Macroeconomic Effects Of Japan S Demographics Can Structural Reforms Reverse Them

Yes, partly. This paper studies the potential role of structural reforms in improving Japan’s outlook using the IMF’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) with newly-added demographic features. Implementation of a not-fully-believed path of structural reforms can significantly offset the adverse effect of Japan’s demographic headwinds — a declining and ageing population — on real GDP (by about 15 percent in the next 40 years), but would not boost inflation or contribute substantially to stabilizing public debt. Alternatively, implementation of a fully-credible structural reform program can contribute significantly to stabilizing public debt because of the resulting increase in inflation towards the Bank of Japan’s target, while achieving the same positive long-run effects on real GDP. If no reforms are implemented, severe demographic headwinds are expected to reduce Japan’s real GDP by over 25 percent in the next 40 years.

This 2019 Article IV Consultation with Japan highlights that the rapid aging and shrinking of Japan’s population has become central to macroeconomic policies and outcomes. The consultation centered on the macroeconomic effects of Japan’s demographics. Mutually reinforcing policies are needed to lift current and expected inflation, stabilize public debt, and raise potential growth. Underlying growth is expected to remain resilient but will be increasingly challenged by slowing external demand and intensifying demographic headwinds. Growth in domestic demand is being eroded by the weaker external environment. Frontloading of private consumption ahead of the October 2019 consumption tax rate increase appears to have been smaller than in 2014.

' Charles Dunst's deeply researched, timely and powerful book offers a blueprint for how democracies should fight back.' - Sir Kim Darroch 'Remarkable. A thoughtful and perceptive book.' - Rt. Hon. Jeremy Hunt, MP The world is currently experiencing the lowest levels of democracy we have seen in over thirty years. Autocracy is on the rise, and while the cost of autocracy seems evident, it nevertheless remains an attractive option to many. While leaders like Viktor Orbán disrupt democratic foundations from within, autocrats like Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin do so from abroad, eroding democratic institutions and values and imperilling democracies that appear increasingly fragile. There are even those who, disillusioned with the current institutions in place, increasingly think authoritarianism can deliver them a better life than democracy has or could. They're wrong. Autocracy is not the solution - better democracy is. But we have to make the case for it. We have to combat institutional rot by learning from one another, and, at times, from our rivals. And we have to get our own houses in order. Only then can we effectively stand up for democratic values around the world and defeat the dictators.

Japan faces the problem of how to finance retirement, health, and long-term care expenditures as the population ages. This paper analyzes the impact of policy options intended to address this problem by employing a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations model, specifically parameterized to match both the macroeconomic and microeconomic level data of Japan. We find that financing the costs of aging through gradual increases in the consumption tax rate delivers a better macroeconomic performance and higher welfare for most individuals than other financing options, including those of raising social security contributions, debt financing, and a uniform increase in health and long-term care copayments.

Japan’s aging and shrinking population could lower the natural rate of interest and, together with low inflation expectations, challenge the Bank of Japan’s efforts to reflate the economy. This paper uses a semi-structural model to estimate the impact of demographics on the natural rate in Japan. We find that demographic change has a significantly negative impact on the natural rate by lowering trend potential growth. We also find that the negative impact has been increasing over time amid stronger demographic headwinds. These findings highlight the importance of boosting potential growth to offset the negative demographic impact and lift the natural rate in Japan.

This issue of Finance & Development discusses link between demographics and economic well-being. In the coming decades, demographics is expected to be more favorable to economic well-being in the less developed regions than in the more developed regions. The age structure of a population reflects mainly its fertility and mortality history. In high-mortality populations, improved survival tends to occur disproportionately among children. The “demographic dividend” refers to the process through which a changing age structure can spur economic growth. It depends, of course, on several complex factors, including the nature and pace of demographic change, the operation of labor and capital markets, macroeconomic management and trade policies, governance, and human capital accumulation. Population aging is the dominant demographic trend of the twenty-first century—a reflection of increasing longevity, declining fertility, and the progression of large cohorts to older ages. Barring a change in current trends, the industrial world’s working-age population will decline over the next generation, and China’s working-age population will decline as well. At the same time, trends toward increased labor force participation of women have played out with, for example, more women than men now working in the United States.

The quantification of how aspects of a job are valued by employees sheds light on the potential for labor market reform in Japan. Using a nationwide sample of 1,046 working-age adults, we conduct a choice experiment that examines individuals’ willingness to trade wages against job characteristics such as the extent of overtime, job security, the possibility of work transfer and relocation. Our results suggest that: i) workers have high WTP (willingness to pay) to avoid extreme overtime and work transfer, ii) women have higher WTP than men, and iii) higher WTP for women are driven in part by feelings of guilt.

Productivity growth in Japan, as in most advanced economies, has moderated. This paper finds supportive evidence for the important role of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in explaining Japan’s modest productivity growth. Results show a substantial dispersion in firm-level productivity growth across sectors and even across firms within the same sector. SMEs, on average, exhibit lower productivity growth than non-SMEs in Japan, with smaller and older SMEs showing particularly low productivity growth. Estimates suggest that boosting productivity growth in all of the worst-performing SMEs could improve overall productivity growth by up to 1.8 percentage points. The SME credit guarantee system, SME financing constraints, demographic factors, and lack of intangible capital investment are discussed as contributors to the slow productivity growth of Japan’s small and old SMEs.