Leibniz S Naturalized Philosophy Of Mind

Larry M. Jorgensen provides a systematic reappraisal of Leibniz's philosophy of mind, revealing the full metaphysical background that allowed Leibniz to see farther than most of his contemporaries. In recent philosophy much effort has been put into discovering a naturalized theory of mind. Leibniz's efforts to reach a similar goal three hundred years earlier offer a critical stance from which we can assess our own theories. But while the goals might be similar, the content of Leibniz's theory significantly diverges from that of today's thought. Perhaps surprisingly, Leibniz's theological commitments yielded a thoroughgoing naturalizing methodology: the properties of an object are explicable in terms of the object's nature. Larry M. Jorgensen shows how this methodology led Leibniz to a fully natural theory of mind.

In the present book, Pauline Phemister argues against traditional Anglo-American interpretations of Leibniz as an idealist who conceives ultimate reality as a plurality of mind-like immaterial beings and for whom physical bodies are ultimately unreal and our perceptions of them illusory. Re-reading the texts without the prior assumption of idealism allows the more material aspects of Leibniz's metaphysics to emerge. Leibniz is found to advance a synthesis of idealism and materialism. His ontology posits indivisible, living, animal-like corporeal substances as the real metaphysical constituents of the universe; his epistemology combines sense-experience and reason; and his ethics fuses confused perceptions and insensible appetites with distinct perceptions and rational choice. In the light of his sustained commitment to the reality of bodies, Phemister re-examines his dynamics, the doctrine of pre-established harmony and his views on freedom. The image of Leibniz as a rationalist philosopher who values activity and reason over passivity and sense-experience is replaced by the one of a philosopher who recognises that, in the created world, there can only be activity if there is also passivity; minds, souls and forms if there is also matter; good if there is evil; perfection if there is imperfection.

The essays included in this volume are a mixture of old and new. Three of them make their first appearance in print on this occa sion (Nos III, IV, and V). The remaining four are based upon materials previously published in learned journals or anthologies. (However, these previously published papers have been revised and, generally, expanded for inclusion here.) Detailed acknowl edgement of prior publications is made in the notes to the relevant articles. I am grateful to the editors of these several publications for their kind permission to use this material. I am grateful to an anonymous reader for the Western Ontario Series for some useful corrigenda. And I should like to thank John Horty and Lily Knezevich for their help in seeing this material through the press. NICHOLAS RESCHER Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania May, 1980 xi INTRODUCTION The unifying theme of these essays is their concern with Leibniz's metaphysics of nature. In particular, they revolve about his cos mology of creation and his conception of the real world as one among infinitely many equipossible alternatives.

Frankfurt/M., Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien. Philosophie und Geschichte der Wissenschaften - Studien und Quellen. Bd. 46 Herausgegeben von Hans Jorg Sandkuhler und Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer. The philosophy of mind is one of the most alive research sectors in the field of philosophical studies nowadays. But there is no universal agreement on what exactly naturalism in the philosophy of mind is, and there is even less agreement on how naturalism in the philosophy of mind relates to naturalism as a general philosophical outlook. At the most general level, naturalism is often characterized by slogans such as « Everything that exists is part of the natural order, or « The methods of natural science provide the only avenue to truth, or « There is no place for a first philosophy prior to natural science. Naturalistic theories of mind explicitly or tacitly accept or presuppose the following principles: Minds (as well as consciousness, spirit or subjectivity) are part of the real world. Nature is the whole real world. Therefore minds, consciousness and subjectivity are part of the nature. Nature can be known only by empirical sciences. There is no knowledge a priori (or obtained by methods that are different from the methods of empirical sciences) of any part of nature. Therefore minds, consciousness and subjectivity, as part of the nature, can be known only by means of empirical sciences. Contents: Dirk Koppelberg: Forms of Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind - Harald Schmidt: Trying to make an unfriendly take-over look like an offer for cooperation or: Never try to jump on a train that is pulling out of the station - some objections to Dirk Koppelberg'scooperative naturalism - Dirk Koppelberg: Why Opt for Cooperative Naturalism? - Response to Harald Schmidt - Sandro Nannini: Cognitive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind - Jurgen Hanken: Some Objections to Sandro Nannini's « Naturalism in the philosophy of mind - Sandro Nannini: Response to Jurgen Hanken - Domenico Parisi: The Naturalization of Humans - Jacob Bosenberg: Comment on D. Parisi's « The naturalization of humans - Domenico Parisi: Response to Jacob Bosenberg - Jurgen Schroder: Naturalizing Consciousness by Reductive Explanations - Carlo Cecchetto/Luigi Rizzi: A Naturalistic Approach to Language - Achim Stephan: Reductionism and Naturalization - Geert Keil: Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind - and what is wrong with it - Jochen Holzner: Abstract and three Questions - Geert Keil: Replies - Hans Jorg Sandkuhler: Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind? For a Philosophical Alternative - Christine Haler: Some Critical Comments on Sandkuhler's Philosophical Alternative to Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind - Hans Jorg Sandkuhler: Response to Christine Haler.