Lessons Of Iraq

The recent Afghanistan and Iraq wars were very controversial. The conflicts’ casualties, intractability and the apparent failure of the US and its allies to achieve their objectives mean that many see the wars as failures. This resulted in a loss of confidence in the West of the utility of force as an instrument of state power. Both wars have been well described by journalists. There is no shortage of memoirs. But there is little discussion of how the conduct of these wars and capabilities of the forces involved changed and evolved, and of the implications of these developments for future warfare. This book gives readers a clear understanding of the military character dynamics of both wars and how these changed between 2001 and 2014. This includes the strategy, operations, tactics and technology of the forces of the US and its allies, Afghan and Iraqi government forces as well as insurgents and militias, showing how they evolved over time. Many of these developments have wider relevance to future conflicts. The book identifies those that are of potential wider application to US, NATO and other western forces, to insurgents, as well as to forces of states that might choose to confront the west militarily.

Draws parallels between the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, arguing that the first conflict's lessons have been ignored by today's leaders while asserting that the Iraq War is unlikely to be resolved quickly or effectively.

Product Description: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government--all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was - or was not - done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.

The role of public opinion in nations' decisions to join or withdraw from the war in Iraq

The essays in this book offer a series of perspectives on connections and parallels between the Vietnam War and the 2003 invasion of, and current conflict in, Iraq.

In his acclaimed collection An Autumn of War, the scholar and military historian Victor Davis Hanson expressed powerful and provocative views of September 11 and the ensuing war in Afghanistan. Now, in these challenging new essays, he examines the world’s ongoing war on terrorism, from America to Iraq, from Europe to Israel, and beyond. In direct language, Hanson portrays an America making progress against Islamic fundamentalism but hampered by the self-hatred of elite academics at home and the cynical self-interest of allies abroad. He sees a new and urgent struggle of evil against good, one that can fail only if “we convince ourselves that our enemies fight because of something we, rather than they, did.” Whether it’s a clear-cut defense of Israel as a secular democracy, a denunciation of how the U.N. undermines the U.S., a plea to drastically alter our alliance with Saudi Arabia, or a perception that postwar Iraq is reaching a dangerous tipping point, Hanson’s arguments have the shock of candor and the fire of conviction.