Malaya Dutch East Indies 1941 42

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was quickly followed by a rapid invasion of Malaya, a plan based entirely on the decisive use of its airpower. While the British was inadequately prepared, they likewise relied on the RAF to defend their colony. The campaign was a short match between Japanese airpower at its peak and an outgunned colonial air force, and its results were stunning. The subsequent Dutch East Indies campaign was even more dependent on airpower, with Japan having to seize a string of island airfields to support their leapfrog advance. Facing the Japanese was a mixed bag of Allied air units, including the Dutch East Indies Air Squadron and the US Far East Air Force. The RAF fell back to airfields on Sumatra in the last stages of the Malaya campaign, and was involved in the last stages of the campaign to defend the Dutch colony. For the first time, this study explores these campaigns from an airpower perspective, explaining how and why the Japanese were so devastatingly effective.

Though few realize it, the Netherlands East Indies were the object of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Likewise, their invasions of Guam, Wake Island and the Philippines were mainly diversionary operations to safeguard their main assault on Dutch and British colonies. Since the end of World War I, Japan had coveted the vast East Indies oil reserves, and the colony had feared invasion since Germany overran Holland in May 1940. Isolated politically the weakly defended archipelago was a tempting prize. The East Indies government initially maintained a strict policy of neutrality while desperately working to build up its military strength. As Japanese actions pushed the region toward war, the Dutch reluctantly embraced closer ties with America and Britain. For a brief period, the East Indies were key players in Pacific War strategy. This book details for the first time in English the Dutch prewar strategy, their efforts to counter Japanese espionage and their sizable though largely forgotten military contribution in the early months of the Pacific War.

At the end of 1941, Imperial Japan targeted The East Indies in an attempt to secure access to precious oil resources. The Netherlands East Indies Campaign featured complex Japanese and Allied operations, and included the first use of airborne troops in the war. This highly illustrated study is one of the less well-known campaigns of the Pacific War. Imperial Japan's campaigns of conquest in late 1941/early 1942 were launched in order to achieve self-sufficiency for the Japanese people, chiefly in the precious commodity of oil. The Netherlands (or Dutch) East Indies formed one of Japan's primary targets, on account of its abundant rubber plantations and oilfields. The Japanese despatched an enormous naval task force to support the amphibious landings over the vast terrain of the Netherlands East Indies. The combined-arms offensive was divided into three groups: western, centre and eastern. The isolated airfields and oilfields were, however, picked off one by one by the Japanese, in the rush to secure the major islands before major Allied reinforcements arrived. This superbly illustrated title describes the operational plans and conduct of the fighting by the major parties involved, and assesses the performance of the opposing forces on the battlefield, bringing to life an often-overlooked campaign of the Pacific War.

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was quickly followed by a rapid invasion of Malaya, a plan based entirely on the decisive use of its airpower. While the British was inadequately prepared, they likewise relied on the RAF to defend their colony. The campaign was a short match between Japanese airpower at its peak and an outgunned colonial air force, and its results were stunning. The subsequent Dutch East Indies campaign was even more dependent on airpower, with Japan having to seize a string of island airfields to support their leapfrog advance. Facing the Japanese was a mixed bag of Allied air units, including the Dutch East Indies Air Squadron and the US Far East Air Force. The RAF fell back to airfields on Sumatra in the last stages of the Malaya campaign, and was involved in the last stages of the campaign to defend the Dutch colony. For the first time, this study explores these campaigns from an airpower perspective, explaining how and why the Japanese were so devastatingly effective.

At the end of 1941, Imperial Japan targeted The East Indies in an attempt to secure access to precious oil resources. The Netherlands East Indies Campaign featured complex Japanese and Allied operations, and included the first use of airborne troops in the war. This highly illustrated study is one of the less well-known campaigns of the Pacific War. Imperial Japan's campaigns of conquest in late 1941/early 1942 were launched in order to achieve self-sufficiency for the Japanese people, chiefly in the precious commodity of oil. The Netherlands (or Dutch) East Indies formed one of Japan's primary targets, on account of its abundant rubber plantations and oilfields. The Japanese despatched an enormous naval task force to support the amphibious landings over the vast terrain of the Netherlands East Indies. The combined-arms offensive was divided into three groups: western, centre and eastern. The isolated airfields and oilfields were, however, picked off one by one by the Japanese, in the rush to secure the major islands before major Allied reinforcements arrived. This superbly illustrated title describes the operational plans and conduct of the fighting by the major parties involved, and assesses the performance of the opposing forces on the battlefield, bringing to life an often-overlooked campaign of the Pacific War.

Though few realize it, the Netherlands East Indies were the object of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Likewise, their invasions of Guam, Wake Island and the Philippines were mainly diversionary operations to safeguard their main assault on Dutch and British colonies. Since the end of World War I, Japan had coveted the vast East Indies oil reserves, and the colony had feared invasion since Germany overran Holland in May 1940. Isolated politically the weakly defended archipelago was a tempting prize. The East Indies government initially maintained a strict policy of neutrality while desperately working to build up its military strength. As Japanese actions pushed the region toward war, the Dutch reluctantly embraced closer ties with America and Britain. For a brief period, the East Indies were key players in Pacific War strategy. This book details for the first time in English the Dutch prewar strategy, their efforts to counter Japanese espionage and their sizable though largely forgotten military contribution in the early months of the Pacific War.