Lotka Volterra Approach To Cooperation And Competition In Dynamic Systems

The investigation of special topics in systems dynamics -uncertain dynamic processes, viability theory, nonlinear dynamics in models for biomathematics, inverse problems in control systems theory-has become a major issue at the System and Decision Sciences Research Program of the International Insti tute for Applied Systems Analysis. The above topics actually reflect two different perspectives in the investigation of dynamic processes. The first, motivated by control theory, is concerned with the properties of dynamic systems that are stable under vari ations in the systems' parameters. This allows us to specify classes of dynamic systems for which it is possible to construct and control a whole "tube" of trajectories assigned to a system with uncertain parameters and to resolve some inverse problems of control theory within numerically stable solution schemes. The second perspective is to investigate generic properties of dynamic systems that are due to nonlinearity (as bifurcations theory, chaotic behavior, stability properties, and related problems in the qualitative theory of differential systems). Special stress is given to the applications of non linear dynamic systems theory to biomathematics and ecoloey.

Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centred not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioural programmes. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behaviour, and of the closely related interactions between species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success, i.e. to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.

This book lays out a number of the general issues concerning the structure of rugged fitness landscapes and examines both the history and the current status of experimental work on somatic mutation and the maturation of the immune response.

Introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries. Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field. Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.

A clear methodological and philosophical introduction to complexity theory as applied to urban and regional systems is given, together with a detailed series of modelling case studies compiled over the last couple of decades. Based on the new complex systems thinking, mathematical models are developed which attempt to simulate the evolution of towns, cities, and regions and the complicated co-evolutionary interaction there is both between and within them. The aim of these models is to help policy analysis and decision-making in urban and regional planning, energy policy, transport policy, and many other areas of service provision, infrastructure planning, and investment that are necessary for a successful society.