Lessons In Corporate Governance From The Global Financial Crisis

Lessons in Corporate Governance from the Global Financial Crisis poses and attempts to answer key questions about the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Did it have to happen? What caused it and, more importantly, why? Could it have been avoided? Could it happen again? This book covers issues such as importance of the fiduciary duties of board members, risk management, influence of hedge funds, impact on members’ pension funds, currency hedging, role of government regulation and the extensive use of financial derivatives.

Over the last two decades there has been a notable increase in the number of corporate governance codes and principles, as well as a range of improvements in structures and mechanisms. Despite this, corporate governance failed to prevent a widespread default of fiduciary duties of corporate boards and managerial responsibilities in the finance industry, which contributed to the 2007–10 global financial crisis. This book brings together leading scholars from North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East to provide fresh and critical analytical insights on the systemic failures of corporate governance linked to the global financial crisis. Contributors draw from a range of disciplines to demonstrate the severe limitations of the dominant corporate governance framework and its associated market-oriented approach. They provide suggestions on how the governance problems could be tackled to prevent or mitigate any future financial crisis and explore new directions for post-crisis corporate governance research and reforms.

This collection brings together leading scholarly thinking to understand why CSR failed to prevent the global financial crisis, how corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) contributed to the financial crisis, and how we may reframe CSR or improve CSR frameworks to help prevent or mitigate any future financial and economic crises.

The years from 2000 to 2010 were bookended by two major economic crises. The bursting of the dotcom bubble and the extended bear market of 2000 to 2002 prompted Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was directed at core aspects of corporate governance. At the end of the decade came the bursting of the housing bubble, followed by a severe credit crunch, and the worst economic downturn in decades. In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which changed vast swathes of financial regulation. Among these changes were a number of significant corporate governance reforms. Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis asks two questions about these changes. First, are they a good idea that will improve corporate governance? Second, what do they tell us about the relative merits of the federal government and the states as sources of corporate governance regulation? Traditionally, corporate law was the province of the states. Today, however, the federal government is increasingly engaged in corporate governance regulation. The changes examined in this work provide a series of case studies in which to explore the question of whether federalization will lead to better outcomes. The author analyzes these changes in the context of corporate governance, executive compensation, corporate fraud and disclosure, shareholder activism, corporate democracy, and declining US capital market competitiveness.

Several financial crises passed, in 1997-1999 and 2007-2009, left lessons for worldwide management control, accounting practice and internal system problems for corporations both in Viet Nam and in the world. It is one of the reasons for this book’s presence. The book cover the subject of corporate governance in theories and practices in regions: Asia Pacific, Europe, Africa and America, after recent time of crisis and corporate scandals over the world, including Viet Nam, which affect our economy, society, work and life balance. The recent trend is shown in its title for part one: Theories and Practices on Corporate Governance Issues and Standards after Financial Crisis. Our own comparative analysis and research is shown in part two and part three of this book. In this edition, the book has some updated information in: adding a new implementation form for corporate governance, as well as proposed new case questions for academic purpose. Welcome any ideas from readers.

Corporate governance, the internal policies and leadership that guide the actions of corporations, played a major part in the recent global financial crisis. While much blame has been targeted at compensation arrangements that rewarded extreme risk-taking but did not punish failure, the performance of large, supposedly sophisticated institutional investors in this crisis has gone for the most part unexamined. Shareholding organizations, such as pension funds and mutual funds, hold considerable sway over the financial industry from Wall Street to the City of London. Corporate Governance Failures: The Role of Institutional Investors in the Global Financial Crisis exposes the misdeeds and lapses of these institutional investors leading up to the recent economic meltdown. In this collection of original essays, edited by pioneers in the field of fiduciary capitalism, top legal and financial practitioners and researchers discuss detrimental actions and inaction of institutional investors. Corporate Governance Failures reveals how these organizations exposed themselves and their clientele to extremely complex financial instruments, such as credit default swaps, through investments in hedge and private equity funds as well as more traditional equity investments in large financial institutions. The book's contributors critique fund executives for tolerating the "pursuit of alpha" culture that led managers to pursue risky financial strategies in hopes of outperforming the market. The volume also points out how and why institutional investors failed to effectively monitor such volatile investments, ignoring relatively well-established corporate governance principles and best practices. Along with detailed investigations of institutional investor missteps, Corporate Governance Failures offers nuanced and realistic proposals to mitigate future financial pitfalls. This volume provides fresh perspectives on ways institutional investors can best act as gatekeepers and promote responsible investment.

Submitted Assignment from the year 2023 in the subject Politics - Topic: Public International Law and Human Rights, grade: 72, University of East London, course: INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, language: English, abstract: The 2008 Global Financial Crisis was a devastating economic event that affected the whole world. It exposed several flaws and weaknesses in the corporate governance arrangements of financial institutions, which failed to prevent excessive risk-taking and ensure effective oversight. This essay critically analyzes the statement by Grant Kirkpatrick that the financial crisis can be largely attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements. It reviews the relevant literature on corporate governance and the Global Financial Crisis, and examines the role of risk management as a key component of corporate governance. It evaluates the merits and demerits of Kirkpatrick’s argument, and considers the alternative perspectives and explanations for the causes and consequences of the crisis. The essay concludes that corporate governance was indeed a significant factor in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, but not the only one. It also suggests some implications and recommendations for improving corporate governance practices in the future.