Manifestations Of Reason

"Can there be a more flagrant challenge to the recent - and classic - relativisms, scepticisms and 'deconstructivisms' toward reason, rationality, logos than the Vision of the Manifestation of Life?" As Tymieniecka writes in the introduction to this second book on the constructive appreciation of reason (first book: Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXXIX), the works of the logos manifest themselves indubitably in the edifice of life. Among perspectives in the compass of reason of this collection: individualisation of life, human existence, reason and doxa (studies by Tymieniecka, Kelkel, Schrag, Buscaroli, Kelly, Laycock, and others) the emphasis falls upon 'inner rationalities' of the spirit, creativity, culture (Bosio, D'Ippolito, Delle Site, Barral, Wittkowski, Regina, Haney, Ales Bello, Sivak, Elosequi), culminating in the issues of historiography and history by Mario Sancipriano, to whom the book is dedicated. This collection stems from the work of The World Phenomenology Institute, mainly its two congresses held in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, and Verona, Italy.

This book analyses the systematic differences between Kant's system and that of Hegel. The relation between the two systems can be described as one of a dialectical character. Hegel continues to explicate some of the basic concepts of Kant's system and mainly the concept of reason, but he does this by way of 'Aufhebung'. The concepts are present but, because of the trend from duality to integration, they undergo basic changes in their meaning and direction. The relation between reason and ethics is, from this angle, the axis of this book.

Reason and rationality represent crucial elements of the self-image of human beings and have unquestionably been among the most debated issues in Western philosophy, dating from ancient Greece, through the Middle Ages, and to the present day. Many words and thoughts have already been spent trying to define the nature and standards of reason and rationality, what they could or ought to be, and under what conditions something can be said to be rational. This volume focuses instead on the relationships of reason and rationality to some relevant specific topics, i.e., science, knowledge, gender, politics, ethics, religion, aesthetics, language, logic, and metaphysics, trying to uncover and clarify both the connections and differences in their various characterisations and uses.

This book provides an analysis of the complex philosophy of Liang Shuming. This twentieth-century thinker opened up a number of paths that were to become central components of modern Chinese philosophy. For the first time, experts are brought together to analyze the complexity of his philosophy, which continues to exert a considerable influence today. This edited volume covers Liang’s multifaceted thought as informed by his many identities as a Buddhist, a Confucian, a Bergsonian, a rural reformer, and a philosopher. The volume will appeal to students, scholars, and general-interest readers.

In this book, Professor Jeanine Grenberg defends the idea that Kant's virtue theory is best understood as a system of eudaemonism, indeed, as a distinctive form of eudaemonism that makes it preferable to other forms of it: a system of what she calls Deontological Eudaemonism. In Deontological Eudaemonism, one achieves happiness both rationally conceived (as non-felt pleasure in the virtually unimpeded harmonious activity of one's will and choice) and empirically conceived (as pleasurable fulfilment of one's desires) only via authentic commitment to and fulfilment of what is demanded of all rational beings: making persons as such one's end in all things. To tell this story of Deontological Eudaemonism, Grenberg first defends the notion that Kant's deontological approach to ethics is simultaneously (and indeed, foundationally, and most basically) teleological. She then shows that the realization of an aptitude for the virtuous fulfilment of one's obligatory ends provides the solid basis for simultaneous realization of happiness, both rationally and empirically conceived. Along the way, she argues both that Kant's notion of happiness rationally conceived is essentially identical to Aristotle's conception of happiness as unimpeded activity, and that his notion of happiness empirically conceived is best realized via an unwavering commitment to the fulfilment of one's obligatory ends.