Managing Command And Control In The Persian Gulf War

During Desert Shield, the Air Force built a very complicated organizational architecture to control large numbers of air sorties. During the air campaign itself, officers at each level of the Central Command Air Forces believed they were managing the chaos of war. Yet, when the activities of the many significant participants are pieced together, it appears that neither the planners nor Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the campaign was going. There was little appreciation of the implications of complex organizational architectures for military command and control. Against a smarter and more aggressive foe, the system may well have failed.

Military alliances provide constraints and opportunities for states seeking to advance their interests around the globe. War, from the Western perspective, is not a solitary endeavor. Partnerships of all types serve as a foundation for the projection of power and the employment of force. These relationships among states provide the foundation upon which hegemony is built. Waging War argues that these institutions of interstate violence—not just the technology, capability, and level of professionalism and training of armed forces—serve as ready mechanisms to employ force. However, these institutions are not always well designed, and do not always augment fighting effectiveness as they could. They sometimes serve as drags on state capacity. At the same time, the net benefit of having this web of partnerships, agreements, and alliances is remarkable. It makes rapid response to crisis possible, and facilitates countering threats wherever they emerge. This book lays out which institutional arrangements lubricate states' abilities to advance their agendas and prevail in wartime, and which components of institutional arrangements undermine effectiveness and cohesion, and increase costs to states. Patricia Weitsman outlines what she calls a realist institutionalist agenda: one that understands institutions as conduits of capability. She demonstrates and tests the argument in five empirical chapters, examining the cases of the first Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Each case has distinct lessons as well as important generalizations for contemporary multilateral warfighting.

Times of the Technoculture explores the social and cultural impact of new technologies, tracing the origins of the information society from the coming of the machine with the industrial revolution to the development of mass production techniques in the early twentieth century. The authors look at how the military has controlled the development of the information society, and consider the centrality of education in government attempts to create a knowledge society. Engaging in contemporary debates surrounding the internet, Robins and Webster question whether it can really offer us a new world of virtual communities, and suggest more radical alternatives to the corporate agenda of contemporary technologies.

In the wake of World War II, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and President Harry S. Truman established the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, to determine exactly how effectively strategic air power had been applied in the European theater and in the Pacific. The final study, consisting of over 330 separate reports and annexes, was staggering in its size and emphatic in its conclusions. As such it has for decades been used as an objective primary source and a guiding text, a veritable Bible for historians of air power. In this aggressively revisionist volume, Gian Gentile examines afresh this influential document to reveal how it reflected to its very foundation the American conceptual approach to strategic bombing. In the process, he exposes the survey as largely tautological and thereby throwing into question many of the central tenets of American air power philosophy and strategy. With a detailed chapter on the Gulf War and the resulting Gulf War Air Power Survey, and a concluding chapter on the lessons of the Kosovo air war, How Effective is Strategic Bombing? is the most comprehensive and important book on air power strategy in decades.

Includes responses to 26 questions asked by the Congress, including: military objectives, military strategy, deployment of troops, use of special operations forces, employment and performance of U.S. military equipment, logistics support, acquisitions policy, personnel management, role of women, effectiveness of reserves, intelligence and counterintelligence, environmental terrorism, rules of engagement, C3 operations, rules of engagement, media policies and procedures, use of deception, preparedness, number of military and civilian casualties, acquisition of foreign military technology from Iraq, and more. Glossary and map.

In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the second of August 1990, a small group of air power advocates in the Pentagon proposed a strategic air campaign - "Operation Desert Storm" designed to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait by a sustained effort against the major sources of Iraqi national power. John Andreas Olsen provides a coherent and comprehensive examination of the origins, evolution and implementation of this campaign. His findings derive from official military and political documentation, interviews with United States Air Force officers who were closely involved with the planning of the campaign and Iraqis with detailed knowledge and experience of the inner workings of the Iraqi regime.

Material taken from the conference panel and discussion titled: What should we have done differently?

Pursuant to Title V of Public Law 102-25, the Department of Defense has prepared this Interim Report on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict. This report reflects many of the preliminary impressions formed by the Department since the cessation of hostilities. However, much of the technical information needed for sound analysis is still being collected. The final report of the Commander-in-Chief of Central Command has not yet been completed. Nonetheless, it is possible to describe some of the key events that occurred in this conflict and to identify preliminary some lessons to be learned. The Department of Defense will continue to study the lessons of the war and will submit a final Report in accordance with Title V in January 1992.