Macroeconomic Effects Of Dividend Taxation With Investment Credit Limits

We analyze the effects of dividend taxation in a general equilibrium business cycle model with an occasionally-binding investment credit limit. Permanent dividend tax reforms distort capital investment decisions in the binding long-run equilibrium, but are neutral otherwise. Temporary unexpected tax cuts stimulate shortterm real activity in the credit-constrained economy, yet produce contractionary macroeconomic outcomes in the slack regime. The occasionally-binding constraint reconciles the `traditional' and `new' views of dividend taxation, and highlights the importance of measuring the firm's initial borrowing position before enacting tax reforms. Finally, permanently lower dividend taxes dampen financial business cycles, and help to explain macroeconomic asymmetries.

Risks to macroeconomic stability posed by excessive private leverage are significantly amplified by tax distortions. ‘Debt bias’ (tax provisions favoring finance by debt rather than equity) has increased leverage in both the household and corporate sectors, and is now widely recognized as a significant macroeconomic concern. This paper presents new evidence of the extent of debt bias, including estimates for banks and non-bank financial institutions both before and after the global financial crisis. It presents policy options to alleviate debt bias, and assesses their effectiveness. The paper finds that thin capitalization rules restricting interest deductibility have only partially been able to address debt bias, but that an allowance for corporate equity has generally proved effective. The paper concludes that debt bias should feature prominently in countries’ tax reform plans in the coming years.

In 2009, the United Kingdom changed from a worldwide to a territorial tax system, abolishing dividend taxes on foreign repatriation from many low-tax countries. This paper assesses the causal effect of territorial taxation on real investments, using a unique dataset for multinational affiliates in 27 European countries and employing the difference-in-difference approach. It finds that the territorial reform has increased the investment rate of UK multinationals by 15.7 percentage points in low-tax countries. In the absence of any significant investment reduction elsewhere, the findings represent a likely increase in total outbound investment by UK multinationals.

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of taxation on economic performance, adds marginally to the empirical literature, and draws conclusions for tax policy in OECD countries.