, who reflected upon laypeople with remarkable frequency. MacGillivray shows that Epictetus maintained his stance that a small and distinguishable group of philosophically aware individuals existed, alongside his conviction that most of humanity can be inclined to act in accordance with virtuous principles by their dependence upon preconceptions, civic law, popular religion, exempla, and the adoption of primitive conditions, among other means. This book also highlights other Stoics and their commentators to show that the means of lay reform that MacGillivray explores were not just implicitly understood in antiquity, but reveal a well-developed system of thought in the school which has, until now, evaded the notice of modern scholars.

Based on author's thesis (doctoral - Princeton University, 2018) issued under title: Making the case for jurors: an ethnographic study of U.S. prosecutors.

For centuries, courts across the common law world have developed systems of law by building bodies of judicial decisions. In deciding individual cases, common law courts settle litigation and move the law in new directions. By virtue of their place at the top of the judicial hierarchy, courts at the apex of common law systems are unique in that their decisions and, in particular, the language used in those decisions, resonate through the legal system. Although both the common law and apex courts have been studied extensively, scholars have paid less attention to the relationship between the two. By analyzing apex courts and the common law from multiple angles, this book offers an entry point for scholars in disciplines related to law - such as political science, history, and sociology - who are seeking a deeper understanding and new insights as to how the common law applies to and is relevant within their own disciplines.

Only recently have philosophers and psychologists begun to consider empirical research methods to inform questions and debates in legal philosophy. With the field ripe for further experimental inquiry, this collection explores the most topical empirical developments and anticipates future research directions. Bringing together legal scholars, psychologists, and philosophers, chapters address questions such as: Do people share a stable set of intuitions about what the law is? What are common perceptions about causation, intentionality, and culpability, and are they consistent with the corresponding legal concepts? To what extent can experimental research methods advance theoretical debates in legal philosophy about the nature of law? With fascinating implications for legal philosophy, ethics, and moral psychology, Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Law sets the agenda for the emerging field of experimental jurisprudence and will be of interest to both researchers and practitioners alike.

Democracy in the Courts examines lay participation in the administration of justice and how it reflects certain democratic principles. An international comparative perspective is taken for exploring how lay people are involved in the trial of criminal cases in European countries and how this impacts on their perspectives of the national legal systems. Comparisons between countries are made regarding how and to what extent lay participation takes place and the relation between lay participation and the legal system's legitimacy is analyzed. Presenting the results of interviews with both professional judges and lay participants in a number of European countries regarding their views on the involvement of lay people in the legal system, this book explores the ways in which judges and lay people interact while trying cases, examining the characteristics of both professional and lay judging of cases. Providing an important analysis of practice, this book will be of interest to academics, legal scholars and practitioners alike.