Libya S Operation Odyssey Dawn

Operation Odyssey Dawn and the situation in Libya: hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, first session, March 31, 2011.

Over the past few weeks, President Obama has carefully helped assemble a broad military coalition supported by a U.N. Resolution. The coalition has established a no-fly zone and an arms embargo, stopped Moammar Qadhafi's advancing army, and has seamlessly passed the command of the military effort from a U.S.-led joint task force to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The fast pace at which the administration has moved and at which the Department of Defense (DOD) has deployed forces is to be commended. It is a testament to the leadership of the Department and to the skill and flexibility of the men and women of our Armed Forces.

Operation Odyssey Dawn and the situation in Libya : hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, first session, March 31, 2011.

Four military reports provide a unique perspective on the Libyan military operation launched by President Obama in 2011, known as Operation Odyssey Dawn. Libya's Operation Odyssey Dawn: Command and Control - Events in Libya from January through April 2011 and the related coalition operation, Operation Odyssey Dawn, provided an opportunity to observe how this new type of command would perform in a crisis/contingency operation. USAFRICOM was required to plan kinetic operations, form a multinational coalition, stand up a multinational joint task force (JTF), conduct offensive and defensive maritime and air operations, and transition leadership of the operation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The best practices and lessons learned from all phases of USAFRICOM's execution of the operation will be valuable in determining the viability of its unique structure and organization and its applicability to other commands. Additionally, the lessons learned will provide input to changes that may be required to ensure future success. The Promise and the Peril of the Responsibility to Protect - In 2005, the United Nations codified the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in its World Summit Outcome, stating that sovereign governments have a responsibility to protect their populations from atrocities, and if that government is unable or unwilling to do so, the international community had a responsibility to act to stop the atrocity through diplomatic, humanitarian or other peaceful means, or by force in extreme cases. The concept of Responsibility to Protect has gained rapid international acceptance, to include its addition in the 2010 United States National Security Strategy, but serious questions remain regarding the legitimate application of force when force is deemed necessary. This paper considers the 2011 Libyan rebellion as a case study of the use of force under the auspices of The Responsibility to Protect. NATO's Air War in Libya: A Template for Future American Operations - This research paper attempts to answer the question: does NATO's air war in Libya provide a template for how the United States will settle its future military conflicts? This paper explores three case studies involving airpower to identify the feasibility of a template for future military operations. The first case study explores NATO's 78-day air war against Bosnia over Kosovo. The next case study looks at America's involvement in Afghanistan during the first six months of Operation Enduring Freedom. The last case study involves NATO and America's 2011 involvement in Libya. Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector: A Coercive Failure? - This monograph examines military operations in Libya 2011, Operations Unified Protector and Odyssey Dawn, through the lens of coercion theory. It seeks to answer the question: if the United States and its allies attempted to apply coercion theory against Gaddafi preceding and during military operations, why did he seemingly exhibit no behavioral changes prior to his death? This monograph purports that even though Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector succeeded in supporting the removal of the Gaddafi regime, ultimately they represent a coercive failure.

HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESSFIRST SESSION

On March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution, with up to dead 2,000 civilians, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided on backing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. While France, Great Britain, and the United States took immediate military action using air and missile strikes, considerations to hand over military actions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged within days of the operation. On March 22 2012, NATO agreed to enforce the arms embargo against Libya; 2 days later, it announced to take over all military aspects of the UNSC 1973. On March 31, 2012, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) began. OUP turned out to be one of NATO's shorter, and seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the regime of Colonel Qaddafi was launching assaults on peacefully demonstrating citizens, its aim was to protect civilians from the air and sea. Described as a "war of choice" rather than a "war of necessity," NATO achieved its goals more by accident than by design, according to some critics. The lessons which can be drawn from OUP are both military and political in nature. The overestimation of air power as a result of "no boots on the ground" might be a dangerous conclusion for future cases; the lack of cultural advice very likely prolonged the mission, while the shortcomings in strategic communication gave input to improve an area that is still new to NATO. The operation also highlighted a strategic dimension the Alliance was not ready to perceive -- that the Mediterranean, and its Southern states, is likely to continue being a source of instability for NATO, particularly after the Arab Spring. In legal terms, the Alliance faced an important communication gap between its legal, and therefore military, mandate -- the legal interpretations of UNSCR 1973 made clear that the operation did not seek to topple Colonel Gaddafi's regime, let alone assassinate him. Its aim was solely the protection of civilians in a situation of internal conflict, and, therefore, it conformed to the norm of "Responsibility to Protect." On the political level, heads of NATO member states made contradictory remarks calling for Gaddafi's departure, thereby compromising the clarity of the mission. Last but not least, the aftermath of NATO's Libya operation was not planned at all as the Libyan National Transitional Council firmly rejected any military personnel on the ground, not even UN observers. As the regime's security forces had virtually imploded, Libya's security therefore fell into the hands of the multiple militias which continued to proliferate after the conflict had ended.

This narrative chronicles Libya's, and to a vast extent Muammar Gaddafi's, remarkable past, meteoric rise to prominence, and convoluted reign, and introduces potential scenarios that may play out in the near term. After four decades of tyrannical, erratic—and pioneering—changes fueled by oil wealth, Muammar Gaddafi's government fell in 2011, and Libya embarked on a new course without known charts. Libya: History and Revolution covers the nation from its origins as independent land masses and kingdoms to its present as a consolidated nation. The work does not focus on the "old" Libya, but aims to bridge yesterday's Libya with tomorrow's, looking at the nation as a regional economic power and military player in North Africa and the Middle East. The result is a comprehensive yet easy-to-understand introduction to the political, economic, and military history and events that led to Gaddafi's downfall, coupled with a consideration of Libya's past and present. Opening with historical underpinnings, the book focuses on the conflict and revolution in Libya during the Arab Spring that brought Gaddafi down, a change that opened a new future for the oil-rich nation. The book closes with a thoughtful discussion of what may be next for Libya and of possible perils for the nation, the region, and the world, as Libya matures as an independent, representatively governed country.