Luis De Molina

Spanish theologian Luis de Molina is enjoying a quiet resurgence among Protestant scholars, a late appreciation for the Reformation-era Jesuit and contemporary of Calvin and Arminius. In the first full work ever on Molina, author Kirk R. MacGregor explores the life and original contributions of the brilliant philosophical theologian.

Since his rediscovery by Alwin Plantinga in the 1970s, the possibility of counterfactuals of freedom in Molinism has become one of the main issues in the contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Notwithstanding this, Luis de Molina (1535-1600) remains one of the most influential and least known authors of late scholasticism and early modern philosophy. The papers collected in this volume treat the whole range of issues posed by his metaphysics as set out in his revolutionary "Concordia" and in his practical philosophy - especially concerning law and economics - in his groundbreaking work "De Justitia et Jure". They also examine Molina's historical commitments and his influences on philosophy. In this way this Companion offers the first comprehensive and thorough overview of Molina's thought.

Luis de Molina was a leading figure in the remarkable sixteenth-century revival of Scholasticism on the Iberian peninsula. Molina is best known for his innovative theory of middle knowledge. Alfred J. Freddoso's extensive introductory essay clears up common misconceptions about Molina's theory, defends it against both philosophical and theological objections, and makes it accessible to contemporary readers.

This book shows how threads of field research, economic reflection, natural law tradition, casuistry and the quest for justice weave together in Luis de Molina’s De Iustitia et Iure, thus forming a major work of Catholic moral theology.

Thomas P. Flint develops and defends the idea of divine providence sketched by Luis de Molina, the sixteenth-century Jesuit theologian. The Molinist account of divine providence reconciles two claims long thought to be incompatible: that God is the all-knowing governor of the universe and that individual freedom can prevail only in a universe free of absolute determinism. The Molinist concept of middle knowledge holds that God knows, though he has no control over, truths about how any individual would freely choose to act in any situation, even if the person never encounters that situation. Given such knowledge, God can be truly providential while leaving his creatures genuinely free. Divine Providence is by far the most detailed and extensive presentation of the Molinist view ever written.Middle knowledge is hotly debated in philosophical theology, and the controversy spills over into metaphysics and moral philosophy as well. Flint ably defends the concept against its most influential contemporary critics, and shows its importance to Christian practice. With particular originality and sophistication, he applies Molinism to such aspects of providence as prayer, prophecy, and the notion of papal infallibility, teasing out the full range of implications for traditional Christianity.

This original study is concerned with the reconciliation of divine providence, grace, and free will. Mark Wiebe explores, develops, and defends Luis de Molina's work in these areas, and bridges the main sixteenth-century conversations surrounding Molina's writings with relevant sets of arguments in contemporary philosophical theology and philosophy of religion. The result fills a gap between theologians and philosophers working in related areas of study and is a unique contribution to the field of analytic theology. Wiebe begins by sketching the historical and theological context from which Molina's work emerged in the late sixteenth century. He then lays out Thomas Aquinas's understanding of God's nature and activity, as well as his understanding of the relationship between God's action and creaturely activity. In the face of challenges like the Problem of Evil, Wiebe argues, Molina's work is a helpful supplement to Aquinas's thought. Turning to direct consideration of Molina's work, Wiebe responds to several of the most well-known objections to Molinism. In support of Molina's understanding of creaturely freedom, he then develops some twentieth-century work in free will philosophy, focusing on the work of thinkers like Austin Farrer, Timothy O'Connor, and Robert Kane. He argues that there are good reasons to defend a restrained version of libertarian or noncompatibilist free will, and also good reasons to believe this sort of freedom obtains among human agents. Wiebe concludes that a Molinistic revision of Eleonore Stump's work on the relationship between providence and free will provides a well-rounded, coherent theological option for reconciling divine providence, grace, and free will. This thoughtful study will appeal to theologians and philosophers, as well as educated readers with a basic knowledge of Christian theology.

Does humanity possess the freedom to think and act, or are we always caused and determined to think and act—exactly how we think and act—by things outside of our control? If we are always causally determined to think and act by things outside of our control, then how can humans be genuinely responsible for any of our thoughts or following actions? However, if humanity is genuinely free and responsible for at least some of our thoughts and actions, then how can the Christian rationally affirm the doctrine that God is totally sovereign and predestines all things? In Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, Timothy A. Stratton surveys the history of theological thought from Augustine to Edwards and reaches surprising historical conclusions supporting what he refers to as “limited libertarian freedom.” Stratton goes further to offer multiple arguments appealing to Scripture, theology, and philosophy that each conclude humanity does, in fact, possess libertarian freedom. He then appeals to the work of Luis de Molina and offers unique arguments concluding that God possesses middle knowledge. If this is the case, then God can be completely sovereign and predestine all things without violating human freedom and responsibility.

Molinism promises the strongest account of God's providence consistent with our freedom. But is it a coherent view, and does it provide a satisfying account of divine providence? The essays in this volume examine the status, defensibility, and application of this recently revived doctrine, and anticipate the future direction of the debate.