Market Dominance And Antitrust Policy

Market dominance - encompassing single firm dominance, overt and tacit collusion, mergers and vertical restraints - raises many complex analytical and policy issues, all of which continue to be the subject of theoretical research and policy reform. This second edition of a popular and comprehensive text extends the arguments and combines an analysis of the issues with a discussion of actual policy and case studies. This new edition addresses the recent fundamental changes in antitrust law, especially in the UK and the EU, and reviews some high profile and controversial cases such as the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger and the Microsoft monopoly. The author moves on to deal with several unresolved questions including the conflicts between trade and antitrust policy, the foreign take-over of domestic assets and extra-territorial claims made by certain countries.

Antitrust and competition law is a fast moving area of law and the subject of extensive academic research. The aim of this volume is to select articles as tools for understanding how antitrust and competition law is applied to unilateral conduct which is harmful to the consumer and to the competitiveness of the market. The articles examine the meaning of dominance and monopolisation and show that although legal and economic rules have been developed to establish whether undertakings hold such strong market positions, it is often difficult to determine with certainty that the undertaking being investigated meets the threshold. The various debates on pricing and non-pricing conduct are also represented as are the conflicts that have arisen regarding the exercise of intellectual property rights by powerful undertakings, particularly in the context of the new economies. The volume includes scholarly articles published on both sides of the Atlantic and enables a greater understanding of the application of antitrust and competition law from the point of view of economics and politics.

This book reviews recent progress in the theory of oligopoly and market leadership and provides new results on the theory of Stackelberg competition and Nash competition with strategic investment under endogenous entry. These theories are applied to models of competition in quantities, prices and to patent races. The results are used to propose a new approach to competition policy and issues of the abuse of dominance.

The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.

No detailed description available for "Antitrust Policy".

In this outstanding new book Professor Keith Hylton and his collaborators examine what antitrust law has become over the past ten years, a time in which economic analysis has become its undisputed core. What has become of the old antitrust doctrine, what are the new issues for the immediate future? This book brings together the leading experts to examine this silent revolution at the core of US domestic policy. Mark Grady, UCLA School of Law, US Hylton s Antitrust Law and Economics brings together many of the best authors writing in antitrust today. Their essays range widely, covering proof of agreement under the Sherman Act, group boycotts, monopolization and essential facilities, tying and other vertical restraints, and merger policy. The writing is clear, accessible but still technically sophisticated and comprehensive. This book represents the best in contemporary antitrust scholarship, by authors who understand and are able to communicate the centrality of economic analysis to antitrust. No antitrust lawyer, serious antitrust student, or antitrust economist should be without this book. Herbert Hovenkamp, University of Iowa College of Law, US This comprehensive book provides an extensive overview of the major topics of antitrust law from an economic perspective. Its in-depth treatment and analysis of both the law and economics of antitrust is presented via a collection of interconnected original essays. The contributing authors are among the most influential scholars in antitrust, with a rich diversity of backgrounds. Their entries cover, amongst other issues, predatory pricing, essential facilities, tying, vertical restraints, enforcement, mergers, market power, monopolization standards, and facilitating practices. This well-organized and substantial work will be invaluable to professors of American antitrust law and European competition law, as well as students specializing in competition law. It will also be an important reference for professors and graduate students of economics and business.

Although it is commonly assumed that consumers benefit from the application of competition law, this is not necessarily always the case. Economic efficiency is paramount; thus, competition law in Europe and antitrust law in the United States are designed primarily to protect business competitors (and in Europe to promote market integration), and it is only incidentally that such law may also serve to protect consumers. That is the essential starting point of this penetrating critique. The author explores the extent to which US antitrust law and EC competition law adequately safeguard consumer interests. Specifically, he shows how the two jurisdictions have gone about evaluating collusive practices, abusive conduct by dominant firms and merger activity, and how the policies thus formed have impacted upon the promotion of consumer interests. He argues that unless consumer interests are directly and specifically addressed in the assessment process, maximization of consumer welfare is not sufficiently achieved. Using rigorous analysis he develops legal arguments that can accomplish such goals as the following: replace the economic theory of 'consumer welfare' with a principle of consumer well-being; build consumer benefits into specific areas of competition policy; assess competition cases so that income distribution effects are more beneficial to consumers; and control mergers in such a way that efficiencies are passed directly to consumers. The author argues that, in the last analysis, the promotion of consumer well-being should be the sole or at least the primary goal of any antitrust regime. Lawyers and scholars interested in the application and development and reform of competition law and policy will welcome this book. They will find not only a fresh approach to interpretation and practice in their field - comparing and contrasting two major systems of competition law - but also an extremely lucid analysis of the various economic arguments used to highlight the consumer welfare enhancing or welfare reducing effects of business practices.

How does it come about that a certain firm dominates a market? Can an understanding of this process lead to a more effective enforcement of competition law? That is the question approached in this compelling book. The author reviews the European Union’s (EU’s) Article 102 case law, comparing it with United States (US) provisions, demonstrating that new ways of looking at market power are needed – today’s tech giants differ from older monopolies. He clarifies the role of dominant firms in the competitive process, proposing that conduct should be scrutinized differently depending on the source of market power, rather than using the same approach for all dominant undertakings. Supporting his contention that the legal consequences that derive from holding a dominant position cannot be disassociated from the sources of that market power—that a dynamic understanding of dominance requires looking both forwards and backwards in time—the author examines such sources of dominance as the following: ‒ statutory dominance derived from explicit protectionist measures or subtler geoeconomic strategies; ‒ legacy firms such as the telecommunications or transport industries; ‒ natural monopolies, e.g., the exploitation of a mine; ‒ investment efforts undertaken in a competitive environment; ‒ intangible resources such as timing, reputation, experience, innovation capabilities, or managerial processes; ‒ lucky monopolies; and ‒ anticompetitive behavior on the road to dominance. Drawing insights from EU and US case law, industrial organization scholarship, and strategic management literature, the book resolves questions related to the role that the origins of market power have played and should play in the enforcement of EU competition rules against dominant firms. It concludes with a list of policy recommendations bringing the application of Article 102 TFEU against dominant firms more in line with the objective of protecting the competitive process. With its focus on how EU competition law enforcement should be fine-tuned to adequately incorporate the origins of firm dominance into the analysis of single-firm behavior, the book makes a major contribution to the analysis of anticompetitive effects. Practitioners, competition authorities, and academics in competition law will greatly appreciate the book’s combination of legal analysis and recommendations for policy reform.