Leverage Shocks Firm Level Evidence On Debt Overhang And Investment

The global economy is in the midst of an unprecedented slump caused by the coronavirus pandemic. This systemic risk like no other at a time of record-breaking debt levels, especially among nonfinancial firms across the world, could exacerbate corporate vulnerabilities, deepen macro-financial instability, and cause long-lasting damage to economic potential. Using data on more than 2.8 million nonfinancial firms from 52 countries during the period 1997–2018, we develop a two-pronged approach to investigate the relationship between corporate leverage and fixed investment spending. The empirical analysis, robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, confirm corporate leverage is highly vulnerable to disruptions in profitability and cash flow at the firm level and economic growth at the aggregate level. These findings imply that corporate debt overhang could become a strenuous burden on nonfinancial firms, especially if the COVID-19 pandemic lingers and global downturn becomes protracted.

This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.

After the 2008 financial meltdown, the American crisis soon infected the European financial system, becoming both a sovereign debt crisis and a banking debacle in many peripheral Euro area countries. The European crisis spread quickly among closely integrated economies and the implementation of austerity policies reinforced a spiral of economic contractions and provoked a rising political rebellion. This World Economics Association book, edited by Victor Baker and Beniamino Moro, was written to address monetary, financial and debt issues, alongside the questions of social stabilization, strategies for structural reform and economic growth that may be re-considered to frame new economic perspectives for Europe. The call for reflection is persuasively made by the contributors: Jacques Sapir; Gerson Lima; Carmelo Ferlito; Merijn Knibbe; Enrico Marelli and Marcello Signorelli; Tom Vleeschhouwer and Tara Koning; Cristiano Boaventura Duarte and AndrE de Melo Modenesi; Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Michalis Nukiforos and Gennaro Zezza. "The World Economics Association's on-line forums are an important step toward the goal of open exchange on policy questions among economists of diverse views world-wide. I congratulate Victor Beker and Beniamin Moro, who here bring together a set of important papers on the European question." James K. Galbraith, The University of Texas at Austin "The huge debates on the future of the European Union as well as the management of the Euro are among the hottest issues in both contemporary politics and finance. The papers in this volume offer a broad survey of the terrain and a broad menu of possible solutions. The authors and the World Economics Association have provided a major public service with this text of great interest for both the general public and for policymakers." Carlos Marichal, El Colegio de MExico "The European Union is suffering from many crises - and many self-inflicted through the structures of the Eurozone. This book is to be highly welcomed for debating the causes of those crises and seeking ways forward. The chapters here offer two contrasting routes away from the crisis of the Eurozone: radical reforms of the economic governance of EMU with creation of a viable monetary union, a sensible fiscal policy and building convergence or the orderly dismantaling of the euro and arrangements to co-ordinate currencies. These authors have set out agendas - when will the policy makers join the debates?" Malcolm Sawyer, University of Leeds, UK

We analyze holdings of public bonds by over 20,000 banks in 191 countries, and the role of these bonds in 20 sovereign defaults over 1998-2012. Banks hold many public bonds (on average 9% of their assets), particularly in less financially-developed countries. During sovereign defaults, banks increase their exposure to public bonds, especially large banks and when expected bond returns are high. At the bank level, bondholdings correlate negatively with subsequent lending during sovereign defaults. This correlation is mostly due to bonds acquired in pre-default years. These findings shed light on alternative theories of the sovereign default-banking crisis nexus.

The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.

This paper investigates the role of tax incentives towards debt finance in the buildup of leverage in the nonfinancial corporate (NFC) sector, using a large firm-level dataset. We find that so-called debt bias is a significant driver of leverage, for both small and medium-sized enterprises and larger firms, with its effect accounting for about a quarter of leverage. The strength of this effect differs with firm size, the availability of collateral, income and income volatility, cash flow, and capital intensity. We conclude that leveling the playing field between debt and equity finance through tax policy reform would decrease NFC leverage, reducing economic risks posited by leverage.

We study the impact of the COVID-19 recession on capital structure of publicly listed U.S. firms. Our estimates suggest leverage (Net Debt/Asset) decreased by 5.3 percentage points from the pre-shock mean of 19.6 percent, while debt maturity increased moderately. This de-leveraging effect is stronger for firms exposed to significant rollover risk, while firms whose businesses were most vulnerable to social distancing did not reduce leverage. We rationalize our evidence through a structural model of firm value that shows lower expected growth rate and higher volatility of cash flows following COVID-19 reduced optimal levels of corporate leverage. Model-implied optimal leverage indicates firms which did not de-lever became over-leveraged. We find default probability deteriorates most in large, over-leveraged firms and those that were stressed pre-COVID. Additional stress tests predict value of these firms will be less than one standard deviation away from default if cash flows decline by 20 percent.