Measures Of Central Bank Autonomy

This paper presents a survey of the literature on the measurement of central bank autonomy. We distinguish inputs that constitute the building blocks in the literature, and the literature that builds on them. Issues including sensitivity analysis, robustness, and endogeneity are discussed. The review shows that empirical evidence regarding the beneficial effects of central bank autonomy is substantial, although some technical issues still remain for further research. In particular, central bank autonomy raises the issue of subjecting the monetary authorities to democratic control; this calls for additional research on the linkages between central bank autonomy and accountability and transparency. Additional empirical analysis on the relationship between the financial strength of the central bank and its de facto autonomy, and between its autonomy and financial stability, would also be desirable.

This paper presents an update of the Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini (GMT) index of central bank (CB) autonomy, based on CB legislation as of end-2003. The index is applied to a set of OECD and developing countries, and emerging market economies. For a smaller set of countries, the paper presents a reconstruction of the GMT index based on Cukierman (1992) and assesses changes in CB autonomy between 1992 and 2003. The results point to a significant increase in CB autonomy, in particular for developing countries. In most cases, this improvement has involved a three-stage process: an initial stage in which the political foundations for CB autonomy are laid; a second stage in which operational autonomy develops; and a final stage in which CBs gain further political autonomy in terms of policy formulation and the appointment of senior management.

Tucker presents guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good.

This book explores three key areas of central banking and governance - autonomy, accountability and transparency. It looks at links between the areas, as well as assessing the impact of central bank autonomy on macroeconomic performance. The issues are approached from theoretical and empirical perspectives.

This paper constructs a new index for measuring de jure central bank independence, the first entirely new index in three decades. The index draws on a comprehensive dataset from the IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database (CBLD) and Monetary Operations and Instruments Database (MOID) and weightings derived from a survey of 87 respondents, mostly consisting of central bank governors and general counsels. It improves upon existing indices including the Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (CWN) index, which has been the de facto standard for measuring central bank independence since 1992, as well as recent extensions by Garriga (2016) and Romelli (2022). For example, it includes areas absent from the CWN index, such as board composition, financial independence, and budgetary independence. It treats dimensions such as the status of the chief executive as composite metrics to prevent overstating the independence of statutory schemes. It distills ten key metrics, simplifying current frameworks that now include upwards of forty distinct variables. And it replaces the subjective weighting systems relied on in the existing literature with an empirically grounded alternative. This paper presents the key features of the new index; a companion, forthcoming paper will provide detailed findings by country/region, income level, and exchange rate regime.

This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.