Making British Defence Policy

This book explores the process by which defence policy is made in contemporary Britain and the institutions, actors and conflicting interests which interact in its inception and continuous reformulation. Rather than dealing with the substance of defence policy, this study focuses upon the institutional actors involved in this process. This is a subject which has commanded far more interest from public, Parliament, government and the armed forces since the protracted, bloody and ultimately unsuccessful British military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The work begins with a discussion of two contextual factors shaping policy. The first relates to the impact of Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States over defence and intelligence matters, while the second considers the impact of Britain’s relatively disappointing economic performance upon the funding of British defence since 1945. It then goes on to explore the role and impact of all the key policy actors, from the Prime Minister, Cabinet and core executive, to the Ministry of Defence and its relations with the broader ‘Whitehall village’, and the Foreign Office and Treasury in particular. The work concludes by examining the increasing influence of external policy actors and forces, such as Parliament, the courts, political parties, pressure groups and public opinion. This book will be of much interest to students of British defence policy, security studies, and contemporary military history.

Based on excerpts from original sources, this book provides an introduction to the controversies and dilemmas that have confronted those making and implementing British defence policy since the end of World War II. Ovendale explores the policy dilemmas caused by Britain's parallel commitments to continental Europe and to a global foreign policy, the legacy of her imperial past. He also examines the decision in 1957 to rely on the nuclear deterrent, abolish conscription and move away from a maritime strategy; and the role of the Treasury in dictating the limits of British defence policy.

This study of British defence policy argues that a "one-off" defence review is not enough but a regular process of defece reviews every five years provide a long-term strategic direction which, the author maintains, is lacking at present.

The phenomenon of Europeanization has become a topic that is constantly under debate. This critical volume examines Europeanization through examples of British defence policy, the European Security and Defence Policy, the legal arms trade and the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003. Drawing on examples from Austria and France, as well as unveiling the role of the Prime Minister and his close confidants in driving through this controversial defence policy, Robert Dover provides an original and engaging contemporaneous account of Europeanization. Academics, post-graduate researchers and analysts concerned with British foreign and defence policy and those interested in European defence policy more generally, will all find this study a must read.

Britain's military forces have rarely been busier. It is therefore crucial to understand the developing trends and underlying assumptions of British Defence Policy, in regard to both foreign policy and international security. This volume, which covers both the Blair and Brown eras in defence policy making, places developments post 11 September in a wider context, assessing the impact of key personalities and events on a range of issues, notably the perennial concern of military overstretch. By critically appraising contemporary developments, and examining the driving policy in specific cases, this volume provides a relevant and up-to-date assessment of this vital policy area. As well as being contemporary in its analysis, the work is also comprehensive in scope, embracing both policy objectives - such as the expeditionary strategy and the desire to be a bridge between the US and EU - and the instruments that underpin such policy.