Limits Of Institutional Engineering Lessons From Iraq

By using a method called process tracing to scrutinize institutional engineering in Iraq, it becomes clear why intensified violence followed the drafting and ratification of the Iraqi constitution. It is not surprising that institutional engineering did not forestall violence; therefore, we can conclude that the Iraqi experience does not support theories of institutional design--Publisher's description.

Consistent with the literature on state building, failed states, peacekeeping and foreign assistance, this book argues that budgeting is a core state activity necessary for the operation of a functional government. Employing a historical institutionalist approach, this book first explores the Ottoman, British and Ba'athist origins of Iraq's budgetary institutions. The book next examines American pre-war planning, the Coalition Provisional Authority's rule-making and budgeting following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the mixed success of the Coalition's capacity-building programs initiated throughout the occupation. This book sheds light on the problem of 'outsiders' building states, contributes to a more comprehensive evaluation of the Coalition in Iraq, addresses the question of why Iraqis took ownership of some Coalition-generated institutions, and helps explain the nature of institutional change.

In the newly updated Sixteenth Edition of The Middle East, Ellen Lust and contributors comprehensively examine regional trends and offer in-depth country profiles to illuminate this vital region.

Political instability has characterised the modern history of Iraq, which has proven itself as a complex state to govern. However, the creation of a federal system in 2005 offers the potential for change and a deviation from a past characterised by authoritarian government, brutality and war. The Iraqi Federation explores why and how Iraq became a federal state, and analyses how the process of formation impacts on the operation of the Iraqi federal system. It argues that the different approaches taken by various federal theorists in the past, particularly William H. Riker’s bargain theory, are insufficient to explain the formation of the Iraqi federation completely. The process of the establishment of a federal Iraq must be understood in the context of its unique history and cultural specificity, as well as in the context of the other new federal models that have appeared since the end of the Cold War, including Belgium, the Russian Federation, Ethiopia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Nigeria. Drawing on interviews with contemporary political players in Iraq, this book helps to deepen our understanding of how one of the newest federal states operates in a practical sense. By linking the new federal models to the classic federal theory, it also provides a unique contribution to theories on federal state formation. It will therefore be of great interest to students and scholars of Middle East Politics, as well as those studying Federalism.

The fallacy of analogy: World War II as American's "good war"--The power of precedent: Arabs' memory of World War I -- Justice interrupted: Arabs' response to occupation -- Conclusion: the use of historical precedent in U.S. policy

Political scientist James H. Lebovic establishes that the size, strength, flexibility, and adaptability of the U.S. military cannot ensure victory in asymmetrical conflicts. In The Limits of U.S. Military Capability, Lebovic shows how political and psychological factors trumped U.S. military superiority in Vietnam and Iraq, where inappropriate strategies, low stakes, and unrealistic goals mired the United States military in protracted, no-win conflicts. Lebovic contends that the United States is at a particular disadvantage when fighting a counterinsurgency without the full support of the host government; when leveraging various third parties (the adversary's foreign allies, societal leaders, and indigenous populations); when attempting to build coalitions and nations while involved in combat; and when sustaining government and public support at home when costs rise and benefits decline. Lebovic cautions against involving the U.S. military in operations without first considering U.S. stakes and suggests that the military take a less-is-more approach when choosing to employ force. Ambitious goals bring higher costs, unexpected results, diminished options, and a greater risk of failure. Rejecting the heavy-handed approach that is typical of most comparisons between the Vietnam and Iraq wars, The Limits of U.S. Military Capability carefully assesses evidence to develop lessons applicable to other conflicts—especially the ongoing war in Afghanistan.

With a penchant for wine and women, Tyler is not the kind of man to let the law stand in his way. Rich, arrogant and spoiled, when his love of wine and cognac leads to the death of a young couple walking along a country lane, he'll do anything to avoid the consequences - including driving his car to his property in Mallorca so the English police can't examine it. When Superior Chief Salas orders all inspectors on the island to determine whether Tyler is in their area, laid-back Inspector Enrique Alvarez regards it, like all work, as an unwanted interruption to his lifestyle. He soon discovers, however, that this routine inquiry has far-reaching consequences he could never have foreseen.