Learning Lessons In The American Expeditionary Forces

Kenneth E. Hamburger's publication provides an in-depth analysis of the American Expeditionary Forces' experiences. Documenting lessons learned and strategies employed, this work offers a comprehensive view of military operations and their implications. A valuable resource for historians, scholars, and military enthusiasts seeking insights into the intricacies of warfare.

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This thesis examines how well the United States Army of World War I prepared for battle by learning the lessons of modern combat from other nations engaged in war. Armies prepare for war during peace. However, the true validation of doctrine weapons, organization, and training developed in peacetime is war. Hostilities between the Allied and Central Powers raged for three years before the Unites States declared war. This period provided the US Army a unique opportunity to observe how technologies and techniques were effectively employed by French, British, and German commanders. The question this thesis attempts to answer is: How well did the United States Army apply the experiences of the belligerent nations from 1914 to 1917 in preparing the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) for combat in the European Theater? The thesis starts with a discussion of pre-war Army developments from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 through the last US military action before the declaration of war, the Punitive Expedition to Mexico. The evolution of warfare through French, British, and German experience is described followed by a discussion of the observations of modern warfare by military professionals and how US Army doctrinal publications and operations planning reflected these changes. The thesis then analyses US battlefield performance and influences upon the formation of US doctrine.

On the eve of World War II, the U.S. Army was a small cadre force without deployable combat divisions. Because of years of preparation and planning during the interwar years, the Army completed the transformation into a huge organization with multiple army groups spread across the world in less than four years. This new army displayed remarkable battlefield flexibility. Doctrine and training guided senior leaders in the European Theater of Operations to ensure overwhelming combat power at the point of attack. They constantly shifted their divisions, a limited asset on the continent for the majority of 1944, between corps headquarters immediately prior to major battles. Many divisions changed corps assignments four times in a three-month period and corps moved between armies on a regular basis with no apparent difficulty. Changing task organization in the face of the enemy is a complex undertaking, affecting command relationships, logistics, and every other staff function. Despite the potential for introducing unwanted friction, the shifting of units from one headquarters to another was a common practice in the European theater in 1944. How were these newly formed units able to display the flexibility to integrate effectively while engaged in combat? This monograph proposes operational flexibility resulted from a unique American way of war developed during the interwar period by veterans of the First World War. Three factors -- common doctrine, carefully selected leaders, and an effective organizational structure -- provided senior commanders the organizational flexibility they required in combat. Without this flexibility, the Army would have had difficulty executing its breakout from the Normandy bridgehead, pursuing the retreating German forces across France, and quickly thwarting the Nazi offensive in the Ardennes at the end of 1944.

Case studies explore how to improve military adaptation and preparedness in peacetime by investigating foreign wars Preparing for the next war at an unknown date against an undetermined opponent is a difficult undertaking with extremely high stakes. Even the most detailed exercises and wargames do not truly simulate combat and the fog of war. Thus, outside of their own combat, militaries have studied foreign wars as a valuable source of battlefield information. The effectiveness of this learning process, however, has rarely been evaluated across different periods and contexts. Through a series of in-depth case studies of the US Army, Navy, and Air Force, Brent L. Sterling creates a better understanding of the dynamics of learning from “other people’s wars,” determining what types of knowledge can be gained from foreign wars, identifying common pitfalls, and proposing solutions to maximize the benefits for doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. Other People’s Wars explores major US efforts involving direct observation missions and post-conflict investigations at key junctures for the US armed forces: the Crimean War (1854–56), Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), Spanish Civil War (1936–39), and Yom Kippur War (1973), which preceded the US Civil War, First and Second World Wars, and major army and air force reforms of the 1970s, respectively. The case studies identify learning pitfalls but also show that initiatives to learn from other nations’ wars can yield significant benefits if the right conditions are met. Sterling puts forth a process that emphasizes comprehensive qualitative learning to foster better military preparedness and adaptability.

This important new history of the development of a leadership corps of officers during World War I opens with a gripping narrative of the battlefield heroism of Cpl. Alvin York, juxtaposed with the death of Pvt. Charles Clement less than two kilometers away. Clement had been a captain and an example of what a good officer should be in the years just before the beginning of the war. His subsequent failure as an officer and his redemption through death in combat embody the question that lies at the heart of this comprehensive and exhaustively researched book: What were the faults of US military policy regarding the training of officers during the Great War? In The School of Hard Knocks, Richard S. Faulkner carefully considers the selection and training process for officers during the years prior to and throughout the First World War. He then moves into the replacement of those officers due to attrition, ultimately discussing the relationship between the leadership corps and the men they commanded. Replete with primary documentary evidence including reports by the War Department during and subsequent to the war, letters from the officers detailing their concerns with the training methods, and communiqués from the leaders of the training facilities to the civilian leadership, The School of Hard Knocks makes a compelling case while presenting a clear, highly readable, no-nonsense account of the shortfalls in officer training that contributed to the high death toll suffered by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I.

This 2007 book provides the most comprehensive examination of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) combat doctrine and methods ever published. It shows how AEF combat units actually fought on the Western Front in World War I. It describes how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. General John Pershing and other AEF leaders promulgated an inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas that retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on the modern battlefield. However, many AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine and operational methods as they fought, preparing more comprehensive attack plans, employing flexible infantry formations, and maximizing firepower to seize limited objectives.