Logical Fictions

The media bombard us with claims that are often strange, unclear, and even upsetting. Quantum physicists claim that "vacuum nothingness" is not really nothing, because it teems with energy and virtual particles. Psychological research suggests that most of our neighbors suffer from some degree of mental disorder. Social scientists assure us that science itself is simply a cultural myth. Can anyone sort out fact from fiction in today's world? The answer, thankfully, is "Yes " But first, you must make a radical shift in your approach, because serious thinking about reality involves serious thinking about fiction, not only in your everyday mind, but also in the scholarly and technical realms. For anyone who has ever wondered-and you should wonder-whether there really are such things as government, society, the economy, or even marriage, the deeply philosophical and utterly practical Logical Fictions shows you how a solid grounding in logic and language can help you avoid getting trapped by the ideological fictions prevalent in today's sophisticated world. Consider yourself warned: humorous and filled with entertaining examples, this book will stretch your brain and provoke your thoughts. Your view of the world may never be the same.

This book examines the ways in which traditions of philosophy and logic are reflected in major works of medieval literature.

This work is for scholars, researchers and students in history and philosophy of science focusing on Logical Empiricism and analytic philosophy (of science). It provides historical and systematic research and deals with the influence and impact of the Vienna Circle/Logical Empiricism on today's philosophy of science. It also explores the intellectual context of this scientific philosophy and focuses on main figures and peripheral adherents.

Since their inception, the Perspectives in Logic and Lecture Notes in Logic series have published seminal works by leading logicians. Many of the original books in the series have been unavailable for years, but they are now in print once again. This volume, the nineteenth publication in the Lecture Notes in Logic series, collects the proceedings of the European Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, held in Paris, France in July 2000. This meeting marked the centennial anniversary of Hilbert's famous lecture and was held in the same hall at La Sorbonne where Hilbert presented his problems. Three long articles, based on tutorials given at the meeting, present accessible expositions of developing research in model theory, computability, and set theory. The eleven subsequent papers present work from the research frontier in all areas of mathematical logic.

First published in 1999, this volume re-examines Bertrand Russell’s views on modal logic and logical relevance, arguing that Russell does in fact accommodate modality and modal logic. The author, Jan Dejnožka, draws together Russell’s comments and perspectives from throughout his canon in order to demonstrate a coherent view on logical modality and logical relevance. To achieve this, Dejnožka explores questions including whether Russell has a possible worlds logic, Rescher’s case against Russell, Russell’s three levels of modality and the motives and origins of Russell’s theory of modality.

Many of Bertrand Russell's most important essays in logic and the theory of knowledge were not easily available until Professor Marsh collected them together in 1956. This work is now the best source of Russell's views in these areas and is firmly established as a philosophical classic in its own right.

This monograph examines truth in fiction by applying the techniques of a naturalized logic of human cognitive practices. The author structures his project around two focal questions. What would it take to write a book about truth in literary discourse with reasonable promise of getting it right? What would it take to write a book about truth in fiction as true to the facts of lived literary experience as objectivity allows? It is argued that the most semantically distinctive feature of the sentences of fiction is that they areunambiguously true and false together. It is true that Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street and also concurrently false that he did. A second distinctive feature of fiction is that the reader at large knows of this inconsistency and isn’t in the least cognitively molested by it. Why, it is asked, would this be so? What would explain it? Two answers are developed. According to the no-contradiction thesis, the semantically tangled sentences of fiction are indeed logically inconsistent but not logically contradictory. According to the no-bother thesis, if the inconsistencies of fiction were contradictory, a properly contrived logic for the rational management of inconsistency would explain why readers at large are not thrown off cognitive stride by their embrace of those contradictions. As developed here, the account of fiction suggests the presence of an underlying three - or four-valued dialethic logic. The author shows this to be a mistaken impression. There are only two truth-values in his logic of fiction. The naturalized logic of Truth in Fiction jettisons some of the standard assumptions and analytical tools of contemporary philosophy, chiefly because the neurotypical linguistic and cognitive behaviour of humanity at large is at variance with them. Using the resources of a causal response epistemology in tandem with the naturalized logic, the theory produced here is data-driven, empirically sensitive, and open to a circumspect collaboration with the empirical sciences of language and cognition.