Managing The Defence Estate

This report looks at the management by the Defence Estates Agency, of the land and property owned by the Ministry of Defence. The estate is worth some £15.3 billion, and costs £1.3 billion to run, with the MoD as one of the largest landowners in the UK with land covering some 240,000 hectares. The Estate itself consists of such facilities as barracks, depots, aircraft hangers and naval bases, as well as training grounds and ranges. Also the MoD has direct managerial responsibility for 200 sites of special scientific interest, along with responsibility for over 1600 listed buildings and monuments. The NAO recognizes the operational challenges of managing such a large utility, but commends the MoD for developing a strategy that saw contractual arrangements deliver higher quality and estate rationalization, along with improved customer satisfaction. There had been a deterioration in the estate due to shortfalls in spending, and the use of traditional methods in the procuring and managing of estate services. The selling off of surplus land has earned the MoD £1.2 billion, and five new regional contracts have been signed to improve the estate. Insufficient funding due to conflicting defence priorities may hamper long-term efficiencies, and that there is more to be done to consolidate recent cultural changes in the organization of contracts for running the estate, especially the move towards large centrally-managed contracts.

The Ministry of Defence, one of the largest landowners in the UK, has strengthened its estate planning and achieved significant receipts from disposal of property but the changes are not yet sufficient to drive value for money for the taxpayer rigorously. While the defence estate primarily exists to support defence capabilities, the Department has not matched its focus on operational needs with enough attention to efficient use of its estate assets and to reducing costs. This report acknowledges that, between 1998 and 2008, the MOD identified and took opportunities to rationalise that part of its UK estate not needed for training, generating £3.4 billion from the sale of surplus property. Nevertheless, over the same period the Department reduced the number of civilian and military personnel three times faster than it reduced its built estate. This raises a clear question about whether there are opportunities to reduce the estate further and secure cost savings and further disposal receipts. The NAO also concludes that the Department's process for categorising sites is rightly driven by operational requirements but it does not give sufficient weight to other factors such as how heavily a site is used, running costs, or potential income from sale. The MOD also lacks sufficient data centrally to conduct the necessary analysis to help it reduce costs in a structured way. This report identified five categories of information needed to identify the scope for further estate rationalisation: operational importance; utilisation; condition; potential value; and running costs.

"The object of the audit was to examine the effectiveness of the management of maintenance of the Defence estate, taking particular account of planning and delivery aspects." -- p. 13.

The Ministry of Defence has a worldwide estate valued at some £18 billion and is the second largest landowner in the UK. The total annual operating cost of the estate was estimated at £3.3 million in 2005-06. This report, following on from an earlier report in 2005 (ISBN 9780102932768), looks at the changes introduced to reverse the deterioration in the quality of the estate and also the programme of estate rationalisation. It is in two parts, the first is entitled 'delivering an estate of the right quality' and the second 'managing, measuring and planning'. The conclusion is that new arrangements have improved the delivery of estate services, however it is still too early to say that this will result in a better quality estate. For this to happen there needs to be continued commitment, supplier innovation and client leadership, with sufficient stability of funding.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has an extensive and complex estate of some 24,000 hectares, and after the Forestry Commission, is the second largest landowner in the UK. The estate is valued at over £18 billion and costs some £3.3 billion to operate. The estate is seen as essential to the delivery of military capability and the welfare and morale of Service personnel. This report, from the Committee of Public Accounts, has taken evidence from the MoD on the standard of living accommodation, the Department's ability to prioritise estate projects effectively, and its response to staff shortages. It follows on from an NAO report (HCP 154, session 2006-7), Managing the Defence Estate: Quality and Sustainability (ISBN 9780102944679). It sets out 9 recommendations, including: more than half of single living accommodation and over 40% of family accommodation does not meet the Department's definition of high-quality accommodation and is therefore substandard; that poor accommodation has a negative impact on retention rates; there is no information on when poor accommodation is to be upgraded, with some military personnel and their families having to continue to live in substandard housing for the next 20 years; there are gaps in the Department's understanding of estate costs; the Department employs only 56% of safety works staff and 57% of quantity surveyors that it needs; that implementing energy saving measures at its' defence sites would bring environmental benefits and savings of more than £2 million annually.

The Ministry of Defence (the Department) is responsible for over £42 billion of annual expenditure. It has failed to exercise the robust financial management necessary to control its resources effectively in the long term, and there is a shortfall in planned expenditure against likely funding of up to £36 billion over the next ten years. The Department's consistent pattern of planned overspend demonstrates serious organisational failings and a dangerous culture of optimism. There are systemic failings: a tendency towards financial over-commitment, weaknesses in the financial planning processes and a division in responsibilities and accountability for financial stewardship. The Accounting Officer has not discharged his responsibility to ensure that expenditure represents value for money, and there is no explicit financial strategy linking funding to priorities. When financial savings have to be found there is then no clear basis for determining where cuts should be made. The appointment of a professionally qualified Finance Director is welcomed. The defence estate is valued at over £20 billion, and costs an estimated £2.9 billion per year to run. The built estate in the UK has been reduced by 4.3% between 1998 and 2008, achieving £3.4 billion in sale receipts. But more of the estate should have been released. The Department does not assess its estate against clear objective criteria. The Department does not collect centrally the information and data that would allow it to manage its estate in an effective way. It appears to lack urgency in its plans to improve its information base.