Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam

This is an analysis of revolutions based on the Maoist Mode. These insurgencies failed, having been successfully contained by their governments. How did the world's strongest power - America - fail where Third World governments have succeeded?

The 1st vol. of the author's trilogy ; the 2d of which is No exit from Vietnam ; the 3d, Revolutionary war in world strategy, 1945-1969.

Erfaringer i bekæmpelse af oprør og guerillabevægelser i Malaysia og Vietnam.

The book deals with the dynamics and growth of a violent 21st century communist rebellion initiated in Nepal by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – CPN(M). It contextualizes and explains why and how a violent Maoist insurgency grew in Nepal after the end of the Cold War, in contrast to the decline of other radical communist movements in most parts of the world. Scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds employ a wide variety of approaches and methods to unravel different aspects of the rebellion. Individual chapters analyze the different causes of the insurgency, factors that contributed to its growth, the organization, agency, ideology and strategies employed by the rebels and the state, and the consequences of the insurgency. New issues are analysed in conjunction with the insurgency, such as the role of the Maoist student organization, Maoist's cultural troupes, the organization and strategies of the People's Army and the Royal Nepal Army, indoctrination and recruitment of rebels, and international factors. Based on original field work and a thorough analysis of empirical data, this book fills an existing gap in academic analyses of the insurgency in Nepal.

Tackling one of the most prevalent myths about insurgencies, this book examines and rebuts the popular belief that Mao Zedong created a fundamentally new form of warfare that transformed the nature of modern insurgency. The labeling of an insurgent enemy as using “Maoist Warfare” has been a common phenomenon since Mao’s victory over the Guomindang in 1949, from Malaya and Vietnam during the Cold War to Afghanistan and Syria today. Yet, this practice is heavily flawed. This book argues that Mao did not invent a new breed of insurgency, failed to produce a coherent vision of how insurgencies should be fought, and was not influential in his impact upon subsequent insurgencies. Consequently, Mao’s writings cannot be used to generate meaningful insights for understanding those insurgencies that came after him. This means that scholars and policymakers should stop using Mao as a tool for understanding insurgencies and as a straw man against whom to target counterinsurgency strategies.

Shows how colonial indirect rule and land tenure institutions create state weakness, ethnic inequality and insurgency in India, and around the world.

This book explores how unconventional warfare tactics have opposed governments, from eighteenth-century guerrilla warfare to contemporary urban terrorism. The tactics of guerrilla leaders such as Lawrence, Mao, Guevara and Marighela are examined and the works of counter-insurgency theorists such as Galleni, Callwell, Thompson and Kitson are analysed.