Liberalism And Affirmative Obligation

The scope of affirmative obligation is a point of contention among liberals. Some see affirmative obligations required by social justice as incompatible with a strong commitment to individual freedom. The task before the moderate liberal is then to consider what a consistently liberal view of affirmative obligation would have to be in order to accommodate liberal commitments to freedom and justice and also account for long-standing institutions that are central to liberal democratic society. In this book, Patricia Smith argues that this can be achieved by reconstructing the liberal doctrine of positive and negative duty. She offers a careful consideration of these elements of liberal principles as they relate to affirmative obligation. Through an innovative analysis of the institutions of family and contract, Smith develops the idea of duties of membership as preferable to natural duties (to explain family obligation) and as needed to supplement contractual duties (to explain professional obligation). This idea is then applied to the problem of justifying political obligation. She argues that membership obligations, implied in cooperative endeavor, must supplement obligations of consent that are central to liberal theory. This is deftly illustrated through a state of nature theory that includes community membership, eliminating atomistic individualism while maintaining consonance with what Smith calls cooperative individualism. The resulting view of liberal individualism is consistent, complete, and capable of handling long-standing liberal institutions, while taking seriously the demands of affirmative obligations. Smiths clear articulation of a liberal view of affirmative obligation finds a middle ground on this polarized topic, with compelling and reasoned implications for liberal political philosophy. Her discussion will interest students and scholars of legal and political philosophy and political science.

The policy of affirmative action, today, more so than in the Civil Rights era, is under severe scrutiny. Nicholas Capaldi's Out of Order typifies the present-day criticism of affirmative action and shows how we have shifted from equality of opportunity and individual merit to the concept of group entitlement and statistical quality of result. Capaldi contends that affirmative action has not solved the problem of equal opportunity for which it was presumably designed, it has instead created a new moral dilemma in the form of reverse discrimination. Out of Order highlights key affirmative action issues from the time of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through the Bakke decision, the Weber case of 1979, and beyond. Capaldi illuminates not only the historical/judicial complexion of affirmative action policies but also their philosophical and social implications. Capaldi questions the necessity of affirmative action, whether its creation was based upon a valid definition of the nature and extent of discrimination, and whether it is a suitable policy for dealing with discrimination. Capaldi maintains that the creation of affirmative action evolved more out of social theory than social reality. By carefully documenting the legislative and judicial history of the Civil Rights Act, the author argues that affirmative action is a bureaucratic fabrication, that it is not a solution to a problem but a policy in search of problems. The crux of Capaldi's thesis boldly claims that affirmative action is perpetuated by the self-interest of "modern liberals" who "guide and control the system from their superior vantage point." Moreover, affirmative action is centered on education and has its roots in doctrinaire liberalism. Since that social philosophy attaches a crucial role to education, and since the conflicting demands made upon the modern American university have exposed its inability to generate coherent policies, doctrinaire liberalism has undergone a crisis of confidence.

Offers a revised liberal political philosophy, arguing that group-based policies are discriminatory and proposing individual-oriented policies in their place.

A liberal society seeks not to impose a single way of life, but to leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends. It therefore must govern by principles of justice that do not presuppose any particular vision of the good life. But can any such principles be found? And if not, what are the consequences for justice as a moral and political ideal? These are the questions Michael Sandel takes up in this penetrating critique of contemporary liberalism. Sandel locates modern liberalism in the tradition of Kant, and focuses on its most influential recent expression in the work of John Rawls. In the most important challenge yet to Rawls' theory of justice, Sandel traces the limits of liberalism to the conception of the person that underlies it, and argues for a deeper understanding of community than liberalism allows.

In this book, Christopher Heath Wellman offers original theories of political legitimacy and our obligation to obey the law, and then, building upon these accounts, defends a number of distinctive positions concerning the rights and responsibilities individual citizens, separatist groups, and political states have regarding one another.

It is tempting to think of liberal democracy in terms of immortality. Democracies have survived wars and depressions, Nazis and communists – so much so that at the end of the Cold War Francis Fukuyama famously declared the “end of history.” In The Culturalist Challenge to Liberal Republicanism, Michael Lusztig assesses the risks that multiculturalism and other forms of culturalism pose to liberal democracy. Establishing the nature of the current regime and exploring the emergence of a cogent theory of justice grounded in both liberal and republican theory, Lusztig demonstrates the inconsistencies between liberal republicanism and culturalist theories of justice. Exploring both the institutional and cultural effects of the tension between culturalism and liberal republicanism, he seeks a balanced view that falls somewhere between Fukuyama’s optimism for regime mortality and the pessimism inherent in the work of more conservative theorists like Samuel Huntington. Lusztig concludes that the narrowness of liberal republican justice is ameliorated by multiculturalism, but the hidden danger is that multiculturalism can serve as a stalking horse for more pernicious agendas. Given the increasing cultural diversity faced by North American and European nations, The Culturalist Challenge to Liberal Republicanism has important implications for political stability in the twenty-first century.

Since the seventeenth century liberal thinkers have been interested in the rights of individuals and their capacities to engage as free equals in the political activity of their community. However, as many in the republican tradition have noted, the maintenance of certain types of communities - predicated on broadly shared ethical expectations, modes of communication and patterns of activity - is a precondition of the meaningful exercise of citizenship rights.This volume presents essays from many of the major names in the field, exploring citizenship from a fresh perspective. After two decades of strident individualism, in the light of claims that the liberal democratic state is under threat of collapse from the forces of globalization, and in the midst of a theoretical debate about the possible and desirable limits of individual autonomy, they argue that it is high time to go beyond the standard concern of what can be ascribed to citizens. We must ask what should be demanded of them, in the name of the protection of liberty, equality and stability.